Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-7126B6B5

6/28/2026, 5:11:40 AM

container-hadolint security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
container-hadolint
Version
v6
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/devsecops/container-hadolint
Coverage
8 Files scanned · 1,389 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The static analyzer reported many severe patterns, but review shows most are Markdown examples or Hadolint configuration references, not hidden malicious behavior. The skill is safe to publish with a warning because it encourages external command execution and includes an unverified network installer pattern.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

8 Files scanned · 1,389 Lines analyzed

2 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
assets/github-actions.yml:75-76SKILL.md:40-42
Unverified Network Download in CI Template
The GitHub Actions template downloads the latest Hadolint binary with wget and makes it executable without checksum verification or immutable version pinning. This is legitimate setup guidance, but it creates supply-chain risk if copied directly into production CI.
The network download is explicit and no checksum or fixed release asset is shown. The context is an installation example, so the risk is supply-chain exposure rather than confirmed malicious behavior.
Needs review findings (1)
REVIEW-001 Medium
SKILL.md:50-58SKILL.md:320-328assets/gitlab-ci.yml:15-26
Agent May Run External Container Linting Commands
The skill is built around running hadolint, docker, find, jq, and CI shell snippets against repository files. This is expected for the skill, but users should understand that following the instructions can execute local tools and read Dockerfiles in the workspace.
The commands are clearly part of Dockerfile linting workflows and arguments are generally quoted. The risk depends on whether an AI agent executes the examples automatically in an untrusted repository.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (4)
Low
SKILL.md:36-58references/security_rules.md:39-47references/security_rules.md:81-90
Markdown Code Examples Triggered External Command Alerts
Most external command findings occur inside Markdown examples that demonstrate Hadolint usage, CI scripts, or Dockerfile remediation patterns. They are not hidden runtime code bundled with the skill.
The flagged lines are fenced examples and rule documentation. I did not find evidence that the skill ships executable scripts that run these commands automatically.
Low
references/security_rules.md:148-151references/security_rules.md:170-172SKILL.md:367-369
Recursive Delete Alerts Are Dockerfile Cleanup Examples
The recursive deletion findings are examples of removing apt package lists or apk cache inside Dockerfile instructions. They do not delete host root or home directories.
The paths are package-manager cache directories in Dockerfile examples. They are bounded cleanup commands, not broad deletion of / or user home paths.
Low
references/security_rules.md:245-258SKILL.md:257-262
Environment Secret Alerts Are Secure BuildKit Examples
The API key and authorization examples appear in documentation that warns against ARG secrets and recommends Docker BuildKit secret mounts. No evidence found of credential collection or exfiltration by the skill.
The surrounding text is defensive guidance about avoiding secrets in image layers. The external URL is an example endpoint, not a hidden destination used by the skill.
Low
references/EXAMPLE.md:35-39assets/hadolint-strict.yaml:36-48SKILL.md:482-484
Reconnaissance and C2 Keyword Alerts Are Contextual False Positives
Network and system reconnaissance alerts map to security-framework references, trusted registry examples, label schema fields, or ShellCheck rule names. No evidence found of scanning networks or contacting command-and-control infrastructure.
The suspicious tokens appear in normal security documentation and Hadolint configuration. I found no semantic evidence of malicious remote-control behavior.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable