📦

cc-pr-review-ci

Name: cc-pr-review-ci
Author: adrianbrowning

Révision du contenu r1 Risque élevé ⚙️ Commandes externes📁 Accès au système de fichiers🔑 Variables d’environnement

Review TypeScript and React Pull Requests

Pull request reviews can miss issues across security, tests, performance, and maintenance. This skill organizes twelve review domains and prepares findings for GitHub comments.

Prend en charge: Claude Codex Code(CC)

⚠️ 38 Médiocre

Maintain this Skill? Claim it ⚠️ 38 Médiocre

Arrêtez-vous et demandez confirmation avant l’installation.

Examinez le plan et obtenez le consentement explicite de l’utilisateur avant de modifier des fichiers.

Installer avec mon Agent

Copiez cette demande dans votre Agent. Elle contient la page Skill de référence et le manifeste.

Demande d’agent

Review the Skillstore skill "cc-pr-review-ci" from https://skillstore.io/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.

Votre Agent doit toujours présenter son plan et demander toute confirmation exigée par la politique de sécurité.

Ressources lisibles par les agents

Utilisez ces liens lorsqu’un Agent IA, un crawler ou un script a besoin d’un contexte propre au lieu de lire toute la page.

Détail Markdown GET /skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci.md manifest signé GET /api/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci/manifest lockfile signé GET /api/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci/lockfile

Tester

Utilisation de « cc-pr-review-ci ». Review local changes that add tests with mocks returning the asserted values.

Résultat attendu:

High priority: A test asserts its mock output without exercising production behavior.
Suggested fix: Execute the production path and assert observable results.
Review decision: Approved with suggestions unless a critical issue is also found.

Utilisation de « cc-pr-review-ci ». Review a workflow supporting both pull requests and manual runs.

Résultat attendu:

High priority: Pull request fields are used during manual runs, where those fields are unavailable.
Suggested fix: Select valid metadata for each supported event.
The review artifact includes a finding identifier, location, explanation, and repair prompt.

Audit de sécurité

Risque élevé

v1 • 06/10/2026 Ouvrir le rapport versionné

Most static flags identify Markdown, JavaScript strings, legitimate credential use, or ordinary repository review operations. Confirmed risks include unvalidated shell interpolation and predictable temporary review input. Semantic findings identify unauthenticated finding suppression, marker-based dismissal of other reviewers, and approval binding to a potentially unreviewed head commit.

Fichiers analysés

1,310

Lignes analysées

Éléments à examiner

Faux positifs ignorés

Préoccupations de sécurité confirmées (3)

Élevé

SKILL.md:35-45 SKILL.md:75-77

Unauthenticated Dismissals Suppress Security Findings

Any negative reaction or human reply containing dismissal language qualifies without an authorization check. Matching findings are then skipped silently, allowing participants to hide unresolved issues.

Fetched replies omit author identity, and reactions are treated as counts. The explicit suppression rule cannot distinguish maintainer decisions from other participants.

Élevé

post-review.js:136-161 post-review.js:176-191

Spoofable Marker Permits Dismissal of Other Reviewers

Existing reviews are selected only by a body marker, without checking author identity. The script attempts dismissal before successfully posting a replacement, potentially removing legitimate blocking reviews.

The query selects review IDs solely by body text, and the retrieved state is ignored. Impact depends on the token having review dismissal permission.

Élevé

post-review.js:42-52 post-review.js:117-123 post-review.js:169-174

Approval Can Target an Unreviewed Head Commit

The script fetches the current PR head and attaches the earlier review artifact to that commit. A push between analysis and posting can receive approval without being reviewed.

The loaded artifact is not compared with an analyzed commit SHA. The API payload uses only the head fetched during posting.

Éléments d’évaluation des capacités (13)

Il s’agit de capacités locales réelles qui peuvent être attendues pour cette compétence ; elles nécessitent donc un examen, mais ne sont pas comptabilisées comme comportement malveillant confirmé.

Élevé

post-review.js:47

Synchronous process execution

execSync(

execSync runs a shell command containing unvalidated repository and PR environment values. Controlling those values permits command injection with inherited GitHub credentials.

Élevé

post-review.js:140

Synchronous process execution

execSync(

The review-list command interpolates unvalidated environment values into a shell. Shell metacharacters can execute additional commands if those values are attacker-controlled.

Élevé

post-review.js:150

Synchronous process execution

execSync(

The state query executes interpolated repository and PR values through a shell without validation. Environment input control creates a command injection path.

Élevé

post-review.js:154

Synchronous process execution

execSync(

The dismissal command includes unvalidated environment values in a shell string. An injected command runs within the credentialed posting process.

Élevé

post-review.js:177

Synchronous process execution

const result = execSync(

Passing review content through standard input is appropriate, but the command itself interpolates unvalidated environment values. Those values can inject shell commands.

Élevé

post-review.js:48

Ruby/shell backtick execution

`gh api repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER} --jq '{sha: .head.sha}'`,

This template literal is passed to execSync and contains unvalidated environment values. Shell execution makes injected metacharacters dangerous, unlike ordinary JavaScript strings.

Élevé

post-review.js:141-142

Ruby/shell backtick execution

`gh api repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/reviews ` +

This command fragment enters execSync with unvalidated repository and PR values. Attacker control of those environment values can inject shell commands.

Élevé

post-review.js:151-155

Ruby/shell backtick execution

`gh api repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/reviews/${reviewId} --jq '.state'`,

The state-query template literal enters execSync with unchecked environment values. Shell metacharacters in those values can execute additional commands.

Élevé

post-review.js:155-156

Ruby/shell backtick execution

`gh api repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/reviews/${reviewId}/dismissals ` +

The dismissal endpoint interpolates unchecked repository and PR values before shell execution. Input control can cause credentialed command injection.

Élevé

post-review.js:178-179

Ruby/shell backtick execution

`gh api repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/reviews ` +

The review-posting endpoint is built from unchecked environment values and passed to execSync. Shell injection remains possible despite safe standard-input payload handling.

Moyen

post-review.js:18

Temp directory access

const REVIEW_PATH = process.env.REVIEW_OUTPUT_PATH ?? "/tmp/review.json";

The default artifact path is predictable in a shared temporary directory, with no ownership or symlink checks. Shared-runner attackers could substitute review input.

Moyen

references/format.md:5

Temp directory access

**Never post comments directly.** Write `review.json` to the path given in `$REVIEW_OUTPUT_PATH` (de

The instructions default to a predictable shared temporary artifact path. Without private storage or symlink protection, another local process could replace or redirect it.

Moyen

SKILL.md:106

Temp directory access

- **PR run**: write to `$REVIEW_OUTPUT_PATH` (default `/tmp/review.json`)

The workflow instructs writing to a predictable shared temporary path by default. Shared hosts require private artifact storage to prevent substitution or symlink redirection.

Facteurs de risque

⚙️ Commandes externes (50)

post-review.js:16 post-review.js:47 post-review.js:140 post-review.js:150 post-review.js:154 post-review.js:177 post-review.js:38 post-review.js:48 post-review.js:73 post-review.js:74 post-review.js:75-80 post-review.js:80 post-review.js:85-86 post-review.js:86-87 post-review.js:87-88 post-review.js:88-89 post-review.js:89-91 post-review.js:91-92 post-review.js:92-126 post-review.js:126-128 post-review.js:128-129 post-review.js:129-130 post-review.js:130-131 post-review.js:131-132 post-review.js:132-133 post-review.js:133-141 post-review.js:141-142 post-review.js:142-151 post-review.js:151-155 post-review.js:155-156 post-review.js:156-178 post-review.js:178-179 post-review.js:179-184 SKILL.md:8 SKILL.md:10 SKILL.md:20-23 SKILL.md:23-27 SKILL.md:27-30 SKILL.md:30-34 SKILL.md:34-37 SKILL.md:37-39 SKILL.md:39 SKILL.md:42-45 SKILL.md:45 SKILL.md:49-53 SKILL.md:53-55 SKILL.md:55 SKILL.md:56 SKILL.md:57-58 SKILL.md:58-60

📁 Accès au système de fichiers (11)

post-review.js:15 post-review.js:36 post-review.js:3 post-review.js:18 references/devops.md:47 references/duplication.md:7 references/duplication.md:9 references/format.md:5 references/test-validity.md:11 references/testing.md:9 SKILL.md:106

🔑 Variables d’environnement (11)

post-review.js:18 post-review.js:19 post-review.js:20 post-review.js:21 post-review.js:18 post-review.js:19 post-review.js:20 post-review.js:21 post-review.js:4 post-review.js:19 post-review.js:25

Audité par: codex

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Badge Markdown

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Carte intégrable

<iframe src="https://skillstore.io/embed/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci.html" title="Skillstore Security Assessment" sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" width="420" height="180"></iframe>

Citations académiques (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

Citation APA

adrianbrowning. (2026). cc-pr-review-ci security audit report (audit version 1) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci/audits/1

Citation BibTeX

@techreport{adrianbrowning-adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci-2026,
  author = {adrianbrowning},
  title = {cc-pr-review-ci security audit report (audit version 1)},
  institution = {Skillstore},
  year = {2026},
  number = {1},
  url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci/audits/1},
  note = {Author version unspecified}
}

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "cc-pr-review-ci security audit report (audit version 1)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
  - name: "adrianbrowning"
date-released: "2026-10-06"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci/audits/1"
identifiers:
  - type: other
    value: "skillstore:adrianbrowning-cc-pr-review-ci:audit:1"
    description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

Score Skillstore

Pourquoi ce score Niveau de confiance des preuves: Moyen

Architecture

Maintenabilité

Contenu

Communauté

Conformité aux spécifications

Ce que vous pouvez créer

Check Changes Before Opening a Pull Request

Review local TypeScript and React changes against origin/main and inspect the structured results before requesting team feedback.

Prepare Consistent Repository Reviews

Use domain checklists to prepare actionable findings with stable identifiers and proposed fixes for human assessment.

Integrate Review Artifacts into CI

Separate AI review generation from credentialed posting after hardening the script and configuring permissions in an external workflow.

Essayez ces prompts

Review Local Changes

Review my current changes against origin/main using cc-pr-review-ci. Print the structured review locally and do not post comments.

Review a Pull Request

Review PR [number] across all twelve domains. Prepare the review artifact, report skipped domains, and leave GitHub posting to the separate script.

Validate Tests and CI

Review PR [number] across all domains, emphasizing test validity and CI permissions. State missing dependencies and explain each proposed fix.

Reassess a Changed Pull Request

Re-review PR [number] after recent commits. Verify authorized dismissals, reassess changed finding locations, and report suppressions for human approval before posting.

Bonnes pratiques

Harden and validate the posting script, bind artifacts to reviewed commits, and use private per-job artifact storage.
Keep AI review credentials read-only and grant the separate posting step only the GitHub permissions it requires.
Review findings and suppressions manually, and provide optional testing skills and duplication reports when those domains matter.

Éviter

Run the current posting script with untrusted environment values or a broadly privileged token.
Treat missing optional domains or AI approval as evidence that tests passed or security is guaranteed.
Accept arbitrary reactions as authorized dismissals or post an old review after the PR head changes.

Foire aux questions

What languages and frameworks does this skill target?

It targets TypeScript and React pull requests, with additional checklists for security, testing, CI, scope, documentation comments, and maintainability.

Can I use it without a pull request?

Yes. It compares changes against origin/main and prints the structured review to standard output.

Does the reviewing agent publish comments?

The instructions prohibit direct posting. A separate Node.js script uses GitHub CLI to publish the review; an external workflow must enforce permissions.

Does it execute tests or generate duplication reports?

Test validity review is static. Duplication review consumes an existing jscpd report rather than generating one.

Which optional skills are needed?

Test validity requires test-validity-review. Testing can use testing-best-practice, but retains a built-in checklist when that skill is unavailable.

Is the posting script ready for untrusted CI inputs?

No. Add shell-free execution, artifact validation, authorized dismissal checks, and reviewed-commit verification before using it with untrusted inputs.