Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-31A0C9F9

6/30/2026, 4:22:04 AM

configuring-tmux security assessment v2

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
configuring-tmux
Version
v2
Maintainer
ibrahimhka
Source
github.com/ibrahimhka/claude-skill-configuring-tmux/tree/master/
Coverage
2 Files scanned · 227 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Confirmed finding summary

No confirmed security findings

The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis found many command, network, and filesystem patterns, but review shows they are mostly tmux setup examples and framework installation guidance. The confirmed risk is medium because following the skill can clone third-party repositories, change files under the user's home directory, create a forced tmux symlink, and configure tmux status command substitutions. No malicious intent or prompt injection attempt was found.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

2 Files scanned · 227 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 9 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 9 evidence locations

Capability review items (5)
Medium
SKILL.md:13-18SKILL.md:46-61SKILL.md:168-170README.md:18-20
Home Directory tmux Configuration Changes
The skill instructs agents to clone frameworks, copy tmux files, create a forced symlink, install TPM plugins, and source tmux config files. This matches the skill purpose, but it can overwrite or alter a user's existing tmux configuration if applied without review.
The file operations are explicit and semantically tied to tmux setup. The risk is environmental modification, not evidence of malware.
Medium
SKILL.md:14SKILL.md:32SKILL.md:48SKILL.md:137-138README.md:15-20
External Repository and API Access
The skill references GitHub clone commands for tmux frameworks and plugins, plus a Yahoo Finance curl request for a widget. These endpoints are relevant to the stated purpose, but they still introduce third-party network trust and availability risks.
The network commands are directly visible and serve documented tmux installation and widget examples. No credential exfiltration or suspicious destination was found.
Medium
SKILL.md:75-78SKILL.md:146-147README.md:35-38
tmux Status Command Substitution
The skill teaches tmux status entries that execute shell scripts through command substitution. This is a normal tmux feature, but any script path placed there will run repeatedly inside the user's tmux session.
The command-substitution behavior is explicit in tmux configuration examples. It is legitimate but can become unsafe if users insert untrusted scripts.
Low
SKILL.md:13README.md:14
Markdown Backtick Detections Are Not Ruby Execution
The static analyzer reported many Ruby backtick execution patterns, but the reviewed locations are Markdown code fences or inline command examples. The examples still include shell commands, but the Ruby-specific detection is a false positive.
The files are Markdown documentation, not Ruby source. The backticks delimit examples rather than executing code.
Low
SKILL.md:90SKILL.md:159-161
Troubleshooting Commands Are Benign
The reported reconnaissance-like patterns are tmux troubleshooting references, such as checking tmux options and known status bar mistakes. They do not enumerate host secrets or collect system identity data.
The commands inspect tmux configuration state for troubleshooting. I found no semantic evidence of host reconnaissance beyond normal tmux diagnostics.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (1)
Low
SKILL.md:3README.md:3
Weak Cryptography Static Findings Are False Positives
The scanner flagged weak cryptography at descriptive text locations, but no cryptographic algorithm or password hashing implementation appears in the reviewed files. No evidence found for real cryptographic behavior.
The cited lines describe the skill and do not contain crypto APIs, hashes, or encryption instructions. This is a strong false positive.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable