Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-D46E6208

7/7/2026, 7:48:17 PM

api-mitmproxy security assessment v8

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
api-mitmproxy
Version
v8
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/appsec/api-mitmproxy
Coverage
6 Files scanned · 2,014 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

4 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown examples, public reference links, or educational security templates. Confirmed risks include a curl-to-shell CI installer, GitHub token exposure in a third-party action context, broad proxy binding, proxy environment variables, and an active path traversal payload. Semantic review also found dual-use credential capture, certificate pinning bypass, and WebSocket tampering guidance; no prompt injection evidence was found.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

6 Files scanned · 2,014 Lines analyzed

13 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 35 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 57 evidence locations

Capability review items (9)
High
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Hardcoded URL
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The URL is used as a remote installer source in a curl-to-shell command. That creates a supply-chain execution risk if the template is copied into CI.
High
assets/ci-config-template.yml:164
Git platform tokens
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
The workflow passes GITHUB_TOKEN into a third-party action context. This is common in CI, but it is still a real secret exposure boundary.
High
SKILL.md:260
Path traversal sequence
payloads = ["' OR '1'='1", "<script>alert(1)</script>", "../../../etc/passwd"]
The payload list includes a path traversal probe intended for API fuzzing. It is valid for authorized testing, but it is an active attack payload against target services.
Medium
SKILL.md:65
Hardcoded IP address
mitmproxy --mode regular --listen-host 0.0.0.0 --listen-port 8080
The command binds mitmproxy to 0.0.0.0, which can expose the interception service on all interfaces. Captured traffic and proxy controls could be reachable beyond the test host.
Medium
SKILL.md:68
Hardcoded IP address
mitmweb --mode regular --listen-host 0.0.0.0 --listen-port 8080
The mitmweb command binds to 0.0.0.0, exposing the proxy interface if network controls are weak. This is risky because mitmweb can inspect captured traffic.
Medium
SKILL.md:163
Hardcoded IP address
mitmproxy --mode reverse:https://api.example.com --listen-host 0.0.0.0 --listen-port 443
The reverse proxy example listens on 0.0.0.0 and port 443. That can expose an interception endpoint to other systems if not isolated.
Medium
SKILL.md:443
Hardcoded IP address
- Ensure mitmproxy is listening on correct interface (0.0.0.0)
The troubleshooting guidance recommends listening on 0.0.0.0. This may be valid for mobile testing, but it increases exposure unless firewall controls are present.
Medium
SKILL.md:353
Proxy environment variable
export HTTP_PROXY=http://localhost:8080
The example sets HTTP_PROXY for subsequent processes in CI. If not scoped and unset, later commands may route sensitive traffic through the interception proxy.
Medium
SKILL.md:354
Proxy environment variable
export HTTPS_PROXY=http://localhost:8080
The example sets HTTPS_PROXY for subsequent processes in CI. This can expose tokens or API calls to the proxy if used outside a controlled test job.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (4)

RISK-001 Critical
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The CI template downloads an install script and immediately pipes it to bash. This can execute changed or compromised remote code in the workflow runner.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:223-241
Credential Capture in Proxy Addon Example
The AuthTester example stores Authorization headers and prints part of captured tokens. This is dual-use and can expose credentials if used outside an approved test scope.
The cited addon explicitly collects authorization headers and modifies authentication behavior. The context is authorized testing, but the credential exposure risk is direct.
RISK-003 High
SKILL.md:152-165SKILL.md:446-453
Certificate Pinning Bypass Guidance
The skill describes using SSL unpinning tools and Frida bypass scripts to inspect mobile app traffic. This can enable unauthorized TLS interception if misused.
Two sections give direct workflow guidance for bypassing certificate pinning. The skill frames this as testing, but the capability is clearly dual-use.
RISK-004 Medium
SKILL.md:408-421
Active WebSocket Message Tampering Example
The WebSocket addon example changes client messages before forwarding them. This supports security testing but can alter authorization or role data in live traffic.
The cited example modifies WebSocket message content in transit. It is not automatically executed, but the intent to tamper with traffic is explicit.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer piped directly to shell in the CI template.
    Replace curl-to-bash with a pinned package, verified checksum, or reviewed release artifact before execution.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Examples capture tokens and demonstrate bypass or tampering techniques.
    Add stronger authorization warnings, redact token output, avoid storing secrets, and require isolated test environments.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Proxy examples bind to all interfaces and set global proxy variables.
    Default to localhost, document firewall requirements, scope proxy variables to one command, and unset them after tests.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable