Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A10676B9

7/8/2026, 4:32:10 AM

higgsfield-generate security assessment v4

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
higgsfield-generate
Version
v4
Maintainer
higgsfield-ai
Source
github.com/higgsfield-ai/skills/tree/main/higgsfield-generate/
Coverage
13 Files scanned · 1,325 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The main confirmed risk is the bootstrap instruction that downloads a remote GitHub installer and pipes it directly to sh. Most other static hits are Markdown examples, placeholder IDs, model names, or Higgsfield CLI documentation and were adjudicated as false positives.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

13 Files scanned · 1,325 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 16 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 121 evidence locations

Capability review items (1)
Critical
SKILL.md:38
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
This hardcoded URL is the remote install script used in the pipe-to-shell bootstrap. The network fetch is dangerous because its contents are executed immediately.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
SKILL.md:38
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
The bootstrap pipes a mutable remote GitHub install script directly into sh. That can execute unaudited code in the user environment without a pinned checksum or explicit approval.
RISK-002 Critical
SKILL.md:34-39
Unattended Remote Installer Execution
The bootstrap says to install the Higgsfield CLI before any other command by fetching a GitHub script and piping it to sh when the binary is missing. This creates supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk for automatic marketplace installation.
The instructions explicitly combine automatic bootstrap behavior with a mutable remote installer and immediate shell execution. The risk is contextual, not only the pipe pattern.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly to sh during bootstrap.
    Remove automatic curl-to-shell installation. Ask users to install the Higgsfield CLI manually from documented releases, with version pinning and checksum verification.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    The bootstrap can trigger installation before explicit user consent.
    Require a clear user confirmation before any network installation or CLI update command runs.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Examples include many shell snippets that static tools flag as executable behavior.
    Mark shell snippets as illustrative examples and prefer safer variable handling in docs, including quoted variables and temporary file cleanup.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable