All 24 static findings are false positives involving Markdown formatting, documented CLI usage, expected authentication checks, reference links, or report filtering. No evidence found of credential exfiltration, system reconnaissance, or prompt injection; the source explicitly rejects instructions embedded in collected data. This review covers SKILL.md only, not the external package implementation or its runtime network behavior.
The skill instructs users to execute a pinned third-party package and optionally provide a service credential. The package implementation was not included in the reviewed file, so its behavior and credential handling remain unverified. Other flagged backticks, links, credential-path checks, and reconnaissance patterns are benign in context.
3. Check an AIsa key is available: `AISA_API_KEY`, or the AIsa CLI logged in (`ls ~/.aisa/key`). Wit
The workflow uses an API key or local login to run an external package. The package implementation was not reviewed, so credential handling cannot be verified.
Most alerts match Markdown formatting, documented authentication checks, or report fields rather than dangerous behavior. The fallback setup clones an unpinned external repository and subsequently executes its Python module, creating a supply-chain risk. No evidence found of credential exfiltration or prompt injection in SKILL.md; the external implementation was not included for review.
1. Find the radar. Use `$NEW_TERM_RADAR_DIR` if set, else `~/new-term-radar`. If neither exists, clo
Setup clones a mutable repository without a pinned revision, then directs commands to run there. The subsequent Python invocation executes unaudited external code.
1. Find the radar. Use `$NEW_TERM_RADAR_DIR` if set, else `~/new-term-radar`. If neither exists, clo
The GitHub URL supplies executable code through an unpinned clone, followed by local execution. The risk is dependency integrity, not demonstrated maliciousness of GitHub.