Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-D71C7417

7/12/2026, 12:33:59 PM

influencer-discovery security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
influencer-discovery
Version
v17.0.0
Maintainer
aaron-he-zhu
Source
github.com/aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills/tree/main/influencer/discover/influencer-discovery
Coverage
4 Files scanned · 600 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static alerts are false positives caused by Markdown code fences, inline code, and relative documentation links. Two findings remain because line 59 executes an unreviewed connector and requires an API key. The workflow also needs safeguards for untrusted public web content and stored creator contact data.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

4 Files scanned · 600 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 29 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 15 evidence locations

Capability review items (2)
High
SKILL.md:59
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Measured YouTube metrics (free key)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/connectors/youtube.
Line 59 directs execution of a Python connector outside the scanned skill and substitutes a creator handle into a shell-style command. An untrusted handle or connector could cause command execution beyond the documented lookup.
High
SKILL.md:59
Generic API/secret keys
**Measured YouTube metrics (free key)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/connectors/youtube.
Line 59 requires YOUTUBE_API_KEY for a connector whose implementation was not included in the scanned files. The use is plausible, but secret handling and destination controls cannot be verified, so this remains fail-closed.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:68-70references/creator-dossier.md:22-28
Untrusted Web Content Has No Prompt-Injection Boundary
The workflow tells the agent to search and read public profiles, posts, and websites without directing it to treat embedded instructions as untrusted data. A malicious creator page could influence the agent's research or output.
The cited instructions explicitly require consuming open-web content, and no content-isolation guidance appears in the reviewed files. Exploitation depends on encountering a malicious page.
RISK-002 Low
SKILL.md:34-35references/creator-dossier.md:67-75
Persistent Storage of Creator Contact Data
The workflow collects public business contact paths and stores roster-worthy creator records in durable memory. It does not define data minimization, retention, deletion, or access controls for this contact data.
The files clearly specify contact discovery and durable record storage. The data is limited to public business channels, which reduces severity but does not remove privacy obligations.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    The YouTube connector executes code outside the audited skill and reads an API key.
    Include the connector in the audited package, validate handles with a strict allowlist, pass arguments without a shell, and restrict the key to YouTube Data API access.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Public profiles and websites may contain instructions aimed at the agent.
    State that web content is untrusted data, ignore embedded instructions, extract only requested facts, and preserve source links for verification.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Creator contact paths can be written to durable memory without lifecycle controls.
    Store only public business contacts needed for the campaign, require permission, limit access, and define retention and deletion rules.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
d71c7417a35d5c2624161bd2fe8de8a41a362128
Content hash
38dd1cabfa121f20f4670c8b918bf43be40dd9bda029f9bf89d091ef5da8629e
Tree hash
ddee6810b73c81cc2aa2e95166c1fd1774c685db7a7607850dcc550e1718615e
Skill path
skills/aaron-he-zhu/influencer-discovery
Audit payload hash
d6c297d78aee5a02d066f75e5a7e14fd

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable