Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-FCB6DE14

7/6/2026, 3:12:52 PM

higgsfield-generate security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
higgsfield-generate
Version
v3
Maintainer
higgsfield-ai
Source
github.com/higgsfield-ai/skills/tree/main/higgsfield-generate/
Coverage
12 Files scanned · 1,107 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Manual review found most static findings are false positives from Markdown backticks, documented CLI examples, placeholders, and troubleshooting text. The confirmed critical issue is a bootstrap command that pipes a remote GitHub installer directly into sh. Additional semantic risks involve automatic local media uploads and possible credit-spending jobs without default cost confirmation.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

12 Files scanned · 1,107 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 16 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 104 evidence locations

Capability review items (1)
Critical
SKILL.md:39
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
The hardcoded GitHub raw URL is used as executable installer input in a curl-to-shell command. It is unpinned remote code execution, not a harmless documentation link.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Critical
SKILL.md:39
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh
SKILL.md line 39 pipes a remote GitHub installer directly into sh. This is a supply-chain risk because changed or intercepted installer content would execute immediately.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:104SKILL.md:121references/media-inputs.md:7
Implicit Local Media Uploads
The skill tells agents that local media paths are auto-uploaded to Higgsfield before submission. Sensitive images, videos, or audio could be exposed if the user does not explicitly approve the upload.
Multiple instructions state that local paths are accepted and auto-uploaded before submission. This is intended behavior, but it creates a clear privacy risk if consent is implicit.
RISK-003 Medium
SKILL.md:50-51SKILL.md:106
Cost-Incurring Jobs Without Default Cost Check
The skill instructs agents not to pre-estimate cost unless asked and to submit generation jobs with wait behavior. This may spend account credits before the user understands the cost impact.
The instructions explicitly discourage cost estimation by default and then submit jobs through the CLI. This is a business-logic risk rather than malicious code.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly to the shell.
    Replace curl-to-shell with documented manual installation, a pinned release artifact, and checksum verification before execution.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Local media paths are uploaded to Higgsfield services.
    Require explicit user approval before uploading local images, videos, or audio files, and explain the destination service.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Generation jobs can consume account credits.
    Run cost-only checks or ask for confirmation before submitting paid generation, batch, or marketing jobs.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    Shell examples interpolate user-controlled prompts and identifiers.
    Prefer JSON files, from-file inputs, or strict quoting guidance for user-supplied prompts, URLs, and IDs.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable