Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-95A139C6

6/28/2026, 5:16:50 AM

crack-hashcat security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
crack-hashcat
Version
v6
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/offsec/crack-hashcat
Coverage
5 Files scanned · 2,029 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Confirmed finding summary

No confirmed security findings

The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis findings are largely true positives for dual-use credential access and password cracking workflows, including privileged hash extraction and cracked password handling. No evidence found of prompt injection, hidden exfiltration, or confirmed malicious intent, but the skill provides operational guidance that can enable unauthorized credential attacks if misused.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

5 Files scanned · 2,029 Lines analyzed

8 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 23 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 92 evidence locations

Capability review items (8)
High
SKILL.md:119-123SKILL.md:327-342
Privileged System Hash Extraction Guidance
The skill instructs users to extract hashes from Linux shadow files and Active Directory NTDS data before cracking them with Hashcat. This is a high-risk credential access workflow even though the surrounding text requires authorization.
The cited lines directly reference /etc/shadow, NTDS.dit, SYSTEM hive input, sudo use, and Hashcat cracking. The authorization framing reduces malicious-intent confidence but not the dual-use security risk.
High
SKILL.md:351-361SKILL.md:364-374SKILL.md:377-384
Credential Cracking Workflows for Enterprise Targets
The skill covers NTLM, WPA2, web application hashes, and Kerberos service ticket cracking. These procedures are legitimate for audits but can also support credential compromise.
The semantic context is explicit password recovery against wireless, application, and Kerberos material. Legitimate audit use is possible, so this is high risk rather than a confirmed critical block.
High
SKILL.md:268-276SKILL.md:303-313
Cracked Password Disclosure and Export Guidance
The skill shows how to display and export cracked credentials. Mishandling this output can expose plaintext passwords and increase downstream account takeover risk.
The lines show direct display and file export of cracked passwords, followed by audit logging guidance. The risk is clear, but the skill also includes secure handling reminders.
Medium
SKILL.md:35-47SKILL.md:391-433references/WORKFLOW_CHECKLIST.md:73-74
Extensive Shell Command Guidance
Most external-command findings are true positives because the skill is command-driven and includes shell pipelines, file redirection, and helper scripts. The examples are user-run instructions rather than hidden execution by the skill itself.
The static command-execution patterns are real commands in documentation. They are not automatically executed, so command injection risk depends on user execution context.
Medium
assets/ci-config-template.yml:237-240
Unsafe Installer Pattern in CI Template
The CI template includes a pipe-to-shell installer for tfsec. This pattern can execute remote content without local verification if copied into a workflow.
The pattern is directly present and risky when adopted. It appears in a generic CI template rather than the primary Hashcat workflow, which limits confidence in immediate exploitability.
Medium
assets/rule-template.yaml:93-165references/EXAMPLE.md:131-162references/EXAMPLE.md:412-447assets/ci-config-template.yml:317-330
Bundled Generic Security Templates Add Unrelated Risk Surface
The asset and reference templates include vulnerable-code examples, environment-variable examples, API key handling, DOM injection examples, and CI filesystem access. These are mostly instructional false positives, but they increase audit noise and may be copied unsafely.
The patterns are present but appear inside templates and secure-coding examples. The main concern is accidental reuse, not hidden execution or exfiltration.
Low
SKILL.md:18-20SKILL.md:505-509assets/rule-template.yaml:43-45
Hardcoded Documentation URLs
Hardcoded URLs in SKILL.md, rule templates, and CI templates point to public documentation or installer locations. They are expected reference links, except where combined with shell execution.
The URLs are visible documentation references and not covert network callbacks. The only higher-risk network case is handled separately as the CI pipe-to-shell finding.
Low
SKILL.md:91-99SKILL.md:364-374assets/rule-template.yaml:235-299
Weak Algorithm Mentions Are Mostly Contextual
MD5, SHA1, and NTLM appear because the skill identifies and audits weak or legacy hash types. Mentioning these algorithms is not itself insecure, but cracking them is sensitive dual-use activity.
The weak-crypto terms are semantically expected in a hash-auditing skill and in a rule template. They do not show the skill implementing weak cryptography for its own security.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable