Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-91332521

6/28/2026, 6:08:26 AM

sast-horusec security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
sast-horusec
Version
v6
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Coverage
5 Files scanned · 1,876 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis flagged many command, network, environment, filesystem, and script patterns. Most findings are documentation examples or legitimate SAST workflow guidance, but the Docker socket mount, world-writable Docker socket advice, and pipe-to-shell installers are confirmed high-risk operational patterns. No evidence found of prompt injection or confirmed malicious intent, so the skill is not blocked but should not publish without revisions.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

5 Files scanned · 1,876 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Capability review items (4)
High
Docker Socket Mounted Into Scanner Container
TRUE_POSITIVE: The skill recommends running Horusec with /var/run/docker.sock mounted into the container. Docker socket access can give a container control over the host Docker daemon, which is a high-impact privilege boundary risk even when used for legitimate scanning.
The exact Docker socket mount appears in recommended local and CI examples. The pattern is operationally legitimate for some scanners, but the host-control impact is well understood and directly evidenced.
High
World-Writable Docker Socket Permission Advice
TRUE_POSITIVE: The troubleshooting section advises chmod 666 on /var/run/docker.sock. This grants local users broad access to the Docker daemon and can enable host compromise through container creation.
The command is explicit and appears as a solution for permission errors. The surrounding note discourages sudo in CI, but it does not provide a safer Docker permission model.
High
Pipe-To-Shell Installer Commands
TRUE_POSITIVE: The skill and CI template include commands that download remote shell scripts and pipe them directly to bash. This creates supply-chain risk because the executed content is not pinned, verified, or reviewed before execution.
The commands are direct curl-to-bash installer patterns. They target known project URLs, so malicious intent is not confirmed, but the execution pattern is still high risk.
Medium
CI Token And Repository Automation Exposure
NEEDS_REVIEW: The CI template uses a GitHub token for Gitleaks and reads a generated report before posting a pull request comment. These are legitimate GitHub Actions patterns, but they require least-privilege permissions and careful artifact handling.
The token is accessed through GitHub secrets and the file read targets a generated report, so this is not credential exfiltration. It remains relevant because CI automation handles repository metadata and security findings.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
Extensive Shell Execution Guidance
NEEDS_REVIEW: The skill is designed to run security scanners, Docker commands, package installers, and report-processing commands. This is expected for a Horusec workflow, but users could run commands against sensitive repositories or CI systems without sandboxing.
The commands are normal for SAST usage and do not show injection by themselves. The risk comes from execution context and the broad file access expected during source scanning.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (3)
Low
Intentional Vulnerable Code Examples
FALSE_POSITIVE: The hardcoded secrets, weak cryptography, XSS, C2, and reconnaissance terms appear inside security-rule templates or reference examples. They document what a scanner should detect rather than implementing malicious behavior.
The surrounding content labels the snippets as vulnerable examples, rule metadata, or framework mappings. No evidence found that these snippets execute as part of the skill.
Low
Documentation URLs And Reference Links
FALSE_POSITIVE: Hardcoded URLs point to Horusec documentation, OWASP, CWE, and security tooling references. These are normal documentation links and do not by themselves indicate data exfiltration.
The URLs are in reference lists and remediation text. They are not paired with secret collection or outbound data transfer in the inspected context.
Low
Environment Variable Examples Are Mostly Defensive
FALSE_POSITIVE: Environment variable references are used for GitHub Actions secrets or examples showing how to avoid hardcoded credentials. This is safer than embedding secrets directly, but users should still protect scan results.
The examples use platform secret storage or compare an API key defensively. No evidence found that the skill sends environment values to an external endpoint.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable