Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-C67D8537

7/6/2026, 3:28:24 PM

higgsfield-soul-id security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
higgsfield-soul-id
Version
v3
Maintainer
higgsfield-ai
Coverage
3 Files scanned · 147 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown backticks, CLI flags, or product reference IDs. The audit confirms the remote installer pipe-to-shell command, the related network dependency, command-construction risks, and sensitive biometric photo handling. No prompt injection attempt was found in the reviewed files.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

3 Files scanned · 147 Lines analyzed

7 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 24 evidence locations

Capability review items (5)
Critical
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The fenced block contains a command that downloads an installer and pipes it to sh. This is shell execution of remote code without pinning or verification.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The command block builds a Higgsfield CLI call from user-provided name and image path values. Without explicit argument escaping, those values could be interpreted by the shell before the CLI receives them.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
This range states that the CLI auto-uploads local paths and then waits on the created job. It is expected for this skill, but it is still external command execution that transfers sensitive local files.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The command examples include prompt and Soul ID placeholders that an agent could interpolate into Bash. They should be passed as escaped arguments to avoid shell interpretation of user text.
Medium
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
The line fetches an installer from a hardcoded GitHub URL at runtime. The URL targets a mutable main-branch script and is paired with shell execution.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
Line 29 pipes a remote install script from GitHub directly into sh. That can execute changed or compromised network content with the user privileges of the agent session.
RISK-002 Medium
Sensitive Biometric Data Handling
The skill asks for 5 to 20 face photos and auto-uploads local paths to train a reusable identity model, but it does not require consent or privacy confirmation.
The cited lines directly describe face-faithful identity training, photo collection, and automatic upload of local paths. No nearby instruction requires consent, ownership verification, or privacy disclosure.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly into a shell.
    Replace the curl-to-sh installer with a pinned release, checksum verification, or package-manager install steps that require explicit user confirmation.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    CLI examples interpolate user-provided names, prompts, paths, and IDs into shell commands.
    Require argument-array execution or clear quoting and escaping rules before passing user values to Bash.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    The workflow uploads face photos to train a reusable identity model without a consent or privacy preflight.
    Add instructions to confirm photo ownership, subject consent, upload destination, and acceptable use before training starts.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable