Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-9E952417

7/23/2026, 6:34:58 AM

sast-horusec security assessment v9

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
sast-horusec
Version
v0.1.0
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/secsdlc/sast-horusec
Coverage
6 Files scanned · 1,886 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

7 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most detections are documentation syntax, secure examples, or reference URLs and are false positives. Confirmed risks include remote installers, Docker socket exposure, unsafe permissions, token exposure, mutable images, and ineffective CI gates.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

6 Files scanned · 1,886 Lines analyzed

12 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 22 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 52 evidence locations

Capability review items (5)
High
assets/ci-config-template.yml:164
Git platform tokens
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
The workflow passes GITHUB_TOKEN to a mutable third-party action reference. Compromise could abuse the token's granted repository permissions.
High
SKILL.md:256
sudo privilege escalation
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/docker.sock
This command makes the Docker socket world-writable. Any local process could gain Docker control and effective root-level host access.
High
SKILL.md:257
sudo privilege escalation
# Or run with sudo (not recommended for CI/CD)
The troubleshooting guidance suggests running Horusec with sudo, expanding scanner and dependency compromise impact to root-level host access.
Low
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Hardcoded URL
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
This URL supplies a remote script that is executed immediately without integrity verification. Source compromise could run arbitrary CI code.
Low
SKILL.md:298
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ZupIT/horusec/main/deployments/scripts/install.sh | bas
This URL supplies a remote installer that is executed immediately without integrity verification. Source compromise could run arbitrary local code.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (7)

RISK-001 Critical
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The template downloads a mutable remote script and executes it without integrity verification. A compromised source can run arbitrary CI code.
RISK-002 Critical
SKILL.md:298
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ZupIT/horusec/main/deployments/scripts/install.sh | bas
The installation command pipes an unverified remote script directly into Bash. A compromised branch or account could execute arbitrary code.
RISK-003 Critical
SKILL.md:39
Docker socket access
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
The command gives a mutable Horusec container direct Docker socket access. Container compromise can control sibling containers and the host.
RISK-004 Critical
SKILL.md:213
Docker socket access
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
The CI example gives a mutable Horusec container direct Docker socket access. Image compromise can control the runner host.
RISK-005 Critical
SKILL.md:256
Docker socket access
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/docker.sock
World-writable Docker socket permissions let any local process control Docker. This commonly provides effective root-level host access.
RISK-006 Critical
SKILL.md:39-40SKILL.md:213-214
Mutable privileged container dependency
The guide runs mutable Horusec images with the host Docker socket, allowing a compromised image to control the host.
Both examples combine a latest image tag with direct host Docker socket access.
RISK-007 High
assets/ci-config-template.yml:34assets/ci-config-template.yml:246-256
Declared CI thresholds are not enforced
The pipeline declares critical and high failures, but the IaC stage only warns and leaves its failure command commented.
The declared failure policy directly conflicts with the warning-only IaC result handling.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote scripts are piped directly into a shell.
    Download a versioned release, verify its checksum or signature, inspect it, and execute the verified local file.
  2. FIX-002
    Critical
    Examples expose the host Docker socket and weaken its permissions.
    Use isolated rootless runners without host socket mounts. Never make the Docker socket world-writable or run scanners as root.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    Mutable actions and container tags receive repository privileges.
    Pin actions to commit hashes and images to digests. Limit token permissions for every job and third-party action.
  4. FIX-004
    High
    CI behavior does not consistently enforce declared severity thresholds.
    Remove blanket success overrides and fail explicitly when parsed results meet the configured critical or high threshold.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
9e952417e76879bc9d853e1b8b2cd6d6d8d4a1c2
Content hash
035dfc470e103a9a4b1cd86a5d1e9ff82432443911c9036fa53c0c6da4705871
Tree hash
595140bbbe5a27a1d30df17302708996c8eca364482ab19069e009e85c73b8f3
Skill path
skills/agentsecops/sast-horusec
Audit payload hash
b430a84c83fb728181da3abd43741047

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active