Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-D71C7417

7/12/2026, 11:25:35 AM

consent-registry security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
consent-registry
Version
v3
Maintainer
aaron-he-zhu
Source
github.com/aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills/tree/main/protocol/consent-registry
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 80 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Confirmed finding summary

No confirmed security findings

The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most findings are false positives caused by Markdown code formatting, relative documentation links, and metadata URLs. The skill does direct agents to resolve a project root with shell substitution and invoke a Python script with an unquoted user-supplied subject identifier, creating genuine command execution risk.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 80 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 9 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 12 evidence locations

Capability review items (4)
High
SKILL.md:51-52
Ruby/shell backtick execution
2. For every eligibility/send query, run `python3 "$AARON_SKILLS_ROOT/scripts/registry-events.py" is
Line 51 directs execution of a Python script and leaves the user-supplied subject identifier unquoted. Shell metacharacters in an identifier could become command injection if substituted directly.
Medium
SKILL.md:50
Ruby/shell backtick execution
1. Read [`registry-event-protocol.md`](../../references/registry-event-protocol.md) and [`runtime-in
Line 50 explicitly directs the agent to resolve a root by executing git inside shell command substitution. Although the purpose is legitimate, it causes external command execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:50
Shell command substitution
1. Read [`registry-event-protocol.md`](../../references/registry-event-protocol.md) and [`runtime-in
Line 50 contains explicit shell command substitution using git to discover the project root. This is intentional external command execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:50
Template literal with command substitution
1. Read [`registry-event-protocol.md`](../../references/registry-event-protocol.md) and [`runtime-in
The quoted root assignment on line 50 embeds shell command substitution. It is a real dynamic shell expression despite being shown inside Markdown.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    The suppression query shows a user-supplied subject identifier as an unquoted shell argument.
    Validate identifiers against a strict format and pass arguments through a structured process API without shell interpretation.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Dynamic project-root discovery executes Git through shell command substitution.
    Obtain the trusted skill root from host configuration and reject missing or unverified roots instead of invoking Git from the shell.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
d71c7417a35d5c2624161bd2fe8de8a41a362128
Content hash
52b2d94137d93e65a718d37112c693d2378d12956217728059c7ef03dd5e26ba
Tree hash
1e180f3b5102629b177731323c100cfe2a06caa3503fd63d6dabad3f783d345f
Skill path
skills/aaron-he-zhu/consent-registry
Audit payload hash
5e5ac9b97f5c2b4657d0340b91003d2e

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable