Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-62D4E0B6

6/30/2026, 2:49:36 AM

higgsfield-generate security assessment v2

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
higgsfield-generate
Version
v2
Maintainer
higgsfield-ai
Coverage
12 Files scanned · 1,107 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Confirmed finding summary

No confirmed security findings

The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis reported many command execution and weak-crypto patterns. Manual review found most hits are false positives from markdown backticks, CLI examples, model names, and troubleshooting text, with no prompt injection or confirmed malicious exfiltration found. The skill still carries high risk because it tells agents to install a remote script with curl piped directly to sh and then run a Bash-based CLI that uploads user media.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

12 Files scanned · 1,107 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 7 evidence locations

Capability review items (4)
High
Remote installer piped directly to shell
The bootstrap step instructs agents to download an install script from GitHub and execute it with sh in one command. This is a real supply-chain risk because the script is not pinned, reviewed, or checksum verified before execution.
The exact pipe-to-shell pattern is present in the bootstrap instructions. It is a known risky installation pattern, although I did not find evidence that the referenced installer is malicious.
Medium
Local media uploads to a third-party service
The skill tells agents that local image, video, and audio paths are auto-uploaded by the Higgsfield CLI. This is expected for media generation, but it creates privacy and data-handling risk for user files.
The documentation explicitly states that local paths are uploaded or used to create avatars and media jobs. This is legitimate product behavior, but users need clear consent before upload.
Medium
Backend URL fetch workflows can disclose external targets
The skill supports product and brand-kit creation by sending user-provided URLs to Higgsfield services for fetching. This is legitimate functionality, but it can disclose target URLs and page content to the service.
The URL fetch flows are clearly documented and tied to expected marketing workflows. I did not find evidence of malicious exfiltration, but the data sharing risk is real.
Low
Temporary JSON files in CLI examples
Several examples create temporary JSON files for avatars and product IDs before passing them to the CLI. These are local helper files, not evidence of malicious filesystem access.
The file writes are limited to mktemp examples and static JSON argument preparation. There is no indication that sensitive files are read or modified.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (1)
Low
Static weak-crypto and reconnaissance hits are false positives
The weak-crypto detections map to model names, dimensions, status strings, or markdown text, not cryptographic code. The reconnaissance detections map to normal CLI schema and status inspection commands.
Manual review found no cryptographic implementation and no host reconnaissance. The cited lines are documentation for model selection and Higgsfield CLI validation.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable