The skill has expected external-command and network behavior because it runs the RunComfy CLI to submit video jobs. Most static hits are false positives from Markdown backticks and ellipsis in documentation, but CLI execution and bearer-token API submission remain confirmed risks. No evidence found of prompt injection text in the skill file.
The skill documents that the CLI posts to the RunComfy Model API with the user bearer token and sends the prompt through the CLI input boundary. This is required for the workflow, but users should treat prompts and credentials as third-party data exposure.
The documentation explicitly states that requests use the user bearer token and that user prompts are passed through the CLI to the Model API. The behavior is transparent, but the data-flow risk is real.
Capability review items (10)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The skill explicitly says it calls the local RunComfy CLI. This is expected behavior, but it is still local external command execution against a third-party service.
The fenced setup example includes an npx install command that installs a skill globally from a GitHub source. Running installer commands from community documentation is a real external command risk.
The prerequisite instructs users to run npm to install the RunComfy CLI globally. This is expected setup, but it executes package-manager code on the local machine.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` with a JSON body matchin
The implementation notes state that the skill invokes the RunComfy CLI with a JSON body. This directly confirms the external command behavior described by the skill.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The security section references runcomfy login as the command that writes the API token. The command is legitimate setup, but it changes local credential state and should be treated as a real command risk.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The skill documents a hardcoded RunComfy Model API endpoint that receives the user bearer token. The endpoint is expected for this skill, but it is a real third-party network and credential transmission risk.
The skill has expected external-command and network behavior because it runs the RunComfy CLI to submit video jobs. Most static hits are false positives from Markdown backticks and ellipsis in documentation, but CLI execution and bearer-token API submission remain confirmed risks. No evidence found of prompt injection text in the skill file.
The skill documents that the CLI posts to the RunComfy Model API with the user bearer token and sends the prompt through the CLI input boundary. This is required for the workflow, but users should treat prompts and credentials as third-party data exposure.
The documentation explicitly states that requests use the user bearer token and that user prompts are passed through the CLI to the Model API. The behavior is transparent, but the data-flow risk is real.
Capability review items (10)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The skill explicitly says it calls the local RunComfy CLI. This is expected behavior, but it is still local external command execution against a third-party service.
The fenced setup example includes an npx install command that installs a skill globally from a GitHub source. Running installer commands from community documentation is a real external command risk.
The prerequisite instructs users to run npm to install the RunComfy CLI globally. This is expected setup, but it executes package-manager code on the local machine.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` with a JSON body matchin
The implementation notes state that the skill invokes the RunComfy CLI with a JSON body. This directly confirms the external command behavior described by the skill.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The security section references runcomfy login as the command that writes the API token. The command is legitimate setup, but it changes local credential state and should be treated as a real command risk.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The skill documents a hardcoded RunComfy Model API endpoint that receives the user bearer token. The endpoint is expected for this skill, but it is a real third-party network and credential transmission risk.
The skill primarily documents a legitimate RunComfy text-to-video workflow, including expected CLI commands and outbound RunComfy API access. Most static hits are Markdown backticks, code fences, URL documentation, or ellipses in API paths rather than malicious behavior. The remaining confirmed issues are the intended external CLI and third-party network dependency, so users should install and run it only when they trust RunComfy and understand credential handling.
1
Files scanned
196
Lines analyzed
20
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (17)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
3. **CI / containers** โ set `RUNCOMFY_TOKEN=<token>` instead of `runcomfy login`.
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
The CLI submits, polls every 2s until terminal, then downloads any `*.runcomfy.net` / `*.runcomfy.co
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` with a JSON body matchin
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
3. The Model API returns a `request_id`; the CLI polls `GET .../requests/<id>/status` every 2 second
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
4. On terminal status, the CLI fetches `GET .../requests/<id>/result` and downloads any URL whose ho
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
5. `Ctrl-C` while polling sends `POST .../requests/<id>/cancel` so you don't get billed for GPU you
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
- **Input boundary**: the user prompt is passed as a JSON string to the CLI via `--input`. The CLI d
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
- **Outbound endpoints**: only `model-api.runcomfy.net` (request submission) and `*.runcomfy.net` /
The skill intentionally instructs use of the RunComfy CLI or documents its credential and network behavior. This is legitimate for the feature, but it is still external command execution with third-party service access.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The skill documents a real outbound HTTPS request to the RunComfy Model API using the user bearer token. This is expected for the video generation workflow but remains third-party network access.
The skill intentionally uses the RunComfy CLI to submit text-to-video jobs and download generated outputs. Most static findings are Markdown formatting, examples, URLs, or documented service behavior rather than hidden execution, path traversal, or reconnaissance. The remaining confirmed issues are disclosed external command and network dependencies that users should understand before installing.
1
Files scanned
196
Lines analyzed
12
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (9)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The skill explicitly states it calls the local runcomfy CLI, so external command execution is an intended capability. The command is fixed to a RunComfy model endpoint, which limits injection risk but still executes local tooling.
This line is part of an installation command using npx skills add. It is a real external command instruction, although it is a documented install path rather than hidden execution.
The prerequisite tells users to install a global npm package. Installing and running third-party CLI tooling is a real supply-chain and execution risk, even when disclosed.
The skill instructs users to run runcomfy login, which launches an external authentication flow. This is expected for the service, but it is still a local CLI command that handles credentials.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` with a JSON body matchin
The workflow states that the skill invokes runcomfy run for text-to-video generation. This confirms intentional external command use rather than only prose formatting.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The skill documents a POST to the RunComfy model API with the user bearer token. This is expected network behavior, but it is a real outbound service dependency carrying user prompt data and credentials.
The real risks are the intended RunComfy CLI executions, global setup commands, and the disclosed POST to the RunComfy Model API. Most other static findings are Markdown backtick, REST ellipsis, documentation link, or standard credential-store false positives.
1
Files scanned
196
Lines analyzed
12
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (9)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The front matter states the skill calls the local RunComfy CLI. That is an intended external command execution path, even though the command target is specific.
The fenced block contains an npx command that installs the skill globally. Running package-manager installation commands is a real supply-chain and system-modification risk.
The prerequisite tells users to run a global npm install for the RunComfy CLI. This is legitimate setup guidance but still executes external package-manager code.
The prerequisite tells users to run runcomfy login, which invokes a local CLI authentication flow. This is expected behavior but involves local command execution and credential handling.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The documented CLI POST sends the user bearer token and prompt data to the RunComfy Model API. This is disclosed and expected, but it is a real outbound data flow.
Most static backtick hits are Markdown examples, prompt samples, or inline parameter names, not Ruby execution. The meaningful risks are the intended RunComfy CLI execution, third-party API calls with a bearer token, output downloads, and disclosed token setup.
1
Files scanned
196
Lines analyzed
18
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (15)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The description states that the skill calls the local runcomfy CLI. This is intended behavior, but it is real external command execution with network and filesystem effects.
The CLI submits, polls every 2s until terminal, then downloads any `*.runcomfy.net` / `*.runcomfy.co
The line describes the CLI polling and downloading generated URLs into an output directory. This confirms the external command has network and filesystem effects.
4. On terminal status, the CLI fetches `GET .../requests/<id>/result` and downloads any URL whose ho
The CLI fetches the result and downloads whitelisted generated output URLs into the chosen output directory. This combines external network access with local file writes.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The line states runcomfy login writes an API token for later CLI use. Credential setup is part of the external command workflow and should be treated carefully.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The CLI submits requests to the RunComfy model API with the user bearer token. This is disclosed and expected, but it is real third-party network transfer.
Most static backtick hits are Markdown examples, prompt samples, or inline parameter names, not Ruby execution. The meaningful risks are the intended RunComfy CLI execution, third-party API calls with a bearer token, output downloads, and disclosed token setup.
