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Evaluación de seguridad versionada

ID del informe: SA-3EE932E6

7/5/2026, 6:12:20 PM

home-assistant-manager evaluación de seguridad v7

Informe de certificación de seguridad de la habilidad

Historial de auditorías
Modelo de auditoría: codex Informe histórico
Nombre de la habilidad
home-assistant-manager
Versión
v7
Mantenedor
komal-SkyNET
Cobertura
3 Archivos escaneados · 1,023 Líneas analizadas
Versión de la política
No disponible

Gravedad máxima de hallazgo confirmada

Alto

2 hallazgos de seguridad confirmados requieren atención.

Contexto de instalación

Evidencia histórica

Este informe podría no describir el artefacto instalable actualmente. Abra la página actual de la Skill para obtener orientación de instalación.

Abrir la página actual de la habilidad

Este informe no bloquea ni autoriza el manifiesto ni el ZIP.

The package is a Markdown skill with a supporting dashboard image and no prompt injection text found in the reviewed files. Many static matches are Markdown formatting or documentation placeholders, but the skill intentionally guides agents through SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, and Home Assistant restart workflows. This should require explicit command review, scoped credentials, and careful handling of Home Assistant storage files.

Posición del informe

Informe histórico

Abra el historial de auditorías antes de usar este informe para instalar.

Atestación de auditoría

No se puede certificar

La vinculación inmutable requerida está incompleta.

Verificación humana

No verificado

No se ha registrado ninguna verificación humana para este informe.

Cobertura

3 Archivos escaneados · 1,023 Líneas analizadas

35 elementos mostrados para revisión

Limitaciones

Este informe no afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado y no prueba la ausencia de efectos secundarios.

Cadena de evidencias

Sigue la evidencia desde la vinculación del código fuente hasta el contrato de instalación. La evidencia disponible permite la verificación; no constituye una garantía de seguridad.

  1. Fuente

    Vinculación no disponible

  2. Artefacto

    Identidad incompleta

  3. Auditoría

    Completo

  4. Contrato de instalación

    Abrir el manifiesto para verificar

    Abrir el manifiesto

Capacidades observadas

Observado significa que este informe registró evidencia de respaldo. No registrado no prueba que una capacidad esté ausente.

Contiene scripts

Puede ejecutar código incluido con la habilidad.

No registrado por esta auditoría

Acceso a red

Puede conectarse a servicios externos.

Observado en 3 ubicaciones de evidencia

Acceso al sistema de archivos

Puede leer o escribir archivos locales.

Observado en 7 ubicaciones de evidencia

Variables de entorno

Puede leer valores del entorno del proceso.

Observado en 1 ubicación de evidencia

Comandos externos

Puede invocar comandos o programas fuera de la habilidad.

Observado en 88 ubicaciones de evidencia

Elementos de revisión de capacidades (33)
Alto
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding workflow instructs agents to use SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, or Home Assistant restart operations against a live instance. These commands can modify configuration or disrupt service if run without review.
Alto
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding workflow instructs agents to use SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, or Home Assistant restart operations against a live instance. These commands can modify configuration or disrupt service if run without review.
Alto
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding workflow instructs agents to use SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, or Home Assistant restart operations against a live instance. These commands can modify configuration or disrupt service if run without review.
Alto
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding workflow instructs agents to use SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, or Home Assistant restart operations against a live instance. These commands can modify configuration or disrupt service if run without review.
Alto
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding workflow instructs agents to use SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, or Home Assistant restart operations against a live instance. These commands can modify configuration or disrupt service if run without review.
Alto
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding workflow instructs agents to use SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, or Home Assistant restart operations against a live instance. These commands can modify configuration or disrupt service if run without review.
Alto
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding workflow instructs agents to use SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, or Home Assistant restart operations against a live instance. These commands can modify configuration or disrupt service if run without review.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Use `scp` for quick testing before committing:
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- ✅ Automations: `hass-cli service call automation.reload`
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- ✅ Scripts: `hass-cli service call script.reload`
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- ✅ Scenes: `hass-cli service call scene.reload`
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- ✅ Template entities: `hass-cli service call template.reload`
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- ✅ Groups: `hass-cli service call group.reload`
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- ✅ Themes: `hass-cli service call frontend.reload_themes`
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The flagged range includes local validation or workflow command references. The commands are expected and low-impact, but still require user review before execution.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The surrounding text contains hass-cli or SSH command examples for querying state, reloading services, triggering automations, or reading logs. These are legitimate management actions but carry operational and privacy risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The flagged range includes local validation or workflow command references. The commands are expected and low-impact, but still require user review before execution.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
1. **Always check configuration** before restart: `ha core check`
The flagged range includes local validation or workflow command references. The commands are expected and low-impact, but still require user review before execution.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The flagged range includes local validation or workflow command references. The commands are expected and low-impact, but still require user review before execution.
Medio
Hidden file access
scp .storage/lovelace.control_center root@homeassistant.local:/config/.storage/
The workflow copies dashboard files into Home Assistant internal .storage paths over scp. Editing this hidden storage area can corrupt dashboards or expose configuration if mishandled.
Medio
Hidden file access
scp .storage/lovelace.new_dashboard root@homeassistant.local:/config/.storage/
The workflow copies dashboard files into Home Assistant internal .storage paths over scp. Editing this hidden storage area can corrupt dashboards or expose configuration if mishandled.
Medio
Hidden file access
scp .storage/lovelace_dashboards root@homeassistant.local:/config/.storage/
The workflow copies dashboard files into Home Assistant internal .storage paths over scp. Editing this hidden storage area can corrupt dashboards or expose configuration if mishandled.
Medio
Hidden file access
scp .storage/lovelace.my_dashboard root@homeassistant.local:/config/.storage/
The workflow copies dashboard files into Home Assistant internal .storage paths over scp. Editing this hidden storage area can corrupt dashboards or expose configuration if mishandled.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
curl -L https://github.com/komal-SkyNET/claude-skill-homeassistant/archive/main.tar.gz | tar xz --st
The README downloads the skill archive over HTTPS and extracts it without a pinned checksum. This is expected installation guidance, but it is a supply-chain risk if the source changes or is compromised.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
claude mcp add --transport http context7 https://mcp.context7.com/mcp \
The README configures an optional external Context7 MCP HTTP endpoint. This is disclosed documentation access, but it still sends requests to a third-party service.

Hallazgos de riesgos

Las preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas están separadas de los elementos que aún deben revisarse.

Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (2)

RISK-001 Alto
Privileged Home Assistant Control Workflow
The skill directs agents to use root SSH, scp, hass-cli, git pull, and Home Assistant restart or reload operations. These actions can change live smart home configuration, expose logs, or disrupt devices if run without explicit review.
Multiple reviewed workflows explicitly use root SSH, scp, git pull, hass-cli service calls, and restart commands. The purpose is legitimate management, but the granted operational authority is broad.
RISK-002 Medio
Plaintext Token Setup Guidance
The README suggests exporting HASS_TOKEN in shell startup files and passing a Context7 API key in a CLI header. These examples may expose user-provided credentials through readable profiles, terminal history, or process listings.
The examples contain placeholders, not embedded secrets, but they document credential handling patterns that can leak real tokens. The cited lines are setup instructions users are expected to follow.

Medidas correctivas

Esta auditoría registra correcciones sugeridas. Aplicarlas es responsabilidad de la persona encargada del mantenimiento.

  1. FIX-001
    Alto
    Privileged remote command workflows
    Require explicit user confirmation before any SSH, scp, git, hass-cli, reload, or restart command is executed.
  2. FIX-002
    Alto
    Root SSH examples
    Prefer least-privilege Home Assistant access where possible and clearly warn users before commands target root@homeassistant.local.
  3. FIX-003
    Medio
    Direct .storage dashboard edits
    Add backup, syntax validation, and rollback steps before copying files into Home Assistant .storage paths.
  4. FIX-004
    Medio
    Credential setup guidance
    Recommend a secret manager or protected environment file, and avoid placing tokens in shell history or command-line headers.
  5. FIX-005
    Bajo
    Unpinned archive download
    Pin installation instructions to a release tag or commit and document checksum verification for downloaded archives.

Evidencia experta

Identidad inmutable del sujeto, metadatos del escáner, coincidencias descartadas y evidencia a nivel de código fuente.

Sujeto del artefacto

Commit de Marketplace
No disponible
Hash del contenido
No disponible
Hash del árbol
No disponible
Ruta del Skill
No disponible
Hash de la carga de auditoría
No disponible

Metadatos del análisis

Modelo de auditoría: codex

Estado del análisis: Completo

El alcance se limita a los archivos, líneas, métodos y pruebas registrados. No se afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado.

Verificar y exportar

El manifiesto y el archivo de bloqueo vinculan los artefactos de instalación a hashes criptográficos. Esta afirmación de integridad es independiente de la evaluación de seguridad.

Atestación de auditoría: not_attestable