Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-DBE0E719

7/8/2026, 2:58:57 AM

Command Development security assessment v8

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
Command Development
Version
v8
Maintainer
davila7
Coverage
11 Files scanned · 7,237 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The skill is documentation-heavy and many static hits are Markdown examples, paths, URLs, or testing snippets rather than hidden execution. However, several examples intentionally teach inline Bash commands with broad Bash access and direct slash-command argument interpolation, which creates real command-injection and over-permission risks if copied into shared commands.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

11 Files scanned · 7,237 Lines analyzed

68 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 8 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 25 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 347 evidence locations

Capability review items (66)
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/pre-release-check.sh $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/build-release.sh $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/package.sh $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
3. Verify cluster accessibility: !`kubectl cluster-info`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`deploy.sh`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`rollback.sh`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`deploy.sh`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`deploy.sh [environment]`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`risky-operation.sh`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Check cluster status: !`kubectl cluster-info`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Deployment details: !`gh api /deployments/$1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`mkdir -p ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/cache && date > ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/cache/last-run.txt`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Stage changes: !\`git add $1\`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Commit changes: !\`git commit -m "$2"\`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Package: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/package.sh`
This inline Bash example runs deployment, repository mutation, or privileged environment tooling. Copying it into a command can modify external systems or local state.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/quality-check.js $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/security-scan.sh $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/perf-analyze.sh $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/best-practices.sh $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/run-tests.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Run plugin analyzer: !`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/analyze.js $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Validate environment argument: !`echo "$1" | grep -E "^(dev|staging|prod)$" && echo "VALID" || echo
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Verify configuration available: !`test -f ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/config/$1.json && echo "FOUND" || ec
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Execute build:** !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/build.sh $1 2>&1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Validation results:** !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/validate-build.sh $1 2>&1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Determine check level: !`echo "$1" | grep -E "^prod$" && echo "FULL" || echo "BASIC"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Full test suite: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/test-full.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Security scan: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/security-scan.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Performance audit: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/perf-check.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Compliance check: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/compliance.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Basic tests: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/test-basic.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Quick lint: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/lint.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/script-name.js $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Validate input: !`echo "$1" | grep -E "^pattern$" && echo "OK" || echo "ERROR"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/analyze.js`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/script.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Validate: !`echo "$1" | grep -E "^(dev|staging|prod)$" || echo "INVALID"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Test execution: !`npm test $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`gh pr view $1 --json title,body,author,files`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Files changed: !`gh pr diff $1 --name-only`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Test status: !`gh pr checks $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Run analysis: !`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/analyze.js`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Lint results: !`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/lint.js $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Step 1 - Prepare: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/prepare.sh $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Step 3 - Execute: !`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/execute $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Run: !`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/process.sh $1 $2`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Build: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/build.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Validate: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/validate.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Test: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/test.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Environment check: !`echo "Deploying to: $1"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/lint.js $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Validate environment: !`echo "$1" | grep -E "^(dev|staging|prod)$" || echo "INVALID"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Check file: !`test -f $1 && echo "EXISTS" || echo "MISSING"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Validate inputs: !`test -n "$1" -a -n "$2" && echo "OK" || echo "MISSING"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Build: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/build.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Try processing: !`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/process.js $1 2>&1 || echo "ERROR: $?"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Run tests: !`npm test $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
1. Fetch PR: !`gh pr view $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Run analysis: !`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/analyze.js $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/script.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Build: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/build.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Test: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/test.sh`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
!`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/lint.js $1`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Validate environment: !`echo "$1" | grep -E "^(dev|staging|prod)$" || echo "INVALID"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Check file exists: !`test -f $1 && echo "EXISTS" || echo "MISSING"`
This example places slash-command arguments directly inside inline Bash. If copied into a command, crafted arguments could alter command behavior or trigger unintended execution.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Execute build: !`bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/build.sh 2>&1 || echo "BUILD_FAILED"`
This is executable Claude Code inline Bash that runs plugin-provided code. It is legitimate functionality, but it can execute arbitrary bundled scripts when invoked.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 High
Unescaped Slash Command Arguments in Bash Examples
Several examples place slash-command arguments such as $1 directly inside inline Bash. If argument substitution happens before shell parsing, crafted input can change commands or options.
The cited lines show executable inline Bash with user-supplied command arguments. The risk depends on Claude Code substitution semantics, but the examples are clear unsafe templates.
RISK-002 Medium
Broad Bash Permissions in Reusable Command Templates
Multiple reusable examples grant Bash(*) to commands intended for distribution. This allows broad shell execution when narrower command filters would reduce impact.
The locations explicitly show wildcard Bash access in templates. The skill also recommends narrower filters elsewhere, so this is a documentation-quality security issue rather than hidden malware.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Inline Bash examples interpolate slash-command arguments directly.
    Show safe validation before Bash execution, quote generated values, and prefer passing arguments through scripts with strict allowlists.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Deployment and release examples can affect external systems.
    Require explicit confirmation, environment allowlists, dry-run modes, and rollback documentation for deploy commands.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Several templates use allowed-tools: Bash(*).
    Replace wildcard Bash grants with specific filters such as Bash(git:*), Bash(npm:*), or Bash(test:*).
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    Plugin script examples run bundled scripts without trust guidance.
    Add guidance to review plugin scripts, use least privilege, and document side effects before publishing commands.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable