Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-68E94E57

6/28/2026, 8:18:54 PM

email-notify security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
email-notify
Version
v6
Maintainer
caopulan
Source
github.com/caopulan/Notification-Skill/tree/main/email-notify
Coverage
2 Files scanned · 282 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

4 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static findings for network, environment access, filesystem references, and documented commands are mostly expected for an SMTP notification skill. No prompt injection or malicious intent was found, but the skill can email task summaries and uses SMTP credentials from environment variables, so users need a clear data disclosure warning.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

2 Files scanned · 282 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (4)

RISK-001 Medium
scripts/send_email_notification.py:162-175scripts/send_email_notification.py:190-202
Task Summary Can Be Sent Over SMTP
The helper sends email through smtplib and includes the task title, status, project, device name, and summary. This is the intended feature, but it can disclose sensitive task details if the summary contains secrets or private project information.
The script directly constructs an email body from task metadata and sends it through SMTP. This confirms network transmission, while the purpose appears legitimate and user configured.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:18-27scripts/send_email_notification.py:102-108scripts/send_email_notification.py:200-201
SMTP Credentials Are Read From Environment Variables
The script reads SMTP host, username, password, sender, recipients, and TLS settings from environment variables. This is normal for SMTP configuration, but credentials can be exposed if shell profiles or logs are mishandled.
The code clearly reads CODEX_EMAIL_PASSWORD and uses it for SMTP login. The behavior is required for authenticated SMTP, but it handles sensitive credentials.
RISK-003 Medium
SKILL.md:16-27
Plaintext Email Password Configuration Is Recommended
The instructions tell users to place CODEX_EMAIL_PASSWORD in shell startup files. This is easy to use but increases exposure to local users, backups, terminal history, and accidental sharing.
The documentation explicitly recommends persistent environment variables in home shell configuration files. The risk is credential exposure, not malicious behavior.
RISK-004 Low
scripts/send_email_notification.py:49-63scripts/send_email_notification.py:160-168
AGENTS.md Project Name Read Is Limited
The script searches upward for AGENTS.md and reads it to extract a project name. This is filesystem access, but it is limited to project metadata and no file contents are emailed except the extracted name.
The filesystem access is explicit and narrow. It could reveal a project name in email, but I did not find evidence of broader file exfiltration.
Needs review findings (1)
REVIEW-001 Low
SKILL.md:16SKILL.md:57
Hidden Home Path References Are Installation Documentation
The skill mentions shell startup files and a ~/.codex skill path. These references are expected for local configuration, but users should protect files containing credentials.
The references are documentation rather than hidden-file reads by code. They still matter because the documented files may store SMTP credentials.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (3)
Low
SKILL.md:54-62
Documented Command Is Not Dynamic Shell Execution
The command in SKILL.md is a user-facing example for running the helper script. I did not find code that builds or executes shell commands dynamically.
The flagged content is a Markdown command example, not executable code inside the skill. The Python script uses argparse and smtplib, not subprocess or shell evaluation.
Low
scripts/send_email_notification.py:89scripts/send_email_notification.py:190-198SKILL.md:26-32
Weak Cryptography Finding Is Not Supported By Evidence
The weak cryptography static finding appears to be triggered by SMTP text, not by a weak hash, cipher, or custom cryptographic implementation. The script uses standard SMTP, SMTP_SSL, and STARTTLS controls.
No weak algorithm or cryptographic primitive is present at the flagged locations. The remaining concern is configuration quality, especially if users disable TLS and SSL.
Low
scripts/send_email_notification.py:70-79SKILL.md:50-52
System Reconnaissance Finding Is Not Supported By Evidence
The flagged lines validate boolean environment values and tell users to avoid secrets in summaries. I did not find host probing, process listing, network scanning, or system inventory collection.
The code only parses configured environment flags and formats user-provided task metadata. No reconnaissance behavior is visible in the reviewed files.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable