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Audit History

list-hygiene-monitor - 9 audits

Version comparison

Capability and finding changes across audited versions, newest first.

VersionDateResultReview itemsChange vs previous
v9 LatestJul 27, 2026, 11:22 AM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v8 Jul 13, 2026, 01:58 PM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v7 Jul 13, 2026, 01:58 PM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v6 Jul 12, 2026, 12:51 PM 1 confirmed1No capability change
v5 Jul 10, 2026, 11:13 AM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v4 Jul 9, 2026, 12:04 PM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v3 Jul 6, 2026, 05:46 PM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v2 Jul 6, 2026, 05:46 PM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v1 Jul 4, 2026, 04:11 PM No confirmed findings1Baseline

Jul 27, 2026, 11:22 AM

Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown links and code formatting. One instruction runs local ESP connector and ledger commands; it is legitimate functionality but should execute only with user confirmation and validated values.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
The skill instructs the agent to run local Python connector and ledger commands against ESP data. The commands are intended functionality, but execution should require user confirmation and validated arguments.
Audited by: claude

Jul 13, 2026, 01:58 PM

Fifty-six detections are false positives caused by Markdown backticks, repository-relative links, fixed memory paths, and homepage metadata. One medium-risk command pattern is confirmed: SKILL.md line 52 places the user-provided list identifier into shell examples without quoting. No evidence found of prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or an unauthorized external destination.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
This line instructs the agent to run Python connector commands and substitutes the user-provided <list> value without quoting or validation. Shell metacharacters in a list name could alter the intended ledger command.
Audited by: codex

Jul 13, 2026, 01:58 PM

Fifty-six detections are false positives caused by Markdown backticks, repository-relative links, fixed memory paths, and homepage metadata. One medium-risk command pattern is confirmed: SKILL.md line 52 places the user-provided list identifier into shell examples without quoting. No evidence found of prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or an unauthorized external destination.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
This line instructs the agent to run Python connector commands and substitutes the user-provided <list> value without quoting or validation. Shell metacharacters in a list name could alter the intended ledger command.
Audited by: codex

Jul 12, 2026, 12:51 PM

Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown code formatting and relative documentation links. One instruction executes bundled Python connector commands against live email data, and saved worklists may retain sensitive subscriber information.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
Subscriber Data Retention Without Explicit Controls
The skill can save segmented subscriber worklists and engagement summaries to persistent memory. It does not specify field minimization, access controls, or retention periods for this sensitive data.
The file explicitly directs storage of a segmented worklist and reusable hygiene summary. Subscriber-level exports and worklists commonly contain addresses and engagement history.
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
The line explicitly instructs the agent to run Python connector and ledger commands against live email-account data. Execution is intended and can access or persist sensitive operational data.
Audited by: codex

Jul 10, 2026, 11:13 AM

Most findings are false positives caused by Markdown formatting and fixed repository-relative links. Two findings are confirmed: line 52 uses an unquoted user-derived command argument, and line 70 creates a save path from an unsanitized value. No prompt injection or malicious exfiltration intent was found.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Path traversal sequence
After delivering, ask "Save these results for future sessions?" If yes, write the hygiene report + t
This line builds a write path with the user-derived <list-or-topic> placeholder and gives no sanitization or root-confinement rule. A traversal value could redirect the save outside the intended directory.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
This line explicitly directs execution of Python connector and ledger commands. The unquoted <list> placeholder can contain user-derived shell metacharacters and enable command injection.
Audited by: codex

Jul 9, 2026, 12:04 PM

Most static findings are false positives from markdown links, code fences, and inline labels, not executable traversal or shell behavior. One confirmed issue remains: SKILL.md line 52 recommends optional Python connector commands that execute local scripts and may access ESP subscriber data.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
SKILL.md line 52 instructs the agent to run python3 connector and ledger commands from CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. This executes local scripts and may read ESP subscriber data, so it needs explicit approval and safe argument handling.
Audited by: codex

Jul 6, 2026, 05:46 PM

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown relative links, prompt examples, inline labels, or homepage metadata. One confirmed medium-risk finding remains: SKILL.md line 52 tells the agent to run optional connector commands that can access ESP subscriber data and write ledger metrics. No evidence found for prompt injection, malicious exfiltration intent, or hidden business-logic abuse.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
SKILL.md line 52 explicitly instructs running python3 connector scripts for Resend and ledger operations. The commands are purposeful, but they can access live subscriber data and write metrics, so execution needs user confirmation.
Audited by: codex

Jul 6, 2026, 05:46 PM

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown relative links, prompt examples, inline labels, or homepage metadata. One confirmed medium-risk finding remains: SKILL.md line 52 tells the agent to run optional connector commands that can access ESP subscriber data and write ledger metrics. No evidence found for prompt injection, malicious exfiltration intent, or hidden business-logic abuse.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
SKILL.md line 52 explicitly instructs running python3 connector scripts for Resend and ledger operations. The commands are purposeful, but they can access live subscriber data and write metrics, so execution needs user confirmation.
Audited by: codex

Jul 4, 2026, 04:11 PM

Most static findings are false positives from Markdown code spans and repo-relative links, not executable Ruby backticks or path traversal. One medium finding remains confirmed because the skill documents optional python3 connector commands that read ESP subscriber and event data.

2
Files scanned
166
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP read + measurement loop (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_
This line documents optional python3 connector commands that read ESP contact and email event data and write ledger metrics. The command is legitimate, but it is real external command execution touching subscriber data and should require user confirmation.
Audited by: codex