Habilidades p-image Historial de auditorías
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Historial de auditorías

p-image - 5 auditorías

Comparación de versiones

Cambios de capacidades y hallazgos entre versiones auditadas, primero las más recientes.

VersiónFechaResultadoElementos de revisiónCambio vs anterior
v5 Más reciente6 ago 2026, 10:46 2 confirmado4Sin cambios de capacidad
v4 5 jul 2026, 16:02 1 confirmado12Sin cambios de capacidad
v3 5 jul 2026, 16:02 1 confirmado12Sin cambios de capacidad
v2 30 jun 2026, 04:06 2 confirmado0Sin cambios de capacidad
v1 15 mar 2026, 08:17 Sin hallazgos confirmados0Base

6 ago 2026, 10:46

Most static detections are Markdown backticks, fenced examples, or documentation links and are false positives. Unpinned skill installation commands and remote image loading remain real risks. The command templates also require safeguards against shell injection and disclosure of sensitive prompts or image URLs.

1
Archivos escaneados
141
Líneas analizadas
8
Elementos de revisión
0
Falsos positivos ignorados

Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (2)

Alto
Shell Injection Through Prompt Interpolation
Examples place prompts and image URLs inside single-quoted shell arguments. Unescaped user input can terminate quoting and append commands.
The examples establish a repeatable shell template where user-supplied prompts or URLs replace literals. Single quotes inside those values would break the shown quoting boundary.
Medio
Remote Submission of User Content
The belt commands send prompts and referenced image URLs to hosted Pruna applications, potentially exposing sensitive content to an external service.
The skill states that belt uses inference.sh and the commands submit prompts and image references to hosted app identifiers. Remote processing is the documented purpose.
Elementos de revisión de capacidades (4)

Estas son capacidades locales reales que pueden esperarse para esta habilidad, por lo que requieren revisión, pero no se cuentan como comportamiento malicioso confirmado.

Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
> **Install the belt CLI skill:** `npx skills add belt-sh/cli`
Line 7 directs users to run an unpinned npx installer that can download executable code and add a third-party skill. This creates a supply-chain risk.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block directs users to run several unpinned npx skill installers from remote repositories. Mutable dependencies can introduce unreviewed instructions or code.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
![P-Image Generation](https://cloud.inference.sh/app/files/u/4mg21r6ta37mpaz6ktzwtt8krr/01kkgym0yqys
The embedded Markdown image can trigger an automatic request to cloud.inference.sh when the skill is rendered. That request exposes viewer network metadata to the remote host.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
> Requires inference.sh CLI (`belt`). [Install instructions](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/infer
The installation link targets a mutable raw file on the main branch. Its instructions can change after review and influence users to execute new installation steps.
Auditado por: codex

5 jul 2026, 16:02

Most static external-command alerts were Markdown fences, model names, or option labels, and those were marked false positive. Confirmed issues are intentional infsh and npx command guidance, a remote embedded image, and third-party inference data transfer. No prompt injection attempt was found in SKILL.md.

1
Archivos escaneados
139
Líneas analizadas
15
Elementos de revisión
0
Falsos positivos ignorados

Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (1)

Medio
External inference service receives user inputs
The skill examples send prompts and image URL inputs through infsh app run commands to Pruna applications. Users may expose sensitive prompt text or private image locations to the inference service.
Multiple examples show infsh app run commands with prompt fields and image URL fields. This is expected functionality, but it is clear third-party data transfer.
Elementos de revisión de capacidades (12)

Estas son capacidades locales reales que pueden esperarse para esta habilidad, por lo que requieren revisión, pero no se cuentan como comportamiento malicioso confirmado.

Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
> Requires inference.sh CLI (`infsh`). Get installation instructions: `npx skills add inference-sh/s
Line 15 tells users to run an npx skill installation command and references the infsh CLI. This is documentation, but it still directs execution of external tooling.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution · 9 apariciones
```bash
The fenced block includes infsh login and infsh app run commands. These invoke an authenticated external CLI and can send prompts to a remote service.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The cited span includes inline guidance to run infsh app list. It is a low-complexity command, but it still invokes external CLI behavior.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
![P-Image Generation](https://cloud.inference.sh/app/files/u/4mg21r6ta37mpaz6ktzwtt8krr/01kkgym0yqys
The Markdown embeds a remote image from cloud.inference.sh. Rendering it may cause an external request and expose viewer metadata to that host.
Auditado por: codex

5 jul 2026, 16:02

Most static external-command alerts were Markdown fences, model names, or option labels, and those were marked false positive. Confirmed issues are intentional infsh and npx command guidance, a remote embedded image, and third-party inference data transfer. No prompt injection attempt was found in SKILL.md.

1
Archivos escaneados
139
Líneas analizadas
15
Elementos de revisión
0
Falsos positivos ignorados

Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (1)

Medio
External inference service receives user inputs
The skill examples send prompts and image URL inputs through infsh app run commands to Pruna applications. Users may expose sensitive prompt text or private image locations to the inference service.
Multiple examples show infsh app run commands with prompt fields and image URL fields. This is expected functionality, but it is clear third-party data transfer.
Elementos de revisión de capacidades (12)

Estas son capacidades locales reales que pueden esperarse para esta habilidad, por lo que requieren revisión, pero no se cuentan como comportamiento malicioso confirmado.

Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
> Requires inference.sh CLI (`infsh`). Get installation instructions: `npx skills add inference-sh/s
Line 15 tells users to run an npx skill installation command and references the infsh CLI. This is documentation, but it still directs execution of external tooling.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution · 9 apariciones
```bash
The fenced block includes infsh login and infsh app run commands. These invoke an authenticated external CLI and can send prompts to a remote service.
Medio
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The cited span includes inline guidance to run infsh app list. It is a low-complexity command, but it still invokes external CLI behavior.
Bajo
Hardcoded URL
![P-Image Generation](https://cloud.inference.sh/app/files/u/4mg21r6ta37mpaz6ktzwtt8krr/01kkgym0yqys
The Markdown embeds a remote image from cloud.inference.sh. Rendering it may cause an external request and expose viewer metadata to that host.
Auditado por: codex

30 jun 2026, 04:06

The static external command findings are confirmed as intentional CLI usage for the inference.sh service, not hidden malware. The network findings are expected for a cloud image-generation skill, while the weak cryptography findings appear to be false positives with no cryptographic operation shown.

1
Archivos escaneados
139
Líneas analizadas
4
Elementos de revisión
2
Falsos positivos ignorados

Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (2)

Medio
External Cloud CLI Invocation
The skill instructs the assistant to run inference.sh CLI commands for Pruna image models. This is the stated purpose of the skill, but it executes external commands and depends on a third-party cloud service.
The command examples are direct evidence of external CLI execution. The intent appears legitimate because every command targets the documented image-generation service.
Medio
User Image Data Sent to External Service
The editing examples pass remote image URLs to the Pruna image-editing app. This may disclose user image locations and prompts to inference.sh or the underlying model provider.
The examples explicitly include image URLs as input to a cloud model command. This is expected functionality, but it creates a real privacy consideration.
Falsos positivos estáticos ignorados (2)

Estas coincidencias estáticas fueron descartadas por la revisión semántica o coincidieron con tokens solo de esquema, por lo que se muestran por transparencia, pero no afectan la puntuación de calidad.

Bajo
Hardcoded Documentation and Example URLs
The hardcoded URLs point to inference.sh documentation, an example image, and placeholder user image URLs. No evidence found of credential exfiltration or suspicious destinations.
The URLs are visible documentation links and sample assets for the named provider. I did not find evidence that secrets or local data are transmitted to those links.
Bajo
Weak Cryptography Static Hits Are False Positives
The reported weak cryptography locations do not show hashing, encryption, or signature verification. They appear to be substring matches inside descriptive text.
Both cited lines contain product description or model preset text, not cryptographic code. There is no evidence of MD5, SHA-1, DES, or related weak algorithm use.

Patrones detectados

Shell Command Examples
Auditado por: codex

15 mar 2026, 08:17

Static analysis detected patterns in SKILL.md documentation file, but all findings are false positives. The file contains markdown documentation with code examples showing CLI usage for the inference.sh platform. Backtick characters are markdown formatting for code blocks, not actual shell execution. Hardcoded URLs are documentation links to inference.sh website. No executable code or malicious patterns exist in this skill.

1
Archivos escaneados
139
Líneas analizadas
2
Elementos de revisión
0
Falsos positivos ignorados
Auditado por: claude