Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-7DB9B9F0

7/9/2026, 1:04:54 AM

ai-native-development security assessment v11

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: claude Latest published report
Skill name
ai-native-development
Version
v1.0.0
Maintainer
AI Agent Hub
Source
github.com/ArieGoldkin/ai-agent-hub/tree/main/skills/ai-native-development
Coverage
10 Files scanned · 4,519 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives caused by JavaScript template literals, documentation links, and environment-variable examples in educational material. One real high-risk example uses eval() in a calculator tool, and the agent template should add explicit approval before email or other external side effects.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

10 Files scanned · 4,519 Lines analyzed

2 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 10 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 11 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Capability review items (1)
High
references/agentic-workflows.md:88
Dynamic code evaluation with eval()
return { result: eval(expression) }
The reference implements a calculate tool with eval(expression), which is unsafe if copied into an agent that accepts model-selected or user-controlled input. This is a direct arbitrary code execution pattern in an educational example.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 High
templates/agent-workflow-template.ts:57-70templates/agent-workflow-template.ts:381-384templates/agent-workflow-template.ts:423-425
Autonomous Agent Action Without Approval Guard
The agent workflow template defines a send_email tool and examples ask an agent to send reports or summaries, but the template does not include an explicit human approval step before external side effects. This can lead users to copy an agent pattern that performs visible actions without confirmation.
The email tool is a stub, but the surrounding template and examples present autonomous email sending as an intended action. The risk is a design-level safety omission rather than hidden malware.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Unsafe eval() in calculator tool example
    Replace eval(expression) with a restricted math parser or a whitelist of supported operations, and warn users not to evaluate model-generated strings.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Agent template includes an email-sending tool without an approval gate
    Require explicit human confirmation before send_email or any external side-effect tool runs, and show the exact recipient, subject, and body before sending.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Example credential access can trigger marketplace warnings
    Label API key reads as example-only setup code and document safe secret handling, including never placing secrets in prompts or logs.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
7db9b9f06e0ab79c575b58bc48c4d8dc9849f424
Content hash
c841b70b3c297e54632825dcd06517ec6c7243c6b42c05ae9b007feea5c577d7
Tree hash
f8904bac3539e1b5e704bacb15fba8bf9bdc7c054d32f08af3d650eefe8777e2
Skill path
skills/ariegoldkin/ai-native-development
Audit payload hash
a489e11a1f316138a81f065204c8be4c

Analysis metadata

Audit model: claude

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable