Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-212A010B

7/3/2026, 10:45:01 AM

media-use security assessment v1

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
media-use
Version
v1
Maintainer
heygen-com
Coverage
19 Files scanned · 2,002 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown examples, local manifest/cache file operations, argv-based CLI calls, or regression tests. The confirmed risk is the documented HeyGen installer command that pipes a hardcoded network URL directly into bash and writes under a hidden home-directory install path.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

19 Files scanned · 2,002 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 54 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 1 evidence location

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 109 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
High
Hidden file in home directory
curl -fsSL https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh | bash # installs latest to ~/.local/bin
The installer documentation says the remote script installs into ~/.local/bin. Writing under a hidden home-directory path from an unreviewed remote script is a real install-time risk.
Medium
Hidden file access
curl -fsSL https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh | bash # installs latest to ~/.local/bin
The installer documentation says the remote script installs into ~/.local/bin. Writing under a hidden home-directory path from an unreviewed remote script is a real install-time risk.
Low
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh | bash # installs latest to ~/.local/bin
The hardcoded URL is part of the documented remote installer command. The URL alone is expected, but combined with pipe-to-shell it is a real supply-chain exposure.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Critical
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh | bash # installs latest to ~/.local/bin
SKILL.md instructs users to pipe a remote installer directly into bash. That pattern can execute unreviewed network content with the user privileges of the agent or operator.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly into bash from SKILL.md.
    Replace the pipe-to-shell instruction with a package-manager install, a downloaded binary plus checksum verification, or a command that asks the user to inspect the script before execution.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Installer writes to a hidden home-directory path.
    Document the exact files created under ~/.local/bin and provide a removable, user-confirmed installation path.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Provider workflows require user credentials and network access.
    State that HEYGEN_API_KEY is only for the HeyGen CLI, avoid logging secret values, and keep network access limited to provider asset search and download.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (1)
Critical
Recursive delete on root/home
// execFileSync (no shell) so a hostile filename like `"; rm -rf ~; ".png`
Force-confirmed blocker/critical static finding; AI dismissal overridden.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable