Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A0668140

7/6/2026, 3:08:43 PM

remotion-render security assessment v4

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
remotion-render
Version
v4
Maintainer
inference-sh-7
Source
github.com/inference-sh-7/skills/tree/main/skills/remotion-render/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most Ruby shell backtick findings are Markdown false positives, not executable Ruby code. The install command pipes a remote script into sh, which is a confirmed critical supply-chain risk. The skill also sends user TSX code and props to an external rendering service, so stronger install and privacy guidance is needed.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 7 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 30 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
High
SKILL.md:17
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The URL is used in an installer command that downloads remote content before shell execution. A changed or compromised endpoint could control local code execution.
Low
SKILL.md:9
Hardcoded URL
Render videos from React/Remotion component code via [inference.sh](https://inference.sh) CLI.
The skill explicitly depends on the external inference.sh service. That creates a network trust boundary for render code and related inputs.
Low
SKILL.md:29
Hardcoded URL
> **Install note:** The [install script](https://cli.inference.sh) only detects your OS/architecture
The line directs users to remote installer and checksum endpoints. This is a real supply-chain trust boundary, although it is documentation rather than direct execution.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
SKILL.md:17
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The command pipes a remote installer directly into sh. This is a critical supply-chain risk because remote content executes before independent verification.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:20-26SKILL.md:35-37SKILL.md:131-167
Remote Rendering of User-Supplied Code
The skill asks users to send React/Remotion TSX code and props to inference.sh for rendering. This creates a third-party execution and data disclosure boundary without clear safety guidance.
The examples and schema show TSX code and props being sent to the inference.sh app. The context is legitimate rendering, but it still exposes user content to a remote service.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly to a shell.
    Replace the curl pipe with a download, checksum verification, and explicit execution steps. Prefer signed packages or pinned release artifacts.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Installer trust depends on mutable remote endpoints.
    Pin CLI versions, publish checksums beside each release, and document how users can verify the binary before login.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Render code and props are submitted to an external service.
    Add a clear disclosure that TSX, props, and referenced assets leave the local environment. Warn users not to include secrets.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
a06681402992ceae98ba04d54cfd4ab004862696
Content hash
d122c9951fd4085ea149ff945c9dcfe551541ffb004f6b1bc022e43fbafd7b65
Tree hash
3bfe2f5300a32cada9e984ee3e2ca2d48cadb95a386e3286da491d6268e3c85a
Skill path
skills/inference-sh-7/remotion-render
Audit payload hash
6d94c781082c4b1240cb88a2841e05cb

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable