Skills parallel-swarm-implementation
📦
parallel-swarm-implementation
Content revision r1 High Risk ⚙️ External commands📁 Filesystem access
Coordinate Parallel Swarm Implementation
Complex implementation plans are hard to assign, validate, and integrate across many agents. This skill provides a structured Loop 2 workflow for agent selection, parallel execution, testing, and delivery packaging.
Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)
Stop for confirmation before installing.
Review the plan and obtain explicit user consent before changing files.
Install with my Agent
Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.
Agent request
Review the Skillstore skill "parallel-swarm-implementation" from https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.
Agent-readable resources
Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.
Test it
Using "parallel-swarm-implementation". A Loop 1 package for an authentication feature.
Expected outcome:
A concise assignment plan with backend, testing, documentation, validation, and integration tasks grouped by dependency order.
Using "parallel-swarm-implementation". A partially completed multi-agent implementation with failing tests.
Expected outcome:
An integration status summary that names failing areas, assigns repair ownership, and defines the next validation pass.
Using "parallel-swarm-implementation". A completed implementation ready for CI/CD review.
Expected outcome:
A delivery summary with implementation metrics, theater validation results, test status, and Loop 3 readiness.
Security Audit
High Riskv8 • 7/5/2026 Open versioned report
Most static backtick detections are Markdown formatting false positives, but the skill does include real agent-facing shell execution, hidden artifact access, and filesystem writes. The highest concerns are mutable npx claude-flow@alpha usage and unsanitized artifact content being promoted into downstream agent prompts. No explicit prompt-injection attack text was found in SKILL.md.
2
Files scanned
960
Lines analyzed
52
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Confirmed security concerns (3)
High
Unpinned External CLI Execution
The skill instructs users or agents to run npx claude-flow@alpha commands. The alpha tag is mutable and can execute package code from outside the repository when npx resolves or updates the dependency.
Multiple explicit npx claude-flow@alpha commands appear in operational workflow steps. The security impact depends on the runtime environment, but the mutable external package execution risk is clear.
High
Unsanitized Artifact Content Promoted To Agent Instructions
The workflow reads planning and assignment artifacts, then inserts fields such as task descriptions, research, risk mitigations, and fix instructions directly into delegated agent prompts. A malicious or corrupted artifact could inject instructions into downstream agents.
The cited lines show generated artifact values being read and passed into Task prompts without validation or quoting rules. This is a strong prompt-injection pathway, although exploitation requires control over those artifacts.
Medium
Automatic Downstream Skill Transition
The skill directs an automatic transition to cicd-intelligent-recovery after Loop 2 completes. This can extend execution into another skill and toolchain without an explicit review checkpoint in the documented workflow.
The text explicitly says to automatically transition and provides the downstream skill invocation context. The risk is procedural rather than direct code execution, so confidence is moderate-high.
Capability review items (52)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Medium
Shell command substitution
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
Medium
Shell command substitution
TOTAL_GROUPS=$(jq '.parallelGroups | length' "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
for GROUP_NUM in $(seq 1 $TOTAL_GROUPS); do
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
TASKS=$(jq -r ".parallelGroups[$((GROUP_NUM-1))].tasks[]" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
AGENT=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .assignedAgent" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
SKILL=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .useSkill" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .customInstructions" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
PRIORITY=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .priority" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
- Research: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
- Risk Mitigation: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigation" "$MAT
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
- Check dependencies complete: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
"Task: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .description" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
- Research findings: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
- Risk mitigations to apply: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigat
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
- Wait for dependencies if any: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medium
Shell command substitution
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medium
Shell command substitution
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
`MISSION: Compile Loop 1 planning package into executable agent+skill graph.
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
```javascript
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medium
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
Medium
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
Medium
Node.js fs operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The Node snippet calls fs.writeFileSync to write the Loop 2 delivery package into the workspace. This is a real filesystem write and can overwrite generated artifact state.
Medium
Synchronous file operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The synchronous write is used to create or replace a hidden delivery artifact. It is bounded to the project artifact directory, but it is still a real local file modification.
Medium
Hidden file access
test -f .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json && echo "✅ Loop 1 Complete" || {
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
- Load planning package: .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
The skill references hidden .claude artifact state in an operational context. This is legitimate for the workflow but remains a real filesystem risk factor.
Medium
Hidden file access
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
Create .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json:
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medium
Hidden file access
1. Store matrix: .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medium
Hidden file access
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
**Output**: `.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json` with complete agent+skill graph
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medium
Hidden file access
MATRIX=".claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json"
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
"Wait for all 5 detection agents. Apply Byzantine consensus: require 4/5 agreement on theater detect
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medium
Hidden file access
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
npm test 2>&1 | tee .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
1. Parse test output: .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medium
Hidden file access
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
const matrix = require('.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json');
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
'.claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json',
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medium
Hidden file access
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
Load implementation data from: .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medium
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.json > tmp.json && mv tmp.json .claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.j
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medium
Hidden file access
}' .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Risk Factors
⚙️ External commands (69)
SKILL.md:35 SKILL.md:60-81 SKILL.md:81-85 SKILL.md:85-109 SKILL.md:109-117 SKILL.md:117-131 SKILL.md:131-143 SKILL.md:143-145 SKILL.md:145-151 SKILL.md:246-248 SKILL.md:248-258 SKILL.md:258-270 SKILL.md:270-273 SKILL.md:273-332 SKILL.md:332-336 SKILL.md:336-348 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:437-448 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:490-501 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:557-565 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:633-641 SKILL.md:641-645 SKILL.md:645-678 SKILL.md:678-710 SKILL.md:710-721 SKILL.md:721-728 SKILL.md:728-735 SKILL.md:735-738 SKILL.md:738-745 SKILL.md:745-750 SKILL.md:750-767 SKILL.md:767-775 SKILL.md:775-785 SKILL.md:785-786 SKILL.md:786-787 SKILL.md:787-788 SKILL.md:788-789 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:356 SKILL.md:358 SKILL.md:362 SKILL.md:368 SKILL.md:369 SKILL.md:370 SKILL.md:371 SKILL.md:380 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:388 SKILL.md:396 SKILL.md:402 SKILL.md:403 SKILL.md:409 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:548 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:151-246 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:349 SKILL.md:502
📁 Filesystem access (26)
SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:63 SKILL.md:91 SKILL.md:119 SKILL.md:130 SKILL.md:154 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:191 SKILL.md:242 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:336 SKILL.md:353 SKILL.md:478 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:512 SKILL.md:525 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:587 SKILL.md:621 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:643 SKILL.md:724 SKILL.md:774
Audited by: codex View Audit History →
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APA citation
DNYoussef. (2026). parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8BibTeX citation
@techreport{dnyoussef-dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation-2026,
author = {DNYoussef},
title = {parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {8},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "DNYoussef"
date-released: "2026-07-05"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation:audit:8"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Skillstore Score
Why this score Evidence Confidence: Medium 55
Architecture
85
Maintainability
87
Content
71
Community
74
Spec Compliance
What You Can Build
Plan-Based Feature Buildout
Use a validated planning package to assign implementation, testing, documentation, and validation work across specialist agents.
Reality-Focused Quality Gate
Run theater detection, sandbox validation, and integration checks before marking a complex agent implementation complete.
Loop 3 Delivery Preparation
Create a delivery package that records agent choices, implementation metrics, and handoff data for CI/CD recovery.
Try These Prompts
Start Loop 2 Implementation
Use parallel-swarm-implementation with my Loop 1 planning package. Create the agent and skill assignment matrix, then show the proposed execution groups before running work.
Create Assignment Matrix Only
Analyze the Loop 1 package and build only the agent and skill matrix. Include task owners, dependencies, skill choices, and validation checkpoints.
Run Validation-First Execution
Execute the implementation workflow with strict theater detection, sandbox validation, and iterative test repair. Pause before any destructive file operation.
Customize Large Swarm Rollout
Use the skill to design a parallel execution plan for a large feature. Limit parallel agents to the project capacity, identify critical path tasks, and define Loop 3 handoff criteria.
Best Practices
- Review the generated assignment matrix before allowing agents to edit files.
- Run the workflow in a sandboxed workspace with version control checkpoints.
- Validate all artifact inputs before injecting them into prompts or shell commands.
Avoid
- Do not use the workflow for trivial single-file edits that do not need multi-agent coordination.
- Do not execute generated shell snippets against untrusted artifacts without review.
- Do not treat claimed pass rates or theater scores as proof without inspecting test evidence.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does this skill do?
It defines a Loop 2 implementation workflow that assigns planned work to agents, runs validation, and prepares a delivery package.
Does it create production code by itself?
No. It guides agent coordination and includes example commands, but the actual code changes depend on the selected agents and project context.
What input does it expect?
It expects a Loop 1 planning package and related artifacts under the .claude artifact directory.
Which tools does it assume?
It assumes tools such as jq, npm, node, claude-flow, and an agent runtime that supports Task-style delegation.
What should users review before running it?
Users should review shell commands, artifact paths, generated instructions, and any use of external packages before execution.
Is it suitable for sensitive repositories?
Use caution. The workflow reads and writes hidden artifacts and can pass artifact content into agent prompts and external tooling.
Developer Details
Author
DNYoussefLicense
MIT
Skillstore revision
r1
Version notice
The author did not declare a version.
Ref
c579efd02184f1128d6741d16e6c8d951d7d4208
Maintenance freshness
7/18/2026
Usage
5 downloads · 276 views
File structure