스킬 parallel-swarm-implementation
📦
parallel-swarm-implementation
콘텐츠 리비전 r1 높은 위험 ⚙️ 외부 명령어📁 파일 시스템 접근
병렬 스웜 구현 조율
복잡한 구현 계획은 여러 에이전트에 할당하고, 검증하고, 통합하기 어렵습니다. 이 스킬은 에이전트 선택, 병렬 실행, 테스트, 전달 패키징을 위한 구조화된 Loop 2 워크플로를 제공합니다.
지원: Claude Codex Code(CC)
설치 전에 중지하고 확인을 요청하세요.
계획을 검토하고 파일을 변경하기 전에 사용자의 명시적 동의를 받으세요.
내 에이전트로 설치
이 요청을 에이전트에 복사하세요. 공식 Skill 페이지와 매니페스트가 포함되어 있습니다.
에이전트 요청
Review the Skillstore skill "parallel-swarm-implementation" from https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.에이전트는 계속해서 계획을 표시하고 보안 정책에서 요구하는 확인을 요청해야 합니다.
에이전트가 읽기 쉬운 리소스
AI 에이전트, 크롤러, 스크립트가 전체 페이지 대신 정리된 컨텍스트만 필요할 때 이 링크를 사용하세요.
테스트해 보기
"parallel-swarm-implementation" 사용 중입니다. 인증 기능을 위한 Loop 1 패키지.
예상 결과:
백엔드, 테스트, 문서화, 검증, 통합 작업을 종속성 순서에 따라 그룹화한 간결한 할당 계획.
"parallel-swarm-implementation" 사용 중입니다. 테스트가 실패하는 부분적으로 완료된 멀티 에이전트 구현.
예상 결과:
실패 영역을 명시하고, 수정 담당자를 할당하며, 다음 검증 패스를 정의하는 통합 상태 요약.
"parallel-swarm-implementation" 사용 중입니다. CI/CD 검토 준비가 완료된 구현.
예상 결과:
구현 지표, theater 검증 결과, 테스트 상태, Loop 3 준비 상태가 포함된 전달 요약.
보안 감사
높은 위험v8 • 2026. 7. 5. 버전별 보고서 열기
Most static backtick detections are Markdown formatting false positives, but the skill does include real agent-facing shell execution, hidden artifact access, and filesystem writes. The highest concerns are mutable npx claude-flow@alpha usage and unsanitized artifact content being promoted into downstream agent prompts. No explicit prompt-injection attack text was found in SKILL.md.
2
스캔된 파일
960
분석된 줄 수
52
검토 항목
0
오탐 무시됨
확인된 보안 우려 사항 (3)
높음
Unpinned External CLI Execution
The skill instructs users or agents to run npx claude-flow@alpha commands. The alpha tag is mutable and can execute package code from outside the repository when npx resolves or updates the dependency.
Multiple explicit npx claude-flow@alpha commands appear in operational workflow steps. The security impact depends on the runtime environment, but the mutable external package execution risk is clear.
높음
Unsanitized Artifact Content Promoted To Agent Instructions
The workflow reads planning and assignment artifacts, then inserts fields such as task descriptions, research, risk mitigations, and fix instructions directly into delegated agent prompts. A malicious or corrupted artifact could inject instructions into downstream agents.
The cited lines show generated artifact values being read and passed into Task prompts without validation or quoting rules. This is a strong prompt-injection pathway, although exploitation requires control over those artifacts.
중간
Automatic Downstream Skill Transition
The skill directs an automatic transition to cicd-intelligent-recovery after Loop 2 completes. This can extend execution into another skill and toolchain without an explicit review checkpoint in the documented workflow.
The text explicitly says to automatically transition and provides the downstream skill invocation context. The risk is procedural rather than direct code execution, so confidence is moderate-high.
기능 검토 항목 (52)
이 스킬에 대해 예상될 수 있는 실제 로컬 기능이므로 검토가 필요하지만, 확인된 악의적 동작으로는 집계되지 않습니다.
중간
Shell command substitution
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
중간
Shell command substitution
TOTAL_GROUPS=$(jq '.parallelGroups | length' "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
for GROUP_NUM in $(seq 1 $TOTAL_GROUPS); do
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
TASKS=$(jq -r ".parallelGroups[$((GROUP_NUM-1))].tasks[]" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
AGENT=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .assignedAgent" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
SKILL=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .useSkill" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .customInstructions" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
PRIORITY=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .priority" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
- Research: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
- Risk Mitigation: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigation" "$MAT
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
- Check dependencies complete: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
"Task: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .description" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
- Research findings: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
- Risk mitigations to apply: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigat
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
- Wait for dependencies if any: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
중간
Shell command substitution
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
중간
Shell command substitution
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
중간
Template literal with command substitution
`MISSION: Compile Loop 1 planning package into executable agent+skill graph.
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
중간
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
중간
Template literal with command substitution
```javascript
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
중간
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
중간
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
중간
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
중간
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
중간
Node.js fs operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The Node snippet calls fs.writeFileSync to write the Loop 2 delivery package into the workspace. This is a real filesystem write and can overwrite generated artifact state.
중간
Synchronous file operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The synchronous write is used to create or replace a hidden delivery artifact. It is bounded to the project artifact directory, but it is still a real local file modification.
중간
Hidden file access
test -f .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json && echo "✅ Loop 1 Complete" || {
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
- Load planning package: .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
The skill references hidden .claude artifact state in an operational context. This is legitimate for the workflow but remains a real filesystem risk factor.
중간
Hidden file access
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
Create .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json:
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
중간
Hidden file access
1. Store matrix: .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
중간
Hidden file access
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
**Output**: `.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json` with complete agent+skill graph
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
중간
Hidden file access
MATRIX=".claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json"
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
"Wait for all 5 detection agents. Apply Byzantine consensus: require 4/5 agreement on theater detect
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
중간
Hidden file access
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
npm test 2>&1 | tee .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
1. Parse test output: .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
중간
Hidden file access
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
const matrix = require('.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json');
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
'.claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json',
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
중간
Hidden file access
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
Load implementation data from: .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
중간
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.json > tmp.json && mv tmp.json .claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.j
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
중간
Hidden file access
}' .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
위험 요인
⚙️ 외부 명령어 (69)
SKILL.md:35 SKILL.md:60-81 SKILL.md:81-85 SKILL.md:85-109 SKILL.md:109-117 SKILL.md:117-131 SKILL.md:131-143 SKILL.md:143-145 SKILL.md:145-151 SKILL.md:246-248 SKILL.md:248-258 SKILL.md:258-270 SKILL.md:270-273 SKILL.md:273-332 SKILL.md:332-336 SKILL.md:336-348 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:437-448 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:490-501 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:557-565 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:633-641 SKILL.md:641-645 SKILL.md:645-678 SKILL.md:678-710 SKILL.md:710-721 SKILL.md:721-728 SKILL.md:728-735 SKILL.md:735-738 SKILL.md:738-745 SKILL.md:745-750 SKILL.md:750-767 SKILL.md:767-775 SKILL.md:775-785 SKILL.md:785-786 SKILL.md:786-787 SKILL.md:787-788 SKILL.md:788-789 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:356 SKILL.md:358 SKILL.md:362 SKILL.md:368 SKILL.md:369 SKILL.md:370 SKILL.md:371 SKILL.md:380 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:388 SKILL.md:396 SKILL.md:402 SKILL.md:403 SKILL.md:409 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:548 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:151-246 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:349 SKILL.md:502
📁 파일 시스템 접근 (26)
SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:63 SKILL.md:91 SKILL.md:119 SKILL.md:130 SKILL.md:154 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:191 SKILL.md:242 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:336 SKILL.md:353 SKILL.md:478 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:512 SKILL.md:525 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:587 SKILL.md:621 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:643 SKILL.md:724 SKILL.md:774
감사자: codex 감사 이력 보기 →
이 보고서 공유 및 인용
버전이 지정된 평가 보고서, 중립 배지, 임베드 카드 및 인용을 공유하세요. Skillstore는 근거를 보고하지만 이 Skill의 안전 여부를 판단하지 않습니다.
보고서 링크 복사
https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8?utm_source=security_passport&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=versioned_reportMarkdown 배지
[](https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation?utm_source=security_passport_badge)HTML 배지
<a href="https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation?utm_source=security_passport_badge"><img src="https://skillstore.io/badges/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/security.svg" alt="Skillstore security assessment" loading="lazy"></a>임베드 카드
<iframe src="https://skillstore.io/embed/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation.html" title="Skillstore Security Assessment" sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" width="420" height="180"></iframe>학술 인용 (APA · BibTeX · CFF)
APA 인용
DNYoussef. (2026). parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8BibTeX 인용
@techreport{dnyoussef-dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation-2026,
author = {DNYoussef},
title = {parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {8},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "DNYoussef"
date-released: "2026-07-05"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation:audit:8"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Skillstore 점수
이 점수의 이유 증거 신뢰도: 중간 55
아키텍처
85
유지보수성
87
콘텐츠
71
커뮤니티
74
사양 준수
만들 수 있는 것
계획 기반 기능 구축
검증된 계획 패키지를 사용해 구현, 테스트, 문서화, 검증 작업을 전문 에이전트들에게 할당합니다.
현실 중심 품질 게이트
복잡한 에이전트 구현을 완료로 표시하기 전에 theater detection, 샌드박스 검증, 통합 확인을 실행합니다.
Loop 3 전달 준비
CI/CD 복구를 위한 에이전트 선택, 구현 지표, 핸드오프 데이터를 기록하는 전달 패키지를 생성합니다.
이 프롬프트를 사용해 보세요
Loop 2 구현 시작
내 Loop 1 계획 패키지와 함께 parallel-swarm-implementation을 사용하세요. 에이전트 및 스킬 할당 매트릭스를 만든 다음, 작업을 실행하기 전에 제안된 실행 그룹을 보여주세요.
할당 매트릭스만 생성
Loop 1 패키지를 분석하고 에이전트 및 스킬 매트릭스만 작성하세요. 작업 담당자, 종속성, 스킬 선택, 검증 체크포인트를 포함하세요.
검증 우선 실행 수행
엄격한 theater detection, 샌드박스 검증, 반복적 테스트 수정을 포함해 구현 워크플로를 실행하세요. 파괴적인 파일 작업 전에는 일시 중지하세요.
대규모 스웜 롤아웃 맞춤화
이 스킬을 사용해 대규모 기능을 위한 병렬 실행 계획을 설계하세요. 병렬 에이전트 수를 프로젝트 용량에 맞게 제한하고, 주요 경로 작업을 식별하며, Loop 3 핸드오프 기준을 정의하세요.
모범 사례
- 에이전트가 파일을 편집하도록 허용하기 전에 생성된 할당 매트릭스를 검토하세요.
- 버전 관리 체크포인트가 있는 샌드박스 작업공간에서 워크플로를 실행하세요.
- 프롬프트나 셸 명령에 주입하기 전에 모든 아티팩트 입력을 검증하세요.
피하기
- 멀티 에이전트 조율이 필요하지 않은 사소한 단일 파일 편집에는 이 워크플로를 사용하지 마세요.
- 검토 없이 신뢰할 수 없는 아티팩트에 대해 생성된 셸 스니펫을 실행하지 마세요.
- 테스트 증거를 검사하지 않고 주장된 통과율이나 theater 점수를 증거로 간주하지 마세요.
자주 묻는 질문
이 스킬은 무엇을 하나요?
계획된 작업을 에이전트에 할당하고, 검증을 실행하며, 전달 패키지를 준비하는 Loop 2 구현 워크플로를 정의합니다.
이 스킬이 자체적으로 프로덕션 코드를 생성하나요?
아니요. 에이전트 조율을 안내하고 예시 명령을 포함하지만, 실제 코드 변경은 선택된 에이전트와 프로젝트 컨텍스트에 따라 달라집니다.
어떤 입력을 예상하나요?
.claude 아티팩트 디렉터리 아래의 Loop 1 계획 패키지와 관련 아티팩트를 예상합니다.
어떤 도구를 가정하나요?
jq, npm, node, claude-flow와 Task 스타일 위임을 지원하는 에이전트 런타임 같은 도구를 가정합니다.
실행 전에 무엇을 검토해야 하나요?
사용자는 실행 전에 셸 명령, 아티팩트 경로, 생성된 지침, 외부 패키지 사용 여부를 검토해야 합니다.
민감한 리포지토리에 적합한가요?
주의해서 사용하세요. 이 워크플로는 숨김 아티팩트를 읽고 쓰며, 아티팩트 콘텐츠를 에이전트 프롬프트와 외부 도구에 전달할 수 있습니다.
개발자 세부 정보
작성자
DNYoussef라이선스
MIT
Skillstore 리비전
r1
버전 안내
작성자가 버전을 선언하지 않았습니다.
참조
c579efd02184f1128d6741d16e6c8d951d7d4208
유지보수 최신성
2026. 7. 18.
사용량
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