All 25 static findings are false positives caused by Markdown syntax, ordinary imports, template literals, and an informational link. Semantic review found client-controlled pricing and redirect URLs in the recommended checkout design.
The public checkout method forwards caller-supplied ShoppingItem values, including price and currency, directly to Stripe without loading authoritative product data.
The documented type exposes priceInCents and the backend passes the caller-provided item array directly into createCheckoutSession without product lookup or validation.
The public checkout method accepts success and cancellation URLs from callers without validating their schemes, hosts, ports, or paths.
The backend signature accepts both URLs as text and forwards them to Stripe without an allowlist; the frontend-generated values do not constrain direct backend callers.
All static alerts are false positives caused by Markdown formatting, relative references, a hyperlink, JavaScript templates, and a Motoko type field. The backend example still trusts checkout parameters and exposes payment status without ownership checks.
The public checkout method forwards caller-provided items, prices, currencies, and redirect URLs without server-side validation. Attackers can underpay or create phishing redirects.
The public method directly passes every caller-controlled checkout argument to Stripe without loading trusted product data or validating redirect origins.
I found no confirmed security issues. The static findings are false positives from Markdown fences, inline code, JavaScript template literals, documentation links, relative imports, and a sample product id field. No prompt injection or data exfiltration intent was found in SKILL.md.