Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-3230D108

6/28/2026, 6:01:09 AM

reviewdog security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
reviewdog
Version
v6
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Coverage
7 Files scanned · 2,087 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis found many command, network, filesystem, and token patterns. Most are expected for a reviewdog CI integration skill, but the GitLab template includes a confirmed curl-to-shell installer pattern that should be remediated before publication. No prompt injection or confirmed malicious exfiltration intent was found.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

7 Files scanned · 2,087 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 29 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 20 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 17 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 219 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 High
Remote Installer Piped Directly To Shell
The GitLab CI template downloads the reviewdog install script over the network and executes it directly with sh. This is a real supply chain risk because CI would execute remote script contents without pinning, checksum verification, or review.
The static pattern is confirmed in a CI template and directly combines network download with shell execution. The use is probably intended for installation, but the execution pattern is unsafe for reusable marketplace content.
Needs review findings (2)
REVIEW-001 Medium
Repository Token Use Requires Least Privilege Controls
The GitHub Actions examples pass repository tokens to reviewdog so it can post pull request comments and checks. This is legitimate for reviewdog, but users must keep permissions minimal and avoid exposing tokens to untrusted pull request code.
The token references are clearly present and required for reviewdog reporters. Risk depends on repository settings, pull request trust boundaries, and scanner behavior rather than malicious code in the skill.
REVIEW-002 Medium
Shell-Based Scanner Pipelines Run In User Repositories
The skill provides shell pipelines that run scanners and pass results to reviewdog. This matches the skill purpose, but users should review scanner arguments, pinned tool versions, and file write locations before adopting the templates.
The command execution patterns are real but primarily demonstrate normal reviewdog usage. They become risky if copied into CI without pinning tools or reviewing behavior on untrusted repositories.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (3)
Low
Security Keyword Findings Are Documentation Examples
Static analysis flagged weak cryptography, eval, private key, and command injection terms in reference material. These references describe vulnerability classes and scanner coverage, not instructions to perform unsafe actions.
The surrounding context is CWE and supported-tool documentation. The flagged terms are examples of issues that scanners detect.
Low
Hardcoded URLs Point To Public Documentation And Tool Sources
The hardcoded URL findings are mainly public project, documentation, and pre-commit repository URLs. They do not show data exfiltration endpoints or suspicious callback behavior.
The URLs are visible configuration and documentation references. No evidence found that they receive secrets or repository data.
Low
Filesystem Access Is Normal Scanner Input And Artifact Handling
Filesystem detections mostly reflect scanner access to repository files, Docker volume mounts, and temporary report files. This behavior is expected for SAST, secret scanning, and linter integrations.
The file paths are used to scan project contents or store local scan reports. No evidence found of unauthorized file collection or exfiltration.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable