Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-088E3E42

6/28/2026, 6:18:39 AM

sca-blackduck security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
sca-blackduck
Version
v6
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/appsec/sca-blackduck
Coverage
14 Files scanned · 4,871 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis found many severe-looking patterns, but most are documentation, policy terminology, or intentionally vulnerable examples for SCA education. The real concern is copyable CI guidance that uses network shell installers and handles Black Duck or GitHub secrets. No prompt injection attempt or confirmed malicious intent was found, so publication is acceptable with a security warning.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

14 Files scanned · 4,871 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 7 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:42SKILL.md:53SKILL.md:189SKILL.md:280assets/ci_integration/github_actions.yml:70assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Network Script Piped to Shell in Copyable Workflows
The skill and CI templates include ready-to-run commands that download scripts over HTTPS and execute them with bash. This is a real supply chain risk if users adopt the snippets without pinning or verification.
The flagged lines are executable examples that fetch remote scripts and immediately run them. The intent is legitimate Black Duck or tfsec setup, but the execution pattern is inherently risky.
Needs review findings (2)
REVIEW-001 Medium
assets/ci_integration/github_actions.yml:41-43assets/ci-config-template.yml:161-164assets/ci_integration/jenkins_pipeline.groovy:29-34assets/blackduck_config.yml:6-11
CI Templates Handle High-Value Secrets
The workflow examples pass GitHub and Black Duck tokens into scanner actions and pipeline environments. This is expected for SCA, but copied templates need strict secret storage and log hygiene.
The locations clearly reference CI secrets and Black Duck credentials. They use standard secret mechanisms, so the concern is operational exposure rather than malicious collection.
REVIEW-002 Medium
SKILL.md:151-154SKILL.md:175-183SKILL.md:209-215references/supply_chain_threats.md:532-533
Referenced Helper Scripts Are Not Present
The skill repeatedly instructs users to run helper scripts, but the scanned file tree does not include a scripts directory. Users may follow incomplete guidance or create unreviewed substitutes.
The documentation cites scripts that are absent from the listed skill files. This is not malicious, but it weakens reproducibility and may lead to unsafe user-created replacements.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (3)
Low
assets/blackduck_config.yml:29-33assets/policy_templates/security_policy.json:147-154
Hidden File Detections Are Scan Exclusions
Static analysis flagged hidden paths, but the cited lines are exclusion patterns for dependency scan configuration. They do not read hidden files or collect private data.
The file paths appear under scanner exclusion lists. They reduce scan scope and are not filesystem access instructions.
Low
assets/policy_templates/security_policy.json:7-17assets/policy_templates/security_policy.json:127-132references/cve_cwe_owasp_mapping.md:335-348
Security Policy Terms Trigger Weak Crypto and Blocker Rules
Many high-severity static matches are ordinary security policy words such as critical, high, blocklist, and compliance framework names. The context is policy configuration, not cryptographic implementation.
The sampled lines are policy metadata and vulnerability triage references. I did not find evidence that they implement weak cryptography or offensive tooling.
Low
references/EXAMPLE.md:135-141references/supply_chain_threats.md:185-205
Intentionally Vulnerable Examples in Reference Material
Reference files contain examples of HTML injection, credential exfiltration, command execution, and backdoor patterns. They are clearly presented as unsafe examples for threat education, not as active skill behavior.
The dangerous snippets are labeled as vulnerable or malicious examples. They still warrant caution because marketplace users may copy reference material.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable