감사 이력

All 272 static alerts reflect documented publishing behavior, defensive checks, or syntax misclassification. No evidence found of unauthorized exfiltration, credential harvesting, hidden execution, or audit-directed prompt injection. Selected content leaves the machine for brewpage.app; unlisted links require passwords for access control.

All 264 static alerts are false positives involving documented publishing, literal Markdown, validation rules, or local safeguards. A separate directory-packaging race can upload unintended files if a concurrent writer replaces validated paths with symlinks. No evidence found of prompt injection, intentional credential theft, or concealed upload destinations.

All 261 static findings are false positives involving documentation, defensive checks, or intended publishing operations. No evidence found of credential theft, encoded payloads, or audit-directed prompt injection. One semantic risk remains: a concurrently modified source ZIP can bypass archive inspection and sensitive-entry confirmation before upload.

All 260 static alerts match documentation, exclusion patterns, intended service endpoints, or defensive local operations. A separate high-severity multipart path injection can upload unintended local files through crafted filenames. No evidence found of prompt injection or deliberate credential exfiltration.

The static alerts match documentation, defensive exclusions, and expected publishing operations rather than demonstrated malicious behavior. Context review found unsafe history destinations, conflicting token-disclosure instructions, unattended privacy defaults, and unbounded ZIP inspection. No evidence found of deliberate credential theft or encoded executable payloads.

Most static hits are Markdown formatting, documentation URLs, or protective exclusions rather than executable risk. Real issues remain in the Bash publish blocks, which interpolate user-controlled values before curl or zip execution and persist owner tokens in a workspace file.

Most static hits are Markdown formatting, documentation URLs, or protective exclusions rather than executable risk. Real issues remain in the Bash publish blocks, which interpolate user-controlled values before curl or zip execution and persist owner tokens in a workspace file.

Static analysis flagged many shell, network, filesystem, and sensitive-file patterns. Review found these patterns are largely intentional publishing instructions, with no evidence of prompt injection or hidden malicious behavior, but the skill sends user-selected content to an external public hosting service and stores owner tokens locally.

The skill is a legitimate publishing tool for brewpage.app. All network requests target the documented brewpage.app API endpoints. External commands use standard tools (curl, jq, zip, mktemp) for content upload. The skill implements security safeguards: it excludes .env, .git, node_modules, and other sensitive paths from site uploads, never prints owner tokens in conversation, and stores them in a private file. The static scanner flagged many false positives because the skill's core function inherently requires network access and command execution. No malicious intent detected.