Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-6D0B1144

10/5/2026, 6:00:28 PM

executor-planning security assessment v1

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
executor-planning
Version
v1
Maintainer
atri10
Source
github.com/atri10/executor/tree/39ddcfe1d9f3497102622b72aa235fb0770187fe/skills/executor-planning
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 773 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most of the 221 static findings are Markdown formatting, legitimate companion references, or routine planning commands. Two temporary-file findings remain confirmed, and a semantic finding identifies overly broad Git staging. No evidence found of prompt injection or exfiltration; companion script implementations are outside the reviewed package.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 773 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Not recorded by this audit

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 20 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Capability review items (2)
Medium
SKILL.md:581
Temp directory access
"$n" /tmp/brief-check.md >/dev/null || echo "TASK $n FAILS"
The example writes each brief to a predictable shared temporary pathname without showing exclusive creation. Concurrent runs or precreated links could corrupt or redirect output.
Medium
SKILL.md:582
Temp directory access
grep -m1 '^\*\*Task:\*\*' /tmp/brief-check.md
The loop reads the same shared temporary file even after extraction failure. Stale output or another concurrent run could substitute the task identity being verified.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:710-715
Broad Git Staging Can Include Unrelated Changes
The handoff runs 'git add docs/executor/INIT-0004-cloud-tenant-cells' before committing. Directory-wide staging can include unrelated or sensitive initiative files beyond the intended plan, index, and specification updates.
The example explicitly stages the entire initiative directory instead of the three intended document updates. Actual exposure depends on other changes in that directory.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    Brief verification writes and reads a predictable shared temporary file.
    Create a private temporary directory with mktemp, stop on extraction failure, and read only successfully generated briefs. Clean up with a trap.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Directory-wide Git staging can include unrelated initiative files.
    Stage only the reviewed plan, index, and specification files. Inspect the staged diff and scan every staged file for secrets before committing.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
6d0b11444384184b7ae743742a7e233a9a705cd9
Content hash
649171eec3e1639ce56df65ec31b51523417bd74567b35889e04e9ea00648ebc
Tree hash
495b7c8a460c49d25f609b12c8a79c67b3c4cfbe26e0b7be56c8072919ae312b
Skill path
skills/atri10/executor-planning
Audit payload hash
d9bba711f46482c9a87299ffc36e586c

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active