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Audit History

performance-analyzer - 11 audits

Version comparison

Capability and finding changes across audited versions, newest first.

VersionDateResultReview itemsChange vs previous
v11 LatestJul 12, 2026, 01:24 PM 1 confirmed2No capability change
v10 Jul 12, 2026, 01:24 PM 1 confirmed2No capability change
v9 Jul 9, 2026, 07:24 AM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v8 Jul 9, 2026, 12:20 PM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v7 Jul 9, 2026, 07:24 AM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v6 Jul 9, 2026, 03:55 AM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v5 Jul 9, 2026, 01:04 AM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v4 Jul 7, 2026, 06:33 AM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v3 Jul 6, 2026, 06:23 PM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v2 Jul 6, 2026, 06:23 PM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v1 Jul 4, 2026, 04:16 PM No confirmed findings0Baseline

Jul 12, 2026, 01:24 PM

Most alerts are false positives caused by Markdown links, code fences, placeholders, and metadata URLs. However, SKILL.md line 58 directs execution of an out-of-package Python connector and use of environment-held API credentials. Publication should require connector review, explicit network consent, and documented credential handling.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
7
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

High
Unaudited Connector Execution
The skill instructs agents to run `${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/connectors/youtube.py`, but that script is absent from the audited package. Its network and credential behavior cannot be reviewed.
The command and external script path are explicit, while the file structure contains only SKILL.md and one reference document.
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The line explicitly directs execution of a Python connector with arguments. The referenced script is outside the audited package and can make network requests.
High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The workflow explicitly expects YOUTUBE_API_KEY and references CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. Secret handling and connector behavior cannot be verified from the audited files.
Audited by: codex

Jul 12, 2026, 01:24 PM

Most alerts are false positives caused by Markdown links, code fences, placeholders, and metadata URLs. However, SKILL.md line 58 directs execution of an out-of-package Python connector and use of environment-held API credentials. Publication should require connector review, explicit network consent, and documented credential handling.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
7
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

High
Unaudited Connector Execution
The skill instructs agents to run `${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/connectors/youtube.py`, but that script is absent from the audited package. Its network and credential behavior cannot be reviewed.
The command and external script path are explicit, while the file structure contains only SKILL.md and one reference document.
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The line explicitly directs execution of a Python connector with arguments. The referenced script is outside the audited package and can make network requests.
High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The workflow explicitly expects YOUTUBE_API_KEY and references CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. Secret handling and connector behavior cannot be verified from the audited files.
Audited by: codex

Jul 9, 2026, 07:24 AM

Most findings are false positives caused by Markdown links, code fences, placeholders, and homepage metadata. One medium issue remains: the skill instructs the agent to run an optional Python YouTube connector from CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT, which is legitimate but still external command execution. No prompt injection, data-exfiltration intent, or malicious override text was found in the reviewed files.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 instructs the agent to run a python3 YouTube connector from CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. The command appears legitimate, but it is still external command execution and should require a trusted path and user consent.
Audited by: codex

Jul 9, 2026, 12:20 PM

Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown links, code fences, placeholder notation, and fixed memory paths. The confirmed risks are the optional YouTube connector command and its use of YOUTUBE_API_KEY. No prompt injection or malicious data-exfiltration intent was found.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
6
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The line references YOUTUBE_API_KEY for the optional YouTube connector. There is no evidence of exfiltration, but environment secret access in a community skill is a real risk that requires disclosure and safeguards.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The line instructs the agent to run python3 with a YouTube connector under CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. The command appears legitimate, but external process execution from a community skill is a real operational risk.
Audited by: codex

Jul 9, 2026, 07:24 AM

Most findings are false positives caused by Markdown links, code fences, placeholders, and homepage metadata. One medium issue remains: the skill instructs the agent to run an optional Python YouTube connector from CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT, which is legitimate but still external command execution. No prompt injection, data-exfiltration intent, or malicious override text was found in the reviewed files.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 instructs the agent to run a python3 YouTube connector from CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. The command appears legitimate, but it is still external command execution and should require a trusted path and user consent.
Audited by: codex

Jul 9, 2026, 03:55 AM

The static analyzer produced many high-severity path traversal and command-pattern hits, but most are Markdown links, templates, metadata, or placeholder labels. The retained risks are the documented YouTube connector command and its API-key dependency, which are legitimate but require installer visibility because they execute local code and read a secret-bearing environment variable.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
6
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The same YouTube connector flow requires a YOUTUBE_API_KEY value. This is legitimate API usage, but it involves secret-bearing environment access and should remain visible to installers.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
The skill explicitly recommends running a local Python connector command for YouTube metrics. This is a legitimate integration path, but it is real external command execution in a community skill and should remain reviewable.
Audited by: claude

Jul 9, 2026, 01:04 AM

Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown links, code fences, placeholders, and influencer handle examples. One documented connector command is a real external-command risk, and its use of YOUTUBE_API_KEY is a real environment-access risk, but I found no malicious intent or prompt injection.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
6
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 references YOUTUBE_API_KEY for the connector. It appears legitimate, but the skill may access an API key from the environment, so the env access risk is real.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 instructs running python3 against a bundled YouTube connector. The command is legitimate and scoped, but it is still external command execution from a community skill.
Audited by: claude

Jul 7, 2026, 06:33 AM

Most static alerts are false positives from Markdown links, fenced examples, placeholders, and sample creator handles. The confirmed issue is SKILL.md line 58, which instructs agents to run a local YouTube connector and use YOUTUBE_API_KEY. No prompt injection or covert exfiltration intent was found in the reviewed files.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
6
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
This line names YOUTUBE_API_KEY in the context of the YouTube connector. The skill can cause secret use for a network API, so key handling must be gated and documented.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
This line tells agents to run python3 on a connector script resolved from CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT with a creator handle. That is real external command execution and requires explicit consent and trusted local code.
Audited by: codex

Jul 6, 2026, 06:23 PM

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown links, fenced examples, inline path labels, and homepage metadata. The confirmed risks are limited to a YouTube connector command that runs local Python and may read YOUTUBE_API_KEY; no prompt injection or exfiltration intent was found.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
6
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 references YOUTUBE_API_KEY for the YouTube connector, so the workflow may read an environment credential. No exfiltration intent is evident, but secret access should require explicit user consent and careful handling.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 instructs the agent to run python3 with a connector under CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. This is bounded to a documented YouTube connector, but it is still external command execution from skill instructions.
Audited by: codex

Jul 6, 2026, 06:23 PM

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown links, fenced examples, inline path labels, and homepage metadata. The confirmed risks are limited to a YouTube connector command that runs local Python and may read YOUTUBE_API_KEY; no prompt injection or exfiltration intent was found.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
6
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 references YOUTUBE_API_KEY for the YouTube connector, so the workflow may read an environment credential. No exfiltration intent is evident, but secret access should require explicit user consent and careful handling.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube post-performance (free key)**: when campaign content lives on YouTube, `python3 "
Line 58 instructs the agent to run python3 with a connector under CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. This is bounded to a documented YouTube connector, but it is still external command execution from skill instructions.
Audited by: codex

Jul 4, 2026, 04:16 PM

All static findings were reviewed against the cited lines and are false positives. The high filesystem findings are relative Markdown links or workspace memory conventions, the command findings are Markdown examples or bounded connector documentation, and no prompt injection or data-exfiltration intent was found.

2
Files scanned
535
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Audited by: codex