Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-F8AF2E97

7/6/2026, 4:37:32 PM

deliverability-qa security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
deliverability-qa
Version
v3
Maintainer
aaron-he-zhu
Source
github.com/aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills/tree/main/email/setup/deliverability-qa
Coverage
2 Files scanned · 141 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Confirmed finding summary

No confirmed security findings

The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static hits are false positives from Markdown backticks, relative documentation links, repository URLs, and deliverability terminology. The optional Python connector commands and RESEND_API_KEY are real risk surfaces because they execute local scripts and handle credentials. No evidence of prompt injection, data exfiltration intent, or malicious business logic was found.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

2 Files scanned · 141 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 25 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 1 evidence location

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 32 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
High
SKILL.md:52
Generic API/secret keys
**Zero-dependency ESP automation (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts
Line 52 requires RESEND_API_KEY for optional Resend automation. The file does not show exfiltration, but use of a live API secret by an external helper is a real credential-handling risk.
Medium
SKILL.md:52
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency ESP automation (when Resend is the ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts
Line 52 tells the agent to run a Python connector from ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} that uses RESEND_API_KEY. This is a real external-command and credential-handling surface, although the stated purpose is read-only ESP verification.
Medium
SKILL.md:54-60
Ruby/shell backtick execution
**Zero-dependency S1 record pull (keyless, works for any ESP)**: `python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scr
Line 54 tells the agent to run a Python DNS-over-HTTPS connector with user-supplied domain and selector arguments. The command supports legitimate DNS checks, but it still creates command-execution and input-validation risk.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Credential handling for Resend automation
    Require a least-privilege RESEND_API_KEY, never print it, and explain where the connector sends requests.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Optional connector command execution
    Document the exact reviewed connector scripts, validate domain and selector arguments, and require confirmation before running Python helpers.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Relative links trigger path traversal scanners
    Keep repository-relative links, but document that they are references, not file operations.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable