Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-C8087C39

7/8/2026, 7:52:40 AM

iterate-pr security assessment v8

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
iterate-pr
Version
v8
Maintainer
davila7
Source
github.com/davila7/claude-code-templates/tree/main/cli-tool/components/skills/sentry/iterate-pr
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 140 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The skill is a legitimate pull request automation workflow, but it relies on GitHub CLI, git, and jq commands. Most backtick detections are Markdown false positives; the meaningful risks are the unquoted branch command substitution and the broad git add, commit, and push flow. No prompt injection attempt was found in SKILL.md.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 140 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Not recorded by this audit

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 28 evidence locations

Capability review items (4)
High
SKILL.md:90-94
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block directs git add -A, git commit, and git push, which can publish unintended or sensitive workspace changes. The commands mutate repository state and push to a remote.
Medium
SKILL.md:65-71
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This command block includes shell execution for gh run list and gh run view, plus command substitution for the current branch. The commands are operationally useful but still execute external tools in an authenticated repository context.
Medium
SKILL.md:67
Shell command substitution
gh run list --branch $(git branch --show-current) --limit 5 --json databaseId,name,status,conclusion
The command uses unquoted shell command substitution to pass the current branch to gh run list. It is not an obvious RCE path, but unusual branch names could alter arguments or cause incorrect command behavior.
Medium
SKILL.md:65-71
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The block contains the same unquoted branch command substitution inside a shell example. The risk is limited, but it is a real shell expansion pattern in instructions an agent may execute.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:88-94
Automated Broad Commit and Push
The workflow instructs the agent to run git add -A, commit, and push without requiring an explicit user review step. This can publish unrelated files, generated artifacts, or secrets that were present in the workspace.
Lines 88-94 directly instruct committing and pushing after broad staging. The risk is semantic because the command sequence can publish unintended local changes.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Broad staging and pushing can publish unintended files.
    Require an explicit user review before commit and push, and show the staged diff before publishing changes.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    git add -A stages every workspace change.
    Stage only files changed to fix the validated CI or review issue, and avoid untracked or generated files by default.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    The branch lookup uses unquoted shell command substitution.
    Store the branch name in a variable and quote it when passing it to GitHub CLI commands.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    Authenticated GitHub commands run in the user repository context.
    Document that the skill should run only in trusted repositories with least-privilege GitHub credentials.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable