Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-DE721AC5

7/6/2026, 3:23:11 PM

higgsfield-product-photoshoot security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
higgsfield-product-photoshoot
Version
v3
Maintainer
higgsfield-ai
Source
github.com/higgsfield-ai/skills/tree/main/higgsfield-product-photoshoot/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 216 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown backticks, mode names, placeholder URLs, and sample output. The confirmed risks are the curl pipe to sh installer, external Higgsfield CLI execution, and intentional upload of local image files to a backend service. No prompt injection attempt was found in SKILL.md.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 216 Lines analyzed

8 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 60 evidence locations

Capability review items (6)
High
SKILL.md:34-36
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This fenced bootstrap block contains a curl pipe to sh installer. It is real external command execution because it downloads and runs remote code from the network.
Medium
SKILL.md:140-147
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The generation block instructs the agent to run the Higgsfield CLI with user-derived prompt and image arguments. This is expected behavior, but it still executes an external command that can submit data to a backend.
Medium
SKILL.md:151-157
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The example shows a Higgsfield CLI invocation that sends a prompt and local image path to the service. It is a legitimate example, but it demonstrates real external command execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:159-164
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The example shows a Higgsfield CLI invocation for moodboard output. It is a legitimate workflow example, but it still demonstrates external command execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:166-171
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The example shows a Higgsfield CLI invocation for restyling an image. It is a legitimate workflow example, but it still demonstrates external command execution with a local image path.
Low
SKILL.md:35
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
Line 35 uses a hardcoded GitHub URL to download the Higgsfield installer. The network access is explicit and expected, but it creates a real dependency on remote content.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
SKILL.md:35
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
Line 35 pipes a remote install script directly into sh. This is a critical supply-chain risk because code from the main branch executes without checksum or signature verification.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:140-146SKILL.md:175
External Upload of Local Images
The skill tells the agent to pass --image paths to the Higgsfield CLI and states that local files are auto-uploaded. This can send user-selected local images to an external service, so the skill should require clear user consent before upload.
The command template includes an --image argument, and line 175 explicitly says local file paths are auto-uploaded. The upload appears intentional, but it is a real privacy and data-transfer concern.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly to sh.
    Remove automatic curl pipe to sh guidance. Link to installation instructions, require explicit user approval, and document checksum or signature verification.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    CLI commands use user-derived prompt and image values.
    Require safe argument quoting and reject shell metacharacters in prompt, path, and aspect ratio values before running Bash commands.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Local image paths are auto-uploaded to an external service.
    Tell users that images will be uploaded to Higgsfield and ask for confirmation before submitting local files.
  4. FIX-004
    Low
    Examples rely on remote service output without privacy guidance.
    Add a short note that generated URLs and uploaded assets may be processed or hosted by Higgsfield according to its service terms.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable