Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A10676B9

7/8/2026, 4:36:36 AM

higgsfield-marketplace-cards security assessment v4

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
higgsfield-marketplace-cards
Version
v4
Maintainer
higgsfield-ai
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 89 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are markdown code spans for options, asset names, sample commands, or output placeholders. Confirmed risks are the external Higgsfield CLI execution path, user-derived command arguments, a curl-to-shell installer, and external backend processing of product data.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 89 Lines analyzed

7 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 30 evidence locations

Capability review items (5)
Critical
Ruby/shell backtick execution
1. If `higgsfield` is not on `$PATH`, install it by running the official installer with Bash: `curl
This line provides a curl command piped into sh to install the CLI. Running downloaded installer content directly in a shell is a remote code execution risk.
Critical
Hardcoded URL
1. If `higgsfield` is not on `$PATH`, install it by running the official installer with Bash: `curl
The hardcoded GitHub URL is used as a remote installer source and is piped into a shell. If the remote content or transport chain is compromised, the install step can execute attacker-controlled code.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Create marketplace-ready product visuals with `higgsfield marketplace-cards create`.
The skill tells the agent to use the Higgsfield CLI to create marketplace assets. This is intended behavior, but it still executes an external local command that may contact a remote service.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Build and run one `higgsfield marketplace-cards create` command from the user's request.
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to build and run a Higgsfield CLI command from the user request. User-derived arguments passed through Bash create command execution and injection risk if not escaped.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
For common bundles, use `--scope <main|product-images|aplus|full-set>`, `--prompt "<short product an
The command accepts user-derived prompts, local image paths, upload IDs, and context flags. Without enforced argument-array execution or validation, these values can affect shell behavior or disclose local assets.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
Pipe to shell pattern
1. If `higgsfield` is not on `$PATH`, install it by running the official installer with Bash: `curl
The bootstrap instruction uses curl piped directly to sh. This is a classic unsafe installer pattern because downloaded code runs immediately without inspection or checksum verification.
RISK-002 Medium
External Processing of Product Data
The skill states that the CLI calls a backend enhancer and creates remote image jobs. User product images, listing intent, and brand context may leave the local workspace.
The prose directly describes a backend enhancer and command arguments for images, prompts, and brand context. This is expected functionality, but it is a real privacy and data-transfer consideration.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Unsafe curl-to-shell installer
    Remove automatic pipe-to-shell guidance. Use a package manager, signed release artifact, checksum verification, and explicit user confirmation before installation.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    User-derived CLI command arguments
    Require argument-array execution, strict shell escaping, path validation, and a confirmation step before running commands built from user prompts or image paths.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    External processing of product assets and listing context
    Disclose that product images and brand context may be sent to Higgsfield services. Warn users not to include confidential or regulated data.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable