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Evaluación de seguridad versionada

ID del informe: SA-EBDFE608

7/23/2026, 5:55:12 PM

azure-cloud-migrate evaluación de seguridad v6

Informe de certificación de seguridad de la habilidad

Historial de auditorías
Versión del escáner 3.0.0 Modelo de auditoría: codex Último informe publicado
Nombre de la habilidad
azure-cloud-migrate
Versión
v0.0.0-placeholder
Mantenedor
microsoft
Fuente
github.com/microsoft/github-copilot-for-azure/tree/main/plugin/skills/azure-cloud-migrate/
Cobertura
32 Archivos escaneados · 4,622 Líneas analizadas
Versión de la política
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Gravedad máxima de hallazgo confirmada

Alto

9 hallazgos de seguridad confirmados requieren atención.

Contexto de instalación

Consulta la página actual de Skill

Esta página resume únicamente las pruebas del informe. La página de la Skill proporciona el aviso de instalación canónico.

Abrir la página actual de la habilidad

Este informe no bloquea ni autoriza el manifiesto ni el ZIP.

Most of the 400 presented findings are documentation false positives involving links, code fences, managed identity examples, and visible migration commands. Confirmed risks involve shared cloud keys, decoded secret transfer through CLI arguments, and local secret materialization. The 30 omitted static matches require manual review before publication. Static review was capped at 400/430 representative findings; omitted static matches are unconfirmed, so automatic publishing stays disabled until manual review.

Posición del informe

Último informe publicado

«Más reciente» se refiere a la secuencia del informe, no a la actualidad del artefacto.

Atestación de auditoría

Atestación activa

Hay una atestación pública disponible para este informe exacto.

Verificación humana

No verificado

No se ha registrado ninguna verificación humana para este informe.

Cobertura

32 Archivos escaneados · 4,622 Líneas analizadas

23 elementos mostrados para revisión

Limitaciones

Este informe no afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado y no prueba la ausencia de efectos secundarios.

Cadena de evidencias

Sigue la evidencia desde la vinculación del código fuente hasta el contrato de instalación. La evidencia disponible permite la verificación; no constituye una garantía de seguridad.

  1. Fuente

    Vinculado al commit y la ruta

  2. Artefacto

    Hashes de contenido y árbol vinculados

  3. Auditoría

    Completo

  4. Contrato de instalación

    Abrir el manifiesto para verificar

    Abrir el manifiesto

Capacidades observadas

Observado significa que este informe registró evidencia de respaldo. No registrado no prueba que una capacidad esté ausente.

Contiene scripts

Puede ejecutar código incluido con la habilidad.

Observado en 12 ubicaciones de evidencia

Acceso a red

Puede conectarse a servicios externos.

Observado en 23 ubicaciones de evidencia

Acceso al sistema de archivos

Puede leer o escribir archivos locales.

Observado en 7 ubicaciones de evidencia

Variables de entorno

Puede leer valores del entorno del proceso.

Observado en 33 ubicaciones de evidencia

Comandos externos

Puede invocar comandos o programas fuera de la habilidad.

Observado en 55 ubicaciones de evidencia

Elementos de revisión de capacidades (14)
Alto
references/services/container-apps/spring-deployment-guide.md:103
Database connection strings
read -s -p "Enter database password: " DB_PASSWORD
The example asks for a database password and writes it into a temporary file for Key Vault import. Cleanup is present, but the flow still materializes secret data locally.
Alto
references/services/container-apps/spring-deployment-guide.md:104
Database connection strings
echo -n "$DB_PASSWORD" > "$SECRET_FILE"
The example asks for a database password and writes it into a temporary file for Key Vault import. Cleanup is present, but the flow still materializes secret data locally.
Alto
references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:116
Shell command substitution
--value "$(gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=<secret-id> --project="$GCP_PROJECT")"
The line recommends or uses command-line secret transfer through az keyvault secret set --value. That can expose decoded secret material through process arguments, logs, or shell history.
Alto
references/services/container-apps/deployment-guide.md:91
Shell command substitution
az keyvault secret set --vault-name myapp-kv --name password --value "$(kubectl get secret mysecret
The line recommends or uses command-line secret transfer through az keyvault secret set --value. That can expose decoded secret material through process arguments, logs, or shell history.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/fargate-deployment-guide.md:144-146
Ruby/shell backtick execution
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id <secret-id> --region <region> `
The command extracts live AWS Secrets Manager values during migration. The guide uses cleanup controls, but the secret is still materialized in the local execution environment.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/spring-deployment-guide.md:83-85
Ruby/shell backtick execution
--azure-file-account-name "$STORAGE_ACCOUNT" --azure-file-account-key "$STORAGE_KEY" `
The line passes a retrieved cloud key as a command argument. This is a legitimate deployment pattern, but it increases the chance of secret exposure in local process or logging surfaces.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:55
Shell command substitution
LOG_KEY=$(az monitor log-analytics workspace get-shared-keys -g "$RG" -n "${RG}-logs" --query primar
The command retrieves cloud shared keys into shell variables. These keys are sensitive credentials and can be exposed through logs, history, or subsequent command arguments.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/deployment-guide.md:64
Shell command substitution
LOG_KEY=$(az monitor log-analytics workspace get-shared-keys --resource-group myapp-rg --workspace-n
The command retrieves cloud shared keys into shell variables. These keys are sensitive credentials and can be exposed through logs, history, or subsequent command arguments.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/fargate-deployment-guide.md:112
Shell command substitution
secret_file="$(mktemp)"
The temp file is created specifically for secret migration. Permissions and cleanup reduce exposure, but local secret materialization remains a security risk.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/spring-deployment-guide.md:12
Shell command substitution
LOG_KEY=$(az monitor log-analytics workspace get-shared-keys --resource-group spring-rg --workspace-
The command retrieves cloud shared keys into shell variables. These keys are sensitive credentials and can be exposed through logs, history, or subsequent command arguments.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/spring-deployment-guide.md:69
Shell command substitution
STORAGE_KEY=$(az storage account keys list --account-name "$STORAGE_ACCOUNT" --resource-group spring
The command retrieves cloud shared keys into shell variables. These keys are sensitive credentials and can be exposed through logs, history, or subsequent command arguments.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/spring-deployment-guide.md:101
Shell command substitution
SECRET_FILE=$(mktemp)
The temp file is created specifically for secret migration. Permissions and cleanup reduce exposure, but local secret materialization remains a security risk.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/fargate-deployment-guide.md:112
Temp file creation
secret_file="$(mktemp)"
The temp file is created specifically for secret migration. Permissions and cleanup reduce exposure, but local secret materialization remains a security risk.
Medio
references/services/container-apps/spring-deployment-guide.md:101
Temp file creation
SECRET_FILE=$(mktemp)
The temp file is created specifically for secret migration. Permissions and cleanup reduce exposure, but local secret materialization remains a security risk.

Hallazgos de riesgos

Las preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas están separadas de los elementos que aún deben revisarse.

Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (9)

RISK-001 Alto
references/services/container-apps/deployment-guide.md:82
System reconnaissance
> **Tip**: Prefer piping decoded secret values directly to `az keyvault secret set --value` to avoid
The line recommends or uses command-line secret transfer through az keyvault secret set --value. That can expose decoded secret material through process arguments, logs, or shell history.
RISK-002 Alto
references/services/container-apps/deployment-guide.md:21-22
Kubernetes Secrets Exported Into Workspace
The guide exports deployments, services, ingress, ConfigMaps, and Secret objects to all-resources.yaml. Base64-encoded Kubernetes secrets can remain recoverable in the workspace.
The command explicitly includes Secret objects in a YAML export file. This directly materializes sensitive values during migration.
RISK-003 Alto
references/services/container-apps/deployment-guide.md:89-91references/services/container-apps/deployment-guide.md:108-112references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:114-116references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:135-137
Decoded Secrets Passed Through CLI Arguments
Several examples pass decoded secrets to az keyvault secret set with --value. Process listings, command logging, terminal history, or shell history may expose them.
The cited examples retrieve decoded secret values and pass them as CLI arguments. The exposure risk is direct despite legitimate migration intent.
RISK-004 Medio
references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:57
System reconnaissance
--logs-workspace-id "$LOG_ID" --logs-workspace-key "$LOG_KEY"
The line passes a retrieved cloud key as a command argument. This is a legitimate deployment pattern, but it increases the chance of secret exposure in local process or logging surfaces.
RISK-005 Medio
references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:68
System reconnaissance
--logs-workspace-id $workspace.customerId --logs-workspace-key $keys.primarySharedKey
The line passes a retrieved cloud key as a command argument. This is a legitimate deployment pattern, but it increases the chance of secret exposure in local process or logging surfaces.
RISK-006 Medio
references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:81
System reconnaissance
--logs-workspace-id "$LOG_ID" --logs-workspace-key "$LOG_KEY" \
The line passes a retrieved cloud key as a command argument. This is a legitimate deployment pattern, but it increases the chance of secret exposure in local process or logging surfaces.
RISK-007 Medio
references/services/container-apps/cloudrun-deployment-guide.md:92
System reconnaissance
--logs-workspace-id $workspace.customerId --logs-workspace-key $keys.primarySharedKey `
The line passes a retrieved cloud key as a command argument. This is a legitimate deployment pattern, but it increases the chance of secret exposure in local process or logging surfaces.
RISK-008 Medio
references/services/container-apps/fargate-deployment-guide.md:114
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id <secret-id> --region <region> \
The command extracts live AWS Secrets Manager values during migration. The guide uses cleanup controls, but the secret is still materialized in the local execution environment.
RISK-009 Medio
references/services/container-apps/fargate-deployment-guide.md:144
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id <secret-id> --region <region> `
The command extracts live AWS Secrets Manager values during migration. The guide uses cleanup controls, but the secret is still materialized in the local execution environment.

Medidas correctivas

Esta auditoría registra correcciones sugeridas. Aplicarlas es responsabilidad de la persona encargada del mantenimiento.

  1. FIX-001
    Alto
    Decoded secrets are passed through az keyvault secret set --value in Kubernetes and Cloud Run migration examples.
    Use protected file input, stdin-safe tooling, or a manual step that avoids process arguments and shell history.
  2. FIX-002
    Alto
    Kubernetes exports include Secret objects in local YAML output.
    Exclude Secret objects by default, or export redacted metadata unless the user explicitly approves secret migration.
  3. FIX-003
    Medio
    Static review capped
    Manually review the omitted 30 static analyzer matches or reduce bundled generated/vendor/reference content before enabling automatic publication.
  4. FIX-004
    Medio
    Some deployment examples retrieve Log Analytics or storage account shared keys into shell variables.
    Prefer identity-based Azure Monitor and storage patterns. Mark shared-key fallbacks as sensitive manual operations.
  5. FIX-005
    Medio
    Temporary files store secrets during import flows.
    Keep restrictive permissions and cleanup. Warn users against running these steps in shared, recorded, or synchronized workspaces.

Evidencia experta

Identidad inmutable del sujeto, metadatos del escáner, coincidencias descartadas y evidencia a nivel de código fuente.

Sujeto del artefacto

Commit de Marketplace
ebdfe608f5de2b66ff37ab4af12af8ac4f5e8006
Hash del contenido
6749b6cbca0ddd1f7ac831b23d825d0a4437af755fd7068f8723621a68449488
Hash del árbol
fd334b4c8f2a88f6fd96bd57d60c5050e6e4b5802427229796f709bdc97fec3d
Ruta del Skill
skills/microsoft/azure-cloud-migrate
Hash de la carga de auditoría
dc2be770107a847125474a59f8202521

Metadatos del análisis

Modelo de auditoría: codex

Estado del análisis: Completo

El alcance se limita a los archivos, líneas, métodos y pruebas registrados. No se afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado.

Verificar y exportar

Informe JSON Atestación de auditoría firmada CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Manifiesto de instalación firmado Fuente

El manifiesto y el archivo de bloqueo vinculan los artefactos de instalación a hashes criptográficos. Esta afirmación de integridad es independiente de la evaluación de seguridad.

Atestación de auditoría: active