Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-D3218BE1

7/6/2026, 12:31:39 AM

api-mitmproxy security assessment v7

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
api-mitmproxy
Version
v7
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/appsec/api-mitmproxy
Coverage
5 Files scanned · 2,004 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

5 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static review confirmed a remote install script piped to bash and examples that bind mitmproxy to all interfaces. Semantic review confirmed dual-use TLS interception, pinning bypass, token capture, and business logic manipulation guidance. Most rule and reference template alerts are benign documentation examples.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

5 Files scanned · 2,004 Lines analyzed

10 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 35 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 57 evidence locations

Capability review items (5)
High
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Hardcoded URL
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The CI template downloads an installer script from GitHub during a workflow without pinning or verification. This creates a supply-chain risk if the remote script changes or is compromised.
High
SKILL.md:68
Hardcoded IP address
mitmweb --mode regular --listen-host 0.0.0.0 --listen-port 8080
The example binds mitmweb to 0.0.0.0, exposing a web interface that can display intercepted traffic. The quick-start command does not include authentication or firewall controls.
Medium
SKILL.md:65
Hardcoded IP address
mitmproxy --mode regular --listen-host 0.0.0.0 --listen-port 8080
The example binds mitmproxy to 0.0.0.0, which exposes the proxy beyond localhost when network controls allow it. Unauthorized clients could use the proxy or reach captured traffic paths.
Medium
SKILL.md:163
Hardcoded IP address
mitmproxy --mode reverse:https://api.example.com --listen-host 0.0.0.0 --listen-port 443
The reverse proxy example listens on 0.0.0.0:443, which can expose a TLS interception endpoint to other hosts. This needs explicit access control and authorization boundaries.
Medium
SKILL.md:443
Hardcoded IP address
- Ensure mitmproxy is listening on correct interface (0.0.0.0)
The troubleshooting guidance encourages listening on 0.0.0.0, which can unintentionally broaden access to the proxy. This is risky without firewall and authentication safeguards.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (5)

RISK-001 Critical
assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash
The workflow pipes a remotely downloaded install script directly into bash. This executes unauthenticated remote code in CI and is a critical supply-chain pattern.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:207
Certificate/key files
1. Push certificate to device: `adb push ~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca-cert.cer /sdcard/`
The skill instructs users to install a mitmproxy CA certificate on a device. This is security-sensitive because trusting that certificate enables HTTPS interception in the test environment.
RISK-003 High
SKILL.md:152-166SKILL.md:196-207SKILL.md:446-451
Dual-use TLS Interception and Pinning Bypass Guidance
The skill guides certificate installation, reverse proxying, host redirection, and SSL pinning bypass for mobile API traffic. These steps are valid in authorized testing but can enable unauthorized HTTPS interception if misused.
The cited lines explicitly describe certificate trust setup, host redirection, and SSL unpinning tools for interception. The surrounding security caveats reduce malicious certainty but not dual-use risk.
RISK-004 High
SKILL.md:221-242SKILL.md:324-330
Authentication Token Capture Workflow
The skill includes an addon pattern that stores authorization tokens and prints a token prefix during traffic analysis. Captured authentication material can expose accounts if logs or flow files are mishandled.
The code sample explicitly collects authorization headers and prints part of each token. The skill also acknowledges captured traffic may contain credentials and PII.
RISK-005 Medium
SKILL.md:128-139SKILL.md:404-421
Business Logic Manipulation Examples
The skill demonstrates changing request headers and WebSocket message content to test authorization and role behavior. This is useful for authorized assessment but can support privilege abuse against systems outside scope.
The cited examples modify user identity headers and replace WebSocket content from user to admin. They are presented for testing, so risk is dual-use rather than clearly malicious.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly to bash in the CI template.
    Use a pinned action, verified package manager install, or checksum-verified release artifact instead of curl to bash.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Proxy and mitmweb examples bind to 0.0.0.0.
    Default examples to localhost and document authentication, firewall, and network scope controls for remote access.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    TLS interception and pinning bypass guidance can be misused outside authorized tests.
    Add stronger scope checks, written authorization reminders, lab-only defaults, and rollback steps near each workflow.
  4. FIX-004
    High
    Authentication token capture examples may expose sensitive values.
    Redact token output, avoid storing raw tokens, and add secure handling guidance next to the addon sample.
  5. FIX-005
    Medium
    Troubleshooting suggests recursive deletion of the mitmproxy directory.
    Replace destructive cleanup with a backup or targeted certificate regeneration command and explain data loss impact.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (4)
Critical
SKILL.md:260
System password file access
payloads = ["' OR '1'='1", "<script>alert(1)</script>", "../../../etc/passwd"]
Force-confirmed blocker/critical static finding; AI dismissal overridden.
Critical
SKILL.md:434
Recursive delete on root/home
rm -rf ~/.mitmproxy/
Force-confirmed blocker/critical static finding; AI dismissal overridden.
High
references/EXAMPLE.md:276
C2 keywords
- **T1041**: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Force-confirmed blocker/high static finding; AI dismissal overridden.
High
references/WORKFLOW_CHECKLIST.md:193
Malware type keywords
[ ] 10. Remove malicious artifacts (malware, backdoors, webshells)
Force-confirmed blocker/high static finding; AI dismissal overridden.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable