Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-0519034D

7/9/2026, 11:38:05 AM

app-store-screenshots security assessment v5

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
app-store-screenshots
Version
v5
Maintainer
halt-catch-fire
Source
github.com/halt-catch-fire/skills/tree/main/guides/design/app-store-screenshots/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 271 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static command hits are Markdown fences, inline CLI names, or documentation examples rather than dynamic shell execution. Confirmed risks are limited to third-party CLI installation guidance, belt commands that call external generation services, and remote processing of prompts or app imagery.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 271 Lines analyzed

10 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 20 evidence locations

Capability review items (9)
Medium
SKILL.md:7
Ruby/shell backtick execution
> **Install the belt CLI skill:** `npx skills add belt-sh/cli`
The line recommends running npx to install a third-party CLI skill. That can download and execute external package code during setup, so it is a real supply-chain risk.
Medium
SKILL.md:17-26
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The fenced example runs belt login and belt app run against a remote model service. The arguments are static, but execution requires authentication and sends prompt data to an external CLI.
Medium
SKILL.md:137-144
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The example invokes belt app run to submit a prompt to a third-party image generation model. It is intentional functionality, but still external command and network execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:148-154
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The cited code block runs belt app run with a remote image model. The command is hardcoded, but it still sends prompt content to an external service.
Medium
SKILL.md:158-165
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The example invokes belt app run for remote image generation. It is a legitimate workflow, but it can transmit user prompt details to the external provider.
Medium
SKILL.md:169-175
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The example runs belt app run with local image filenames for stitching. If executed, app screenshots may be read or uploaded by the external CLI workflow.
Medium
SKILL.md:206-211
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The example invokes belt app run against a remote video generation model. It is legitimate for the skill, but it is still external command execution with network transfer.
Medium
SKILL.md:262-267
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The related skills block recommends multiple npx skills add commands. Installing third-party skills through npx introduces supply-chain and code provenance risk.
Low
SKILL.md:15
Hardcoded URL
> Requires inference.sh CLI (`belt`). [Install instructions](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/infer
The line links to mutable raw GitHub install instructions for a required external CLI. This is a low-severity supply-chain concern because users may follow unaudited setup content.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:11-15SKILL.md:21-25SKILL.md:171-174SKILL.md:206-210
Third-Party Asset Processing Through belt
The skill directs users to create screenshots and videos through the inference.sh belt CLI. Prompts and referenced app images may be processed by an external service, so private app assets need explicit user approval.
The documentation explicitly depends on inference.sh and shows belt app run commands for remote image, stitching, and video generation. The risk is privacy exposure, not evidence of malicious intent.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    External CLI and skill installation commands
    Move npx installation steps behind explicit user confirmation and pin trusted sources or versions where possible.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Remote processing of app prompts and images
    Add a privacy note telling users not to submit confidential screenshots, unreleased UI, credentials, or customer data without approval.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Mutable external install documentation link
    Prefer stable release documentation or a pinned commit URL for installation instructions.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
0519034dad657fb1f7706e0550e962beeda73fdf
Content hash
3fd7a868ffdf84122a84934d4a190fbc53d0f42ed47d20b5038461d24b7142c8
Tree hash
e82706d8f2f8a8eea01578d3eaf8930a5b1e147104d4f63f4c8c7ce9d68f0e23
Skill path
skills/halt-catch-fire/app-store-screenshots
Audit payload hash
0b3e6ba4cf2f32fa23fc17c858952e70

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable