Compétences parallel-swarm-implementation
📦
parallel-swarm-implementation
Révision du contenu r1 Risque élevé ⚙️ Commandes externes📁 Accès au système de fichiers
Coordonner l’implémentation d’un essaim parallèle
Les plans d’implémentation complexes sont difficiles à attribuer, valider et intégrer entre de nombreux agents. Cette skill fournit un workflow Loop 2 structuré pour la sélection des agents, l’exécution parallèle, les tests et le packaging de livraison.
Prend en charge: Claude Codex Code(CC)
Arrêtez-vous et demandez confirmation avant l’installation.
Examinez le plan et obtenez le consentement explicite de l’utilisateur avant de modifier des fichiers.
Installer avec mon Agent
Copiez cette demande dans votre Agent. Elle contient la page Skill de référence et le manifeste.
Demande d’agent
Review the Skillstore skill "parallel-swarm-implementation" from https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.Votre Agent doit toujours présenter son plan et demander toute confirmation exigée par la politique de sécurité.
Ressources lisibles par les agents
Utilisez ces liens lorsqu’un Agent IA, un crawler ou un script a besoin d’un contexte propre au lieu de lire toute la page.
Tester
Utilisation de « parallel-swarm-implementation ». Un package Loop 1 pour une fonctionnalité d’authentification.
Résultat attendu:
Un plan d’affectation concis avec des tâches backend, de test, de documentation, de validation et d’intégration regroupées par ordre de dépendance.
Utilisation de « parallel-swarm-implementation ». Une implémentation multi-agent partiellement terminée avec des tests en échec.
Résultat attendu:
Un résumé de l’état d’intégration qui nomme les zones en échec, attribue la responsabilité des réparations et définit le prochain passage de validation.
Utilisation de « parallel-swarm-implementation ». Une implémentation terminée prête pour une revue CI/CD.
Résultat attendu:
Un résumé de livraison avec les métriques d’implémentation, les résultats de validation de théâtre, l’état des tests et la préparation Loop 3.
Audit de sécurité
Risque élevév8 • 05/07/2026 Ouvrir le rapport versionné
Most static backtick detections are Markdown formatting false positives, but the skill does include real agent-facing shell execution, hidden artifact access, and filesystem writes. The highest concerns are mutable npx claude-flow@alpha usage and unsanitized artifact content being promoted into downstream agent prompts. No explicit prompt-injection attack text was found in SKILL.md.
2
Fichiers analysés
960
Lignes analysées
52
Éléments à examiner
0
Faux positifs ignorés
Préoccupations de sécurité confirmées (3)
Élevé
Unpinned External CLI Execution
The skill instructs users or agents to run npx claude-flow@alpha commands. The alpha tag is mutable and can execute package code from outside the repository when npx resolves or updates the dependency.
Multiple explicit npx claude-flow@alpha commands appear in operational workflow steps. The security impact depends on the runtime environment, but the mutable external package execution risk is clear.
Élevé
Unsanitized Artifact Content Promoted To Agent Instructions
The workflow reads planning and assignment artifacts, then inserts fields such as task descriptions, research, risk mitigations, and fix instructions directly into delegated agent prompts. A malicious or corrupted artifact could inject instructions into downstream agents.
The cited lines show generated artifact values being read and passed into Task prompts without validation or quoting rules. This is a strong prompt-injection pathway, although exploitation requires control over those artifacts.
Moyen
Automatic Downstream Skill Transition
The skill directs an automatic transition to cicd-intelligent-recovery after Loop 2 completes. This can extend execution into another skill and toolchain without an explicit review checkpoint in the documented workflow.
The text explicitly says to automatically transition and provides the downstream skill invocation context. The risk is procedural rather than direct code execution, so confidence is moderate-high.
Éléments d’évaluation des capacités (52)
Il s’agit de capacités locales réelles qui peuvent être attendues pour cette compétence ; elles nécessitent donc un examen, mais ne sont pas comptabilisées comme comportement malveillant confirmé.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
TOTAL_GROUPS=$(jq '.parallelGroups | length' "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
for GROUP_NUM in $(seq 1 $TOTAL_GROUPS); do
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
TASKS=$(jq -r ".parallelGroups[$((GROUP_NUM-1))].tasks[]" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
AGENT=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .assignedAgent" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
SKILL=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .useSkill" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .customInstructions" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
PRIORITY=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .priority" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
- Research: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
- Risk Mitigation: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigation" "$MAT
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
- Check dependencies complete: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
"Task: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .description" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
- Research findings: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
- Risk mitigations to apply: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigat
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
- Wait for dependencies if any: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Moyen
Shell command substitution
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
Moyen
Template literal with command substitution
`MISSION: Compile Loop 1 planning package into executable agent+skill graph.
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Moyen
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Moyen
Template literal with command substitution
```javascript
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Moyen
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Moyen
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Moyen
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
Moyen
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
Moyen
Node.js fs operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The Node snippet calls fs.writeFileSync to write the Loop 2 delivery package into the workspace. This is a real filesystem write and can overwrite generated artifact state.
Moyen
Synchronous file operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The synchronous write is used to create or replace a hidden delivery artifact. It is bounded to the project artifact directory, but it is still a real local file modification.
Moyen
Hidden file access
test -f .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json && echo "✅ Loop 1 Complete" || {
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
- Load planning package: .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
The skill references hidden .claude artifact state in an operational context. This is legitimate for the workflow but remains a real filesystem risk factor.
Moyen
Hidden file access
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
Create .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json:
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Moyen
Hidden file access
1. Store matrix: .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Moyen
Hidden file access
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
**Output**: `.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json` with complete agent+skill graph
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Moyen
Hidden file access
MATRIX=".claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json"
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
"Wait for all 5 detection agents. Apply Byzantine consensus: require 4/5 agreement on theater detect
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Moyen
Hidden file access
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
npm test 2>&1 | tee .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
1. Parse test output: .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Moyen
Hidden file access
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
const matrix = require('.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json');
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
'.claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json',
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Moyen
Hidden file access
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
Load implementation data from: .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Moyen
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.json > tmp.json && mv tmp.json .claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.j
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Moyen
Hidden file access
}' .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Facteurs de risque
⚙️ Commandes externes (69)
SKILL.md:35 SKILL.md:60-81 SKILL.md:81-85 SKILL.md:85-109 SKILL.md:109-117 SKILL.md:117-131 SKILL.md:131-143 SKILL.md:143-145 SKILL.md:145-151 SKILL.md:246-248 SKILL.md:248-258 SKILL.md:258-270 SKILL.md:270-273 SKILL.md:273-332 SKILL.md:332-336 SKILL.md:336-348 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:437-448 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:490-501 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:557-565 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:633-641 SKILL.md:641-645 SKILL.md:645-678 SKILL.md:678-710 SKILL.md:710-721 SKILL.md:721-728 SKILL.md:728-735 SKILL.md:735-738 SKILL.md:738-745 SKILL.md:745-750 SKILL.md:750-767 SKILL.md:767-775 SKILL.md:775-785 SKILL.md:785-786 SKILL.md:786-787 SKILL.md:787-788 SKILL.md:788-789 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:356 SKILL.md:358 SKILL.md:362 SKILL.md:368 SKILL.md:369 SKILL.md:370 SKILL.md:371 SKILL.md:380 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:388 SKILL.md:396 SKILL.md:402 SKILL.md:403 SKILL.md:409 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:548 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:151-246 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:349 SKILL.md:502
📁 Accès au système de fichiers (26)
SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:63 SKILL.md:91 SKILL.md:119 SKILL.md:130 SKILL.md:154 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:191 SKILL.md:242 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:336 SKILL.md:353 SKILL.md:478 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:512 SKILL.md:525 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:587 SKILL.md:621 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:643 SKILL.md:724 SKILL.md:774
Audité par: codex Voir l’historique des audits →
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Citation APA
DNYoussef. (2026). parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8Citation BibTeX
@techreport{dnyoussef-dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation-2026,
author = {DNYoussef},
title = {parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {8},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "DNYoussef"
date-released: "2026-07-05"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation:audit:8"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Score Skillstore
Pourquoi ce score Niveau de confiance des preuves: Moyen 55
Architecture
85
Maintenabilité
87
Contenu
71
Communauté
74
Conformité aux spécifications
Ce que vous pouvez créer
Développement de fonctionnalité basé sur un plan
Utiliser un package de planification validé pour répartir le travail d’implémentation, de test, de documentation et de validation entre des agents spécialisés.
Point de contrôle qualité axé sur la réalité
Exécuter la détection de théâtre, la validation en sandbox et les contrôles d’intégration avant de marquer comme terminée une implémentation complexe par agents.
Préparation de livraison Loop 3
Créer un package de livraison qui consigne les choix d’agents, les métriques d’implémentation et les données de transfert pour la récupération CI/CD.
Essayez ces prompts
Démarrer l’implémentation Loop 2
Utilisez parallel-swarm-implementation avec mon package de planification Loop 1. Créez la matrice d’affectation des agents et des skills, puis affichez les groupes d’exécution proposés avant de lancer le travail.
Créer uniquement la matrice d’affectation
Analysez le package Loop 1 et construisez uniquement la matrice des agents et des skills. Incluez les responsables de tâches, les dépendances, les choix de skills et les points de contrôle de validation.
Exécuter avec validation prioritaire
Exécutez le workflow d’implémentation avec une détection de théâtre stricte, une validation en sandbox et une réparation itérative des tests. Mettez en pause avant toute opération destructive sur les fichiers.
Personnaliser un déploiement avec grand essaim
Utilisez la skill pour concevoir un plan d’exécution parallèle pour une grande fonctionnalité. Limitez les agents parallèles à la capacité du projet, identifiez les tâches du chemin critique et définissez les critères de transfert Loop 3.
Bonnes pratiques
- Examiner la matrice d’affectation générée avant d’autoriser les agents à modifier des fichiers.
- Exécuter le workflow dans un espace de travail sandboxé avec des points de contrôle de contrôle de version.
- Valider toutes les entrées d’artefacts avant de les injecter dans des prompts ou des commandes shell.
Éviter
- Ne pas utiliser le workflow pour de simples modifications d’un seul fichier qui ne nécessitent pas de coordination multi-agent.
- Ne pas exécuter des snippets shell générés sur des artefacts non fiables sans revue préalable.
- Ne pas considérer les taux de réussite déclarés ou les scores de théâtre comme des preuves sans inspecter les éléments probants des tests.
Foire aux questions
Que fait cette skill ?
Elle définit un workflow d’implémentation Loop 2 qui attribue le travail planifié aux agents, exécute la validation et prépare un package de livraison.
Crée-t-elle du code de production par elle-même ?
Non. Elle guide la coordination des agents et inclut des commandes d’exemple, mais les modifications de code réelles dépendent des agents sélectionnés et du contexte du projet.
Quelle entrée attend-elle ?
Elle attend un package de planification Loop 1 et les artefacts associés sous le répertoire d’artefacts .claude.
Quels outils suppose-t-elle ?
Elle suppose des outils tels que jq, npm, node, claude-flow et un runtime d’agents prenant en charge la délégation de type Task.
Que doivent examiner les utilisateurs avant de l’exécuter ?
Les utilisateurs doivent examiner les commandes shell, les chemins d’artefacts, les instructions générées et toute utilisation de packages externes avant l’exécution.
Est-elle adaptée aux dépôts sensibles ?
Faites preuve de prudence. Le workflow lit et écrit des artefacts cachés et peut transmettre le contenu d’artefacts dans des prompts d’agents et des outils externes.
Détails du développeur
Auteur
DNYoussefLicence
MIT
Révision Skillstore
r1
Avis de version
L’auteur n’a déclaré aucune version.
Réf
c579efd02184f1128d6741d16e6c8d951d7d4208
Récence de maintenance
23/07/2026
Utilisation
5 téléchargements · 276 vues
Structure de fichiers