Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-7600E968

9/30/2026, 2:31:06 PM

github-actions security assessment v1

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History

Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report

Skill name: github-actions
Version: v1
Maintainer: callstackincubator
Source: github.com/callstackincubator/agent-skills/tree/61e6e7dfdf3a8ee862254c200d751fcb1fb863dc/skills/github-actions
Coverage: 5 Files scanned · 735 Lines analyzed
Policy version: skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Three static findings permit command injection through directly interpolated action inputs; the other 75 matches are legitimate build operations or documentation. A separate semantic finding identifies unchecked multiline values that can overwrite workflow outputs and alter downstream settings. No evidence found of malicious intent, credential exfiltration, or prompt injection.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

5 Files scanned · 735 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

Source

Commit and path bound
Artifact

Content and tree hashes bound
Audit

Complete
Install contract

Open manifest to verify
Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 30 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)

Medium

references/gha-android-composite-action.md:135

Shell command substitution

VARIANT="$(echo "${{ inputs.variant }}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"

GitHub substitutes inputs.variant into Bash source before parsing. A caller-supplied command substitution or quote can execute commands; exposure depends on caller input trust.

Medium

references/gha-ios-composite-action.md:174

Shell command substitution

APP_PATH="$(find "$SEARCH_DIR" -type d -name "${{ inputs.scheme }}.app" | sort | head -n1 || true)"

The scheme input is inserted directly into the find command's Bash source. Shell metacharacters can execute commands if an untrusted caller controls the scheme.

Medium

references/gha-ios-composite-action.md:205

Shell command substitution

CONFIG="$(echo "${{ inputs.configuration }}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"

GitHub inserts inputs.configuration directly into Bash before the script runs. Embedded command substitution can execute commands when callers provide untrusted configuration values.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium

references/gha-android-composite-action.md:91-93 references/gha-ios-composite-action.md:133-135 references/gha-workflow-and-downloads.md:136-138 references/gha-workflow-and-downloads.md:199-200

Workflow Output Injection Through Unchecked Line Breaks

Unvalidated identifiers and build inputs are written as single-line GITHUB_OUTPUT entries. Embedded newlines can introduce additional keys or overwrite existing outputs, changing downstream project paths, build selectors, or artifact metadata.

The templates append arbitrary strings with echo and do not reject line breaks. GitHub interprets additional key=value lines as separate outputs; exploitation requires control of those strings.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

FIX-001
Medium
Action inputs are interpolated directly into Bash source, including variant, scheme, and configuration.

Pass inputs and outputs through step environment variables, then use quoted Bash expansions. Apply this throughout both composite actions and the caller workflow.
FIX-002
Medium
Unchecked line breaks in identifiers, project settings, and build inputs can introduce additional workflow outputs or overwrite existing values.

Reject carriage returns and line feeds before writing single-line outputs. Validate project paths, identifiers, schemes, configurations, and variants against expected values.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit: 7600e968314e2c246773cde1fd359956be68c620
Content hash: 0d656b3361161b11a04ee741b06bf2e44c2b4dd96ea2d038aa7df0a048fc8850
Tree hash: 95948022d2d942b724e591d35c16e266928c07e63f803eb4ec69fe86eb07c4dc
Skill path: skills/callstackincubator/github-actions
Audit payload hash: 511689b5027e3c215a12bac53eed4f02

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active