Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-D46E6208

7/7/2026, 9:44:43 PM

sast-horusec security assessment v8

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
sast-horusec
Version
v8
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/secsdlc/sast-horusec
Coverage
6 Files scanned · 1,886 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

5 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown examples, rule templates, and defensive security references. The confirmed risks are unsafe installation and Docker guidance: remote scripts piped to shell, Docker socket exposure, and broad Docker socket permission changes.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

6 Files scanned · 1,886 Lines analyzed

9 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 22 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 64 evidence locations

Capability review items (4)
High
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Hardcoded URL
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The URL is used in a CI command that downloads an installer script and immediately executes it. This network dependency is part of an unsafe remote code execution path.
High
SKILL.md:256
sudo privilege escalation
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/docker.sock
The guidance suggests using sudo to change Docker socket permissions to a world-writable mode. This weakens host isolation and can expose privileged Docker control to untrusted local processes.
High
SKILL.md:257
sudo privilege escalation
# Or run with sudo (not recommended for CI/CD)
The text suggests elevated execution as a workaround, even though it notes this is not recommended for CI/CD. Running scanning tooling with sudo increases impact if the tool chain is compromised.
High
SKILL.md:298
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ZupIT/horusec/main/deployments/scripts/install.sh | bas
The URL appears inside an install command that pipes remote content into bash. This is more than a reference link because it is part of a command users may execute.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (5)

RISK-001 Critical
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The CI template pipes a remote installer script directly into bash without integrity verification. A compromised upstream script or download path could execute arbitrary commands in the runner.
RISK-002 Critical
SKILL.md:298
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ZupIT/horusec/main/deployments/scripts/install.sh | bas
The skill recommends piping a remote install script directly to bash. That pattern executes unaudited remote code in the user shell and creates a supply-chain execution risk.
RISK-003 Critical
SKILL.md:39
Docker socket access
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
The Docker command mounts the host Docker socket into the Horusec container. Container access to the Docker daemon can provide effective host control on many systems.
RISK-004 Critical
SKILL.md:213
Docker socket access
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
The GitHub Actions example mounts the host Docker socket into the scanning container. A compromised container image or analyzer could control the runner Docker daemon.
RISK-005 Critical
SKILL.md:256
Docker socket access
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/docker.sock
The troubleshooting guidance changes permissions on the Docker socket. Making this socket broadly accessible can allow local privilege escalation through Docker daemon control.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer scripts are piped directly to bash in SKILL.md and the CI template.
    Replace pipe-to-shell installs with pinned release downloads, checksum verification, or package manager instructions that verify integrity before execution.
  2. FIX-002
    Critical
    Docker examples mount /var/run/docker.sock into the scanning container.
    Avoid Docker socket mounts. Use rootless Docker, isolated runners, read-only source mounts, or non-Docker Horusec execution where possible.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    Troubleshooting guidance suggests world-writable Docker socket permissions.
    Remove chmod 666 guidance and document safer Docker group membership, least-privilege runners, or temporary isolated environments.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    CI examples rely on mutable third-party actions, images, and remote installer scripts.
    Pin actions and container images to immutable SHAs or digests, and document update review procedures for CI dependencies.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable