Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-CA2CAD39

7/5/2026, 2:58:59 AM

atxp security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
atxp
Version
v3
Maintainer
atxp-dev
Source
github.com/atxp-dev/cli/tree/main/skills/atxp/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 67 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The skill is a thin reference for ATXP CLI and MCP services, and most markdown backtick detections are not Ruby execution. Several findings remain valid because the instructions call external npx commands, source a hidden config file, read an ATXP connection token, and contact ATXP network services.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 67 Lines analyzed

15 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 1 evidence location

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

Capability review items (13)
High
SKILL.md:18
Hidden file in home directory
source ~/.atxp/config
Line 18 instructs `source ~/.atxp/config`, which reads and executes shell content from a hidden home-directory file. That can load secrets and run arbitrary shell statements.
Medium
SKILL.md:3
Ruby/shell backtick execution
description: Access ATXP paid API tools for web search, AI image generation, music creation, video g
The cited description explicitly requires `npx atxp login`, which executes an external npm package during authentication. The markdown backticks are not Ruby execution, but the command instruction is real.
Medium
SKILL.md:12-19
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The bash block includes `npx atxp login` and `source ~/.atxp/config`. Running an npm package and sourcing a shell config are real external command actions.
Medium
SKILL.md:19-25
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The finding starts at a code-fence close, but its cited range reaches the command table that begins with `npx atxp search <query>`. This is an external CLI command instruction, so it is kept.
Medium
SKILL.md:25-26
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `npx atxp search <query>` | Real-time web search |
Line 25 documents `npx atxp search <query>`, which executes the ATXP CLI and sends a query to an external service. This is intentional but security-relevant command execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:26-27
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `npx atxp image <prompt>` | AI image generation |
Line 26 documents `npx atxp image <prompt>`, which runs an external CLI and transmits prompt content for image generation. This is intentional but still an external command risk.
Medium
SKILL.md:27-28
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `npx atxp music <prompt>` | AI music generation |
Line 27 documents `npx atxp music <prompt>`, which runs an external CLI and sends user prompt data to a paid service. This is a real external command pathway.
Medium
SKILL.md:28-29
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `npx atxp video <prompt>` | AI video generation |
Line 28 documents `npx atxp video <prompt>`, which runs an external CLI and sends prompt content to a video generation service. This is expected but security-relevant.
Medium
SKILL.md:29-33
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `npx atxp x <query>` | X/Twitter search |
Line 29 documents `npx atxp x <query>`, which runs the ATXP CLI and sends search terms to an external X search service. This is real external command use.
Medium
SKILL.md:18
Hidden file access
source ~/.atxp/config
Line 18 accesses `~/.atxp/config`, a hidden user configuration path likely to contain authentication material. The access is intentional but security-sensitive.
Low
SKILL.md:47
Hardcoded URL
mcpServer: 'https://search.mcp.atxp.ai',
The TypeScript sample hardcodes `https://search.mcp.atxp.ai` as the MCP server. This is intentional, but it creates outbound network communication to a third-party service.
Low
SKILL.md:48
Environment variable access (dot notation)
account: new ATXPAccount(process.env.ATXP_CONNECTION),
Line 48 reads `process.env.ATXP_CONNECTION` for account authentication. This is expected for the client, but it uses an environment value that may contain a secret token.
Low
SKILL.md:48
Environment variable object
account: new ATXPAccount(process.env.ATXP_CONNECTION),
Line 48 accesses the environment object to retrieve `ATXP_CONNECTION`. The value appears to be an authentication connection string and should be treated as sensitive.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:48
Environment file access
account: new ATXPAccount(process.env.ATXP_CONNECTION),
The exact code reads an environment variable rather than an environment file, but `ATXP_CONNECTION` is used as account credential material. Keeping the sensitive finding is appropriate because the secret is passed into the ATXP client.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:8SKILL.md:25-33
Cost-Incurring API and Deployment Actions
The skill describes paid API tools and includes commands for generation services plus a PaaS deployment reference. Automated use could spend credits or create cloud resources without clear user confirmation.
The file explicitly says the tools are paid and lists media generation commands plus serverless deployment capabilities. This is a business-logic risk separate from the raw command and network patterns.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Hidden config is sourced from the user home directory.
    Avoid sourcing shell files directly; document a safer token-loading method that reads only the required ATXP connection value.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    ATXP connection credentials are read from the environment.
    Warn users not to paste ATXP_CONNECTION into prompts, logs, issues, or generated files.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    External commands run through npx.
    Require explicit user confirmation before running ATXP commands, and pin or verify the package source when possible.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    Paid and deployment-capable tools may create costs or resources.
    Add a confirmation requirement before paid generation, X search, or PaaS deployment actions.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable