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Audit History

accessibility-engineering - 1 audit

Nov 19, 2026, 05:00 PM

Most alerts describe Markdown formatting, documentation links, or routine report handling. The script embeds environment-derived paths in JavaScript, automatically runs npm packages, and opens user-supplied targets with no enforced audit scope. Page content enters the reports, but the reviewed files show no evidence of deliberate data exfiltration or embedded prompt injection.

2
Files scanned
368
Lines analyzed
21
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (3)

Medium
Automatic Execution of Downloaded Audit Tools
The workflow can download and run npm tools with no installation prompt. Top-level version pins do not replace a reviewed dependency lockfile.
The examples and wrapper use npx with automatic confirmation. The reviewed bundle contains no lockfile or preapproved local tool setup.
Medium
Browser Audit Does Not Enforce Target Scope
The wrapper passes user-supplied URLs and paths to browser tools without enforcing an approved scope. Scans can reach resources available to the runner.
The wrapper checks for missing input and then forwards targets unchanged. The resources reachable in practice depend on the runner and browser configuration.
Low
Page-Controlled Content Enters Audit Reports
Audit reports can include sensitive markup or page text that looks like instructions. Assistants and report recipients should treat those excerpts as untrusted data.
The JSON output preserves axe node HTML and pa11y context without filtering. No evidence found of an embedded attack or automatic report upload.
Capability review items (15)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Node.js fs operations ยท 2 occurrences
const result = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/result.json', 'utf8'));
The result path is inserted into JavaScript passed to Node. An unsafe temporary directory path can change the code instead of supplying a filename.
Medium
Node.js fs operations
const axe = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/axe-report.json', 'utf8'));
The axe report path is expanded inside executable JavaScript. A path inherited through TMPDIR can break the intended string literal.
Medium
Node.js fs operations ยท 2 occurrences
fs.writeFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/result.json', JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
The write uses a path embedded in Node source rather than an argument. Unsafe temporary path characters can alter that source.
Medium
Node.js fs operations
const pa11y = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/pa11y-report.json', 'utf8'));
The pa11y report path is expanded into a JavaScript string literal. Parsing the report as JSON does not protect the surrounding source.
Medium
Node.js fs stat operations
if (fs.statSync('$TEMP_DIR/axe-report.json').size > 0) {
The axe fallback size check embeds the temporary path in Node source. Node parses that source even if the fallback never runs.
Medium
Node.js fs stat operations
if (fs.statSync('$TEMP_DIR/pa11y-report.json').size > 0) {
The pa11y fallback embeds the report path in the generated JavaScript. The path can alter that source before the fallback condition is checked.
Medium
Synchronous file operations ยท 2 occurrences
const result = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/result.json', 'utf8'));
The risk is path interpolation, not synchronous reading. The temporary path becomes part of the code that Node executes.
Medium
Synchronous file operations
const axe = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/axe-report.json', 'utf8'));
The axe input filename is expanded within the JavaScript program. The shell quoting does not escape it for a JavaScript literal.
Medium
Synchronous file operations ยท 2 occurrences
fs.writeFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/result.json', JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
The synchronously written report is legitimate. The risk is that the destination path is interpolated into executable source.
Medium
Synchronous file operations
const pa11y = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('$TEMP_DIR/pa11y-report.json', 'utf8'));
The temporary report filename enters executable JavaScript rather than a separate argument. An unsafe path can change the parsed program.
Medium
Synchronous file operations
const r = JSON.parse(require('fs').readFileSync('$RESULT_FILE', 'utf8'));
The text formatter inserts RESULT_FILE into Node source. The value derives from the temporary directory and is not escaped for JavaScript.
Audited by: codex