Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A25199BC

7/5/2026, 5:37:12 PM

remotion-render security assessment v4

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
remotion-render
Version
v4
Maintainer
inference-sh-6
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static backtick findings are Markdown formatting or documentation examples, but the installer command at SKILL.md:17 is a confirmed critical pipe-to-shell risk. Several infsh and npx examples are real external command guidance, and the skill intentionally sends TSX code and props to inference.sh. No prompt injection attempt was found in the reviewed file.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed

10 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 7 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 30 evidence locations

Capability review items (8)
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This fenced bash block instructs users to run a curl-to-shell installer and then use the infsh CLI. The command guidance is real execution guidance, not only Markdown formatting.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This bash example invokes infsh app run and sends component code to inference.sh. It is intended behavior, but it is real external command execution with third-party transfer.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This bash example runs the infsh CLI with embedded TSX input. Legitimate use is clear, but the command still executes a third-party rendering workflow.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block starts an infsh app run command that submits rendering code to the hosted service. The use is documented, but external execution and upload are real.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This example runs infsh app run with user props and component code. That is expected for the skill, but it creates a third-party data submission path.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This bash example submits a multi-scene Remotion component through infsh. The command is legitimate, but it still executes an external CLI workflow.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The related-skills block contains npx skills add commands that install additional skills. That is a real supply-chain action outside the declared infsh-only tool scope.
Low
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The URL is used to fetch an installer from cli.inference.sh in a shell command. It is not exfiltration by itself, but it introduces a real network trust dependency.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The command curls a remote installer and pipes it directly to sh. This executes unaudited network content immediately and is a classic supply-chain risk.
RISK-002 Medium
Third-Party Code and Prop Upload
The skill sends React/Remotion component code and optional props to the inference.sh rendering service. Users could expose private source, media URLs, or sensitive data if they include it in render inputs.
SKILL.md shows infsh and Python SDK examples submitting code and props to inference.sh. This is the core feature, so it is a privacy boundary rather than covert exfiltration.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Pipe-to-shell installer command
    Remove curl-to-sh installation. Provide a pinned release download, checksum verification steps, and a separate infsh login command.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Third-party code and prop submission
    Warn users before sending TSX, props, media URLs, or credentials to inference.sh. Document data retention and privacy expectations.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Related skill installation commands
    Replace npx skills add examples with links, or require explicit user confirmation before installing additional skills.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
a25199bc7d6b82598536822d1738eb5d5f54025b
Content hash
d122c9951fd4085ea149ff945c9dcfe551541ffb004f6b1bc022e43fbafd7b65
Tree hash
3bfe2f5300a32cada9e984ee3e2ca2d48cadb95a386e3286da491d6268e3c85a
Skill path
skills/inference-sh-6/remotion-render
Audit payload hash
f287a05e10d06c7f499321921fbb9a59

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable