Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-89EDFDC7

7/23/2026, 6:34:07 AM

react-server-components-framework security assessment v9

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
react-server-components-framework
Version
v1.0.0
Maintainer
AI Agent Hub
Source
github.com/ArieGoldkin/ai-agent-hub/tree/main/skills/react-server-components-framework
Coverage
11 Files scanned · 2,709 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

4 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

All 127 static alerts are false positives caused by documentation formatting, standard React patterns, placeholder fetch calls, or server-only environment access. Manual review found stored cross-site scripting, missing authorization, mass assignment, and draft disclosure in the supplied examples. These examples require security hardening before publication.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

11 Files scanned · 2,709 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (4)

RISK-001 High
examples/blog-app-example.tsx:69-89examples/blog-app-example.tsx:276-279
Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Blog Example
The blog example stores author-supplied post content and renders it as raw HTML without sanitization. Script-bearing content could execute in readers' browsers.
The input schema accepts unrestricted content, stores it, and later passes it directly to dangerouslySetInnerHTML. No sanitization step appears in the example.
RISK-002 High
templates/server-action-template.ts:30-50templates/server-action-template.ts:110-142templates/server-action-template.ts:151-158templates/server-action-template.ts:174-205templates/server-action-template.ts:219-236
Missing Authorization in Mutating Server Actions
Several exported Server Actions create, delete, toggle, bulk-update, upload, or revalidate without authentication or authorization. Remote callers could abuse these mutation endpoints.
These functions are exported from a use-server module and perform privileged operations without calling the session or ownership checks shown in updateResource.
RISK-003 High
templates/server-action-template.ts:71-92templates/server-action-template.ts:151-158
Mass Assignment in Resource Update Actions
Update actions accept Partial<Resource> and pass it directly to database operations without an allowlist schema. Callers could modify fields outside the intended form.
The exported actions accept caller-provided partial database records and use them as update data. No Zod schema or field allowlist constrains these values.
RISK-004 Medium
examples/blog-app-example.tsx:238-250
Unpublished Blog Posts Exposed by Slug
The public post page loads any post matching a slug without requiring published status. Anyone who learns a draft slug could read unpublished content.
The listing and static-parameter queries filter published posts, but the page query uses only the slug and renders the returned record without an access check.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    The blog example renders stored post content through dangerouslySetInnerHTML without sanitization.
    Sanitize HTML with a strict server-side allowlist before storage or rendering. Prefer a renderer that escapes raw HTML by default.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Several mutating Server Actions omit authentication, authorization, and ownership checks.
    Authenticate every action, enforce resource ownership or roles, and scope database mutations to the authorized principal.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    Resource update actions pass caller-provided Partial<Resource> values directly to Prisma.
    Validate update payloads with a strict schema and map only approved fields into database operations.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    The public blog detail query does not require published status.
    Filter public queries by published status. Allow draft access only after an explicit author or administrator authorization check.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
89edfdc710d0846129dcee6a929477b04f08052c
Content hash
ab5326747954a20452345872dc6ad27c82203cb27bad51e6c9c2a3209738714c
Tree hash
e0d302990ff398d94abad11bc0d30d3ade8a064f50aca3ba7ff5f4b6f1caff49
Skill path
skills/ariegoldkin/react-server-components-framework
Audit payload hash
52c64c33b7182802e7ee1b8ae0bf55c9

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active