Skills commit-prepare Audit History
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Audit History

commit-prepare - 11 audits

Version comparison

Capability and finding changes across audited versions, newest first.

VersionDateResultReview itemsChange vs previous
v11 LatestJul 9, 2026, 01:34 AM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v10 Jul 9, 2026, 01:34 AM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v9 Jul 7, 2026, 11:11 PM No confirmed findings6No capability change
v8 Jul 5, 2026, 04:23 AM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v7 Jul 5, 2026, 04:23 AM No confirmed findings2Network access
v6 Jun 28, 2026, 06:03 PM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v5 Jan 16, 2026, 08:37 PM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v4 Jan 16, 2026, 08:37 PM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v3 Jan 10, 2026, 11:33 AM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v2 Jan 10, 2026, 11:33 AM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v1 Jan 10, 2026, 11:33 AM No confirmed findings0Baseline

Jul 9, 2026, 01:34 AM

The static findings are documentation examples for normal git commit preparation, not unsafe command execution or network behavior. The skill asks for confirmation before committing, warns against bypassing hooks, and includes a secrets check reminder. No prompt injection attempt or malicious intent was found.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
2
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Audited by: claude

Jul 9, 2026, 01:34 AM

The static findings are documentation examples for normal git commit preparation, not unsafe command execution or network behavior. The skill asks for confirmation before committing, warns against bypassing hooks, and includes a secrets check reminder. No prompt injection attempt or malicious intent was found.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
2
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Audited by: claude

Jul 7, 2026, 11:11 PM

Most static findings are Markdown backtick false positives around examples, commit templates, or attribution links. I confirmed limited external-command risk where the skill instructs staging and committing files, especially the heredoc command substitution for multi-line messages. No prompt injection or covert network behavior was found in SKILL.md.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
8
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (6)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- "Stage all changes?" (`git add .`)
This line presents git add . as a staging option. It is user-confirmed, but broad staging can add unintended secrets or unrelated files, so the repository-modification risk is real.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution · 2 occurrences
```bash
This block instructs git add and git commit after user confirmation. These commands modify repository state and depend on correct user review, so the external-command risk is real but bounded.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
This range introduces mandatory heredoc usage immediately before the commit command shown on line 98. The evidence is contextual, so confidence is lower, but the shell-based commit workflow remains a real risk.
Medium
Shell command substitution
git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
The command uses $(cat <<EOF) inside git commit -m. This unnecessary shell interpretation increases injection risk if generated commit message content is attacker-controlled or malformed.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The multi-line commit example depends on command substitution to pass generated text to git commit. That pattern is avoidable and creates a real shell parsing risk around untrusted message content.
Audited by: codex

Jul 5, 2026, 04:23 AM

The audit reviewed 41 static findings in SKILL.md. Most hits are Markdown code fences or inline examples, not executable Ruby backticks. The only retained issue is the multi-line commit template that uses shell command substitution.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Shell command substitution
git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
The multi-line commit example uses shell command substitution inside a command the assistant may run. The quoted heredoc limits expansion, but this pattern is fragile and safer commit-message input is available.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The range includes the multi-line commit template that embeds command substitution in a shell command. It is not malicious, but it creates avoidable shell parsing risk for generated commit messages.
Audited by: codex

Jul 5, 2026, 04:23 AM

The audit reviewed 41 static findings in SKILL.md. Most hits are Markdown code fences or inline examples, not executable Ruby backticks. The only retained issue is the multi-line commit template that uses shell command substitution.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Shell command substitution
git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
The multi-line commit example uses shell command substitution inside a command the assistant may run. The quoted heredoc limits expansion, but this pattern is fragile and safer commit-message input is available.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The range includes the multi-line commit template that embeds command substitution in a shell command. It is not malicious, but it creates avoidable shell parsing risk for generated commit messages.
Audited by: codex

Jun 28, 2026, 06:03 PM

Static analysis flagged many shell patterns because the skill documents git commands and commit-message examples. Review found no malicious intent, data exfiltration, prompt injection, or hidden execution path, but the skill does instruct agents to run repository-mutating git commands after user confirmation.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
3
Review items
1
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Repository-Mutating Git Commands
The skill instructs the agent to inspect diffs, stage files, and run git commit after user confirmation. This is legitimate for a commit-preparation skill, but it can modify repository state and create commits, so users should review staged files and the final message before execution.
The commands are explicit and semantically tied to the skill purpose. Risk is operational rather than malicious because the file also requires user confirmation before committing.
Low
Documentation Link Flagged as Network Usage
The hardcoded Claude Code URL appears only in attribution text, not in code that performs a network request. I did not find evidence of data transmission, credential collection, or a remote callback.
Both URL locations are inside Markdown attribution examples. There is no fetch, curl, webhook, or other network execution instruction at those lines.
Static false positives ignored (1)

These static matches were dismissed by semantic review or matched schema-only tokens, so they are shown for transparency but do not drive the quality score.

Low
Weak Cryptography Alerts Are False Positives
Static weak-cryptography matches at the reported lines do not reference cryptographic algorithms or hashing APIs. The lines contain the skill description, commit-message body text, and an example sentence about retry backoff.
The cited lines are plain Markdown prose. No evidence found of MD5, SHA-1, DES, RC4, or crypto API usage in the skill file.

Detected Patterns

Shell Command Examples for Git Operations
Audited by: codex

Jan 16, 2026, 08:37 PM

Pure prompt-based skill with no executable code. Only provides guidelines for generating conventional commit messages through git commands. All static findings are false positives: 'weak crypto' misidentifies 'conventional commits' standard, 'shell backtick' flags legitimate git command documentation, and URLs are standard attribution links. All git operations require user approval.

2
Files scanned
398
Lines analyzed
1
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Audited by: claude

Jan 16, 2026, 08:37 PM

Pure prompt-based skill with no executable code. Only provides guidelines for generating conventional commit messages through git commands. All static findings are false positives: 'weak crypto' misidentifies 'conventional commits' standard, 'shell backtick' flags legitimate git command documentation, and URLs are standard attribution links. All git operations require user approval.

2
Files scanned
398
Lines analyzed
1
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Audited by: claude

Jan 10, 2026, 11:33 AM

Pure prompt-based skill with no executable code. Only provides guidelines for generating conventional commit messages through git commands. No network, filesystem, or environment access beyond standard git operations required for commit message preparation.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
1
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Risk Factors

Audited by: claude

Jan 10, 2026, 11:33 AM

Pure prompt-based skill with no executable code. Only provides guidelines for generating conventional commit messages through git commands. No network, filesystem, or environment access beyond standard git operations required for commit message preparation.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
1
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Risk Factors

Audited by: claude

Jan 10, 2026, 11:33 AM

Pure prompt-based skill with no executable code. Only provides guidelines for generating conventional commit messages through git commands. No network, filesystem, or environment access beyond standard git operations required for commit message preparation.

1
Files scanned
199
Lines analyzed
1
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Risk Factors

Audited by: claude