Habilidades image-audit
📦
image-audit
v1.1.2 Revisión del contenido r1 Riesgo alto 🌐 Acceso a red📁 Acceso al sistema de archivos⚙️ Comandos externos🔑 Variables de entorno
Audit Images for Sensitive Content
Manual image review is slow and inconsistent. This skill compresses image batches, submits them to an MCP moderation service, and summarizes pass, blocked, and failed results.
Compatible con: Claude Codex Code(CC)
Detente y solicita confirmación antes de instalar.
Revisa el plan y obtén el consentimiento explícito del usuario antes de modificar archivos.
Instalar con mi Agente
Copia esta solicitud en tu Agente. Incluye la página canónica del Skill y el manifiesto.
Solicitud de agente
Review the Skillstore skill "image-audit" from https://skillstore.io/skills/xiaowu89-image-audit.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/xiaowu89-image-audit/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.Tu Agente debe seguir mostrando su plan y solicitar cualquier confirmación exigida por la política de seguridad.
Recursos legibles por agentes
Usa estos enlaces cuando un agente de IA, crawler o script necesite contexto limpio en vez de leer la página completa.
Pruébalo
Usando "image-audit". Audit one confirmed image after approving the external upload.
Resultado esperado:
Audit complete: product-front.jpg passed. The service returned no violation details.
Usando "image-audit". Audit a folder containing three supported images.
Resultado esperado:
- banner.jpg: passed
- profile.png: blocked, manual review required
- scan.webp: failed, service timeout
Usando "image-audit". Audit a batch with one unreadable file.
Resultado esperado:
Processed four files: two passed, one blocked, and one failed during compression. The failed file was not uploaded.
Auditoría de seguridad
Riesgo altov1 • 28/7/2026 Abrir el informe versionado
Most static command and reconnaissance findings are Markdown or JavaScript syntax false positives. Confirmed risks include secret exposure, global package installation, external image transfer, unsafe value interpolation, and unbounded image processing.
2
Archivos escaneados
294
Líneas analizadas
16
Elementos de revisión
0
Falsos positivos ignorados
Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (4)
Alto
Unescaped Values Embedded in Executable JavaScript
Image paths, the endpoint, and the API key replace single-quoted placeholders. A crafted value containing a quote can inject JavaScript into the heredoc.
The workflow explicitly requires direct placeholder replacement inside executable single-quoted JavaScript literals, with no escaping or structured argument passing.
Alto
Unbounded Image Processing Can Exhaust Memory
The script processes every matching file, disables Sharp pixel limits, and retains compressed data twice. Large batches or decompression bombs can exhaust memory.
The code has no file-count or byte limit, sets limitInputPixels to false, and stores each data URL in both records and data_urls.
Alto
Bulk Image Upload Without Explicit Transfer Consent
The workflow sends compressed local image contents to an external service. It does not require confirmation after naming the destination and selected files.
Both workflows direct the agent to encode local images and submit them externally, but neither requires informed confirmation immediately before transfer.
Medio
Localized Instructions Use Different Remote Endpoints
The Chinese and English files configure different hardcoded ModelScope endpoint identifiers. Users can send the same images to different service instances by language.
The endpoint strings visibly differ at the same configuration line in the two files, while both are presented as the nx-mcp-audit service.
Elementos de revisión de capacidades (16)
Estas son capacidades locales reales que pueden esperarse para esta habilidad, por lo que requieren revisión, pero no se cuentan como comportamiento malicioso confirmado.
Alto
Fetch API call
if(data_urls.length>0){const r3=await fetch(MCP_URL,{method:'POST',headers:H,body:JSON.stringify({js
This request sends compressed local images and the API key to the configured remote MCP endpoint. The data transfer creates privacy and credential exposure risk.
Alto
Hidden file in home directory
cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null || cat ~/.mcp.json 2>/dev/null
The command reads the complete project or home MCP configuration, which can expose unrelated service credentials and endpoints to the agent transcript.
Alto
Hidden file in home directory
- **有 Key**:帮用户创建 `~/.mcp.json`(用户家目录),全局和项目安装都通用
The skill directs the agent to create a persistent hidden configuration in the user's home directory. It gives no merge or overwrite protection.
Alto
Hidden file access
cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null || cat ~/.mcp.json 2>/dev/null
The command prints the complete hidden MCP configuration rather than parsing only this service entry. Other stored secrets can enter logs or model context.
Alto
Hidden file access
- **有 Key**:帮用户创建 `~/.mcp.json`(用户家目录),全局和项目安装都通用
The instructions authorize writing a hidden home configuration without preserving existing entries. This can persist secrets or damage unrelated MCP configuration.
Alto
Generic API/secret keys
查找顺序:项目根目录 → 用户家目录。提取 `url` → `MCP_URL`,`env.NX_API_KEY` → `API_KEY`。
The workflow explicitly extracts NX_API_KEY from project or home configuration. This moves a sensitive credential into agent-controlled processing.
Alto
Generic API/secret keys
- 找到 → 记录 `url` 和 `NX_API_KEY`,继续步骤 2
The agent is told to record the extracted API key for later use. Recording secrets can expose them in model context or execution logs.
Alto
Generic API/secret keys
替换 `PIC_DIR`、`MCP_URL`、`API_KEY` 后,heredoc 直接通过 stdin 喂给 node,**不写任何文件**:
The workflow substitutes the API key directly into an executable heredoc. This exposes the secret in generated command content and permits unsafe literal interpolation.
Alto
Generic API/secret keys
const API_KEY='<从.mcp.json读取的NX_API_KEY>';
The actual API key is inserted into a JavaScript string literal. It can be retained in command transcripts and is not protected by environment-based secret handling.
Alto
Generic API/secret keys
const H={'Content-Type':'application/json','Accept':'application/json, text/event-stream','Authoriza
The extracted secret is placed in an Authorization header for a configurable remote endpoint. Compromised configuration could disclose the credential.
Alto
Generic API/secret keys
if(data_urls.length>0){const r3=await fetch(MCP_URL,{method:'POST',headers:H,body:JSON.stringify({js
The API key is sent in the request body together with local image data. The remote service receives the credential beyond the Authorization header.
Medio
Shell command substitution
NODE_PATH=$(npm root -g) node -e "require('sharp')" 2>/dev/null || npm install -g sharp
This command resolves a global npm path and automatically installs an unpinned package globally. It changes the host environment and introduces supply-chain risk.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
"url": "https://mcp.api-inference.modelscope.net/274be9de7fd649/mcp"
The instructions configure a fixed external ModelScope MCP endpoint. Images submitted through this configuration leave the local environment.
Bajo
Fetch API call
const r1=await fetch(MCP_URL,{method:'POST',headers:H,body:JSON.stringify({jsonrpc:'2.0',id:'1',meth
The script makes an outbound initialization request to the configured MCP endpoint. This is an intentional network side effect.
Bajo
Fetch API call
await fetch(MCP_URL,{method:'POST',headers:H,body:JSON.stringify({jsonrpc:'2.0',method:'notification
The script makes a second outbound MCP notification request. This is an intentional network side effect.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
"url": "https://mcp.api-inference.modelscope.net/da16b3f65bdb4e/mcp",
The configuration contains a fixed external ModelScope MCP endpoint. The later workflow sends user image data to this destination.
Factores de riesgo
🌐 Acceso a red (5)
📁 Acceso al sistema de archivos (12)
⚙️ Comandos externos (47)
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🔑 Variables de entorno (8)
Auditado por: codex
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Cita APA
xiaowu89. (2026). image-audit security audit report (audit version 1) [Author version 1.1.2]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/xiaowu89-image-audit/audits/1Cita BibTeX
@techreport{xiaowu89-xiaowu89-image-audit-2026,
author = {xiaowu89},
title = {image-audit security audit report (audit version 1)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {1},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/xiaowu89-image-audit/audits/1},
note = {Author version 1.1.2}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "image-audit security audit report (audit version 1)"
version: "1.1.2"
type: report
authors:
- name: "xiaowu89"
date-released: "2026-07-28"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/xiaowu89-image-audit/audits/1"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:xiaowu89-image-audit:audit:1"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Puntuación de Skillstore
Por qué esta puntuación Confianza de la evidencia: Medio 55
Arquitectura
100
Mantenibilidad
87
Contenido
65
Comunidad
91
Cumplimiento de la especificación
Lo que puedes crear
Review User Uploads
Screen a controlled batch of uploaded images before publication and identify items needing human review.
Check Product Assets
Audit local product images before release and summarize blocked or failed files for remediation.
Triage Media Libraries
Create a first-pass moderation report for a legacy image collection before detailed manual inspection.
Prueba estos prompts
Audit One Image
Audit the image at [path]. Show the external destination and ask for confirmation before uploading it.
Audit a Folder
Find supported images in [folder]. Report the file count, request upload confirmation, then return a moderation table.
Review Selected Files
Audit only these files: [file list]. Use batches of [size], retry failures once, and separate blocked results from service errors.
Run a Constrained Audit
Audit [folder] with a maximum of [count] files and [bytes] total input. Stop on limits and provide a manual-review queue.
Mejores prácticas
- Confirm the destination and selected files immediately before external transfer.
- Use small, bounded batches and enforce decoded-pixel and total-byte limits.
- Treat blocked results as review signals and inspect failures separately.
Evitar
- Do not print API keys or complete MCP configuration files.
- Do not upload private images without informed user approval.
- Do not treat automated moderation as a final legal or policy decision.
Preguntas frecuentes
What content can this skill detect?
The service reports adult, political, and violent content classifications.
Does processing remain local?
No. Compression is local, but compressed image data is sent to an external MCP service.
What setup is required?
You need Node.js 18 or later, Sharp, network access, the MCP service, and a valid API key.
Which image formats are supported?
The primary workflow lists PNG, JPEG, WebP, BMP, and TGA files.
Can it audit image URLs?
The English workflow supports URLs, but recommends downloading and submitting compressed data URLs.
Should blocked images be deleted automatically?
No. Review blocked images manually before removal because automated classifications can be incomplete or incorrect.