1
Files scanned
196
Lines analyzed
18
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (15)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The description states that the skill calls the local runcomfy CLI. This is intended behavior, but it is real external command execution with network and filesystem effects.
The CLI submits, polls every 2s until terminal, then downloads any `*.runcomfy.net` / `*.runcomfy.co
The line describes the CLI polling and downloading generated URLs into an output directory. This confirms the external command has network and filesystem effects.
4. On terminal status, the CLI fetches `GET .../requests/<id>/result` and downloads any URL whose ho
The CLI fetches the result and downloads whitelisted generated output URLs into the chosen output directory. This combines external network access with local file writes.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The line states runcomfy login writes an API token for later CLI use. Credential setup is part of the external command workflow and should be treated carefully.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The CLI submits requests to the RunComfy model API with the user bearer token. This is disclosed and expected, but it is real third-party network transfer.
Static findings for Ruby backtick execution and weak cryptography are false positives caused by Markdown code spans, examples, arrows, and prose in SKILL.md. The confirmed risks are intentional RunComfy CLI execution, outbound HTTPS API calls, bearer token handling, and downloaded output files, so users should publish with a clear external-service warning.
1
Files scanned
196
Lines analyzed
7
Review items
1
False positives ignored
Capability review items (4)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
External CLI Invocation Sends User Prompts to RunComfy
The skill instructs agents to run the local RunComfy CLI for HappyHorse text-to-video generation. This is expected behavior, but it executes an external command and submits user prompt content to a third-party API.
The invocation examples and workflow description explicitly show runcomfy commands and POST submission to the RunComfy model API. The behavior is intentional, not hidden, but it has privacy and execution risk.
The skill documents RunComfy login, RUNCOMFY_TOKEN use, and token storage under a hidden user configuration path. This is legitimate for authenticated API access, but marketplace users should understand that credentials are required and stored or provided through the environment.
The file explicitly references a bearer token, RUNCOMFY_TOKEN, and ~/.config/runcomfy/token.json. This confirms credential handling, while the documented 0600 mode reduces severity.
The skill directs the CLI to download generated outputs into a caller-supplied output directory. The documented host whitelist and file size cap are helpful controls, but the workflow still writes remote model output to local storage.
The command examples require --output-dir and the workflow describes downloading whitelisted URLs. The risk is bounded by documented controls but remains relevant for disk usage and file provenance.
The hardcoded URLs point to RunComfy home, model, documentation, and API endpoints that match the skill purpose. No evidence found of covert callbacks, unrelated domains, or suspicious exfiltration endpoints.
The cited domains are RunComfy documentation and model API domains aligned with the declared function. The skill also states a narrow outbound endpoint policy.
Static false positives ignored (1)
These static matches were dismissed by semantic review or matched schema-only tokens, so they are shown for transparency but do not drive the quality score.
Static Backtick and Weak Crypto Alerts Are False Positives
The analyzer flagged many Markdown backticks as Ruby command execution and weak cryptography in prose. Review found documentation, shell examples, arrows, and model descriptions, with no executable Ruby code or cryptographic implementation in the skill file.
The only scanned file is Markdown, and the cited lines are front matter, examples, and prose. No evidence found of Ruby code execution or weak hash usage.
Static analysis flagged 86 potential issues, but evaluation reveals most are false positives. The skill is a legitimate RunComfy CLI wrapper for video generation. Backtick detections are markdown code formatting, not Ruby execution. Network calls go to documented RunComfy API endpoints. Filesystem access is limited to output directory. Security documentation is present and comprehensive.
The RunComfy CLI stores the API token at ~/.config/runcomfy/token.json. While this is standard CLI practice and the file is created with mode 0600 (owner-only), accessing the user's home directory is a filesystem risk factor.
Token storage location is documented with proper permission settings. This is standard CLI practice, not a vulnerability.