Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-D46E6208

7/7/2026, 8:59:10 PM

ir-velociraptor security assessment v8

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
ir-velociraptor
Version
v8
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Coverage
13 Files scanned · 4,899 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

5 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives caused by defensive Velociraptor examples, VQL detection patterns, MITRE terminology, and placeholder configuration. I confirmed risks in the deployment and CI guidance, including remote script execution, privileged service installation, broad network binding, temporary client config handling, webhook secret placement, and insecure NFS guidance. No prompt injection attempt was found in the reviewed files.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

13 Files scanned · 4,899 Lines analyzed

37 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 52 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 20 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 99 evidence locations

Capability review items (32)
High
Hardcoded URL
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The URL is used as the source for a remote install script that is immediately executed by the CI job. A mutable remote script creates supply-chain risk.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mv velociraptor-v0.72.3-linux-amd64 /usr/local/bin/velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo cat > /etc/systemd/system/velociraptor.service <<'EOF'
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo useradd -r -s /bin/false velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mkdir -p /etc/velociraptor /var/lib/velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo chown -R velociraptor:velociraptor /etc/velociraptor /var/lib/velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo systemctl enable velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo systemctl start velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo apt install certbot
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo certbot certonly --standalone \
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
# Install: sudo dpkg -i velociraptor-client.deb
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo cp velociraptor /usr/local/bin/
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo cp client.config.yaml /etc/velociraptor/
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo cat > /etc/systemd/system/velociraptor-client.service <<'EOF'
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo systemctl enable velociraptor-client
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo systemctl start velociraptor-client
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo apt install nfs-kernel-server
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mkdir -p /export/velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo chown nobody:nogroup /export/velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mount -t nfs nfs-server:/export/velociraptor /var/lib/velociraptor
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8000 -j ACCEPT
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8889 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8889 -j DROP
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo iptables-save > /etc/iptables/rules.v4
This deployment step asks the user to run privileged system commands. The commands are legitimate for installation, but they can alter host state, services, packages, or firewall rules.
Medium
Hardcoded URL
webhook: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/..."
The template places a Slack webhook URL directly in configuration. Even as a placeholder, this pattern encourages storing webhook secrets in files.
Medium
Slack webhook
webhook: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/..."
Slack webhook URLs are bearer secrets when real values are inserted. The template should reference a secret store instead of a literal webhook field.
Medium
Hardcoded URL
wget https://github.com/Velocidex/velociraptor/releases/download/v0.72/velociraptor-v0.72.3-linux-am
The guide downloads a Velociraptor binary from an external release URL without checksum verification in the shown step. This is legitimate deployment guidance but needs integrity checks.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
bind_address: 0.0.0.0
The example binds a Velociraptor service to 0.0.0.0, exposing it on all interfaces unless firewall and access controls are correct. That is a real deployment hardening risk.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
bind_address: 0.0.0.0
The example binds a Velociraptor service to 0.0.0.0, exposing it on all interfaces unless firewall and access controls are correct. That is a real deployment hardening risk.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
bind_address: 0.0.0.0
The example binds a Velociraptor service to 0.0.0.0, exposing it on all interfaces unless firewall and access controls are correct. That is a real deployment hardening risk.
Medium
Temp directory access
config client > /tmp/client.config.yaml
The guide writes a client configuration to /tmp, which may expose enrollment or server connection details on shared systems. Use a restricted directory and permissions.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (5)

RISK-001 Critical
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The template executes a downloaded shell script with `curl | bash`, which can run arbitrary upstream code in CI. This is a direct supply-chain execution risk.
RISK-002 High
Systemd service enablement
sudo systemctl enable velociraptor
The guide enables Velociraptor server or client services to start at boot. Persistent service installation is legitimate here but security-sensitive and should require explicit approval.
RISK-003 High
Systemd service enablement
sudo systemctl enable velociraptor-client
The guide enables Velociraptor server or client services to start at boot. Persistent service installation is legitimate here but security-sensitive and should require explicit approval.
RISK-004 High
Unpinned CI Tool Installation
The CI template installs security tools and actions from mutable package names, branches, or remote scripts. Pin versions, prefer verified actions, and verify release checksums before execution.
Multiple CI steps install tools without version pins or integrity checks, and one action tracks a mutable branch. The file is a reusable template, so this insecure pattern could be copied into production pipelines.
RISK-005 High
Insecure NFS Export Option
The deployment guide shows an NFS export using no_root_squash for Velociraptor storage. This can allow remote root access to retain root privileges on the shared export.
The no_root_squash option is present directly in the example export line. This is a well-known NFS hardening issue and is not covered by the static hardcoded-IP pattern.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote script execution in CI template
    Replace curl-to-shell installation with pinned releases, checksum verification, or packaged scanner actions.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Mutable CI dependencies and actions
    Pin package versions and GitHub Actions to immutable versions or commit SHAs, then document update procedures.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    Privileged deployment commands and persistent services
    Require explicit operator approval, least-privilege service users, rollback steps, and review before enabling services at boot.
  4. FIX-004
    High
    NFS export uses no_root_squash
    Remove no_root_squash, use least-privilege export options, and document storage hardening for shared deployments.
  5. FIX-005
    Medium
    Velociraptor services bound to all interfaces
    Bind administrative services to restricted interfaces where possible and enforce firewall, TLS, RBAC, and audit logging controls.
  6. FIX-006
    Medium
    Client configuration written to /tmp
    Write client configuration to a restricted directory with owner-only permissions and remove temporary files after packaging.
  7. FIX-007
    Medium
    Webhook secret shown in a template file
    Load webhook URLs from CI or secret-manager variables and avoid committing real webhook values.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